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ABSTRACT 
 
 
INITIAL PUBLIC OFFERINGS TIMING: EVIDENCE FROM TURKEY 
 
Ozan Savaşkan 
Istanbul Bilgi University, 2007 
Supervisor: Oral Erdoğan 
 
 
The literature on Initial Public Offerings offers a wide variety of explanations to 
justify the dramatic swings in the volume and number of IPOs observed in the market. 
Although there are some studies about underpricing and aftermarket performance of 
IPOs, there is not enough research conducted about timing Turkish IPO market, Istanbul 
Stock Exchange. During this dissertation, the literature on IPO is examined and the 
results are compared to those reached in ISE. 
The study’s result concludes that, corresponding to timing, IPO market in Turkey 
has significant positive relationship with market level and initial returns of IPOs but 
negative relationship with risk variables, such as volatility in markets. No strong evidence 
of GDP growth and IPO market is reached, in contrast to expectations.   
 
Özet 
 
Birincil halka arzlarla ilgili literatür, halka arz sayı ve hasılatında gözlemlenen 
dalgalanma ile ilgili birçok yorum getirmektedir. Fakat düşük fiyatlandırma ve halka arz 
sonrası performans ile ilgili olarak birçok çalışma olmasına rağmen, Türkiye’deki birincil 
halka arzların zamanlaması ile ilgili olarak yeterince çalışma bulunmamaktadır. Bu 
çalışma boyunca, halka arzlara ilişkin literatür incelenmiş ve İstanbul Menkul Kıymetler 
Borsası’nda yapılan birincil halka arzlarla karşılaştırılmıştır. 
Bu çalışmanın sonuçlarına göre, zamanlamaya ilişkin olarak, birincil halka 
arzların piyasa seviyesi, halka arzların başlangıç getirisi ile pozitif ve anlamlı, risk 
değişkenleriyle, örneğin piyasadaki oynaklık ile negatif ve anlamlı ilişkisi vardır. 
Bununla beraber, yaygın inanışın aksine, ekonomik büyüme ile halka arz piyasası 
arasında anlamlı bir ilişkiye ulaşılmamıştır.   
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1. Introduction 
 
The literature on IPOs offers a wide variety of explanations to justify the dramatic 
swings in the volume of IPOs observed in the market. Many theories predict that hot IPO 
markets are characterized by clusters of firms in particular industries for which a 
technological innovation has occurred, suggesting that hot and cold market IPO firms will 
differ in quality, prospects, or types of business. Others suggest hot market IPOs are firms 
that take advantage of irrational investors. Some others argue that IPOs tend to be 
increase when markets are in their peaks or after some changes in economic and financial 
indicators, such as market return, volatility, GDP growth and etc. 
So, according to many researches, firms decide to go public not only by private 
motives but also according to market conditions or general economical environment; 
when these conditions are desirable, hot markets appear. 
Istanbul Stock Exchange, where 325 companies’ stocks are listed by 31.10.2006, 
is only stock exchange in Turkey founded in 1986. Although number of publicly traded 
firms is low as cannot be compared to New York Stock Exchange or NASDAQ, there are 
some researches made about IPOs in ISE. However these are almost about underpricing 
or aftermarket performance of newly issued firms’ stocks and there isn’t any research 
followed about timing of IPOs in ISE and the general economic’s and financial 
indicators’ effect on IPO decision of individual actors of capital markets. 
The purpose of this study is exploring the relation of IPOs and some indicators 
assumed to be essential about IPO timing. IPOs changes are analyzed in the light of 
regulations imposed by government or CMB, local authority in capital markets in Turkey. 
After introducing the simple model, graphics, correlation and regression analyses 
conducted are displayed in the empirical results part.  
In the first part of the study, for the entrance, the financing of firms are defined by 
Modigliani-Miller theorem. Then types of financing are determined and kinds of equity 
are specified and it is majored on IPOs for more detailed analysis. The essential 
phenomenons related to IPOs are also determined. At this part; most important 
anomalies; underpricing phenomenon, poor aftermarket performance of IPOs, hot issue 
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markets are explicated. Besides, asymmetric information, adverse selection and moral 
hazard problems are explained as some researchers argue that IPO timing is related to 
information difference between firms and potential investors. The reasons for these 
anomalies are also given during this part of the study. In addition, critical research 
solutions about these subjects and studies which make contribution to the literature are 
also explained.  
At the literature review part more specifically, important research results about 
IPO timing are represented and the main indicators found to be effective in IPO timing 
are determined from the studies conducted in other countries’ market, for the data 
analysis part and for making comparison with the results in Turkish IPO market. 
After introducing simple model, correlation and regression analysis conducted are 
represented in the data and methodology section. The economic, market level, risk and 
market return variables are used. It is expected to have strong positive relation between 
market level, initial return in IPOs and market return changes, strong negative relation 
between volatility in market and interest rates level or changes with hot IPO markets. The 
rumour is that GDP growth rate and IPO market has positive and high correlation. All 
these hypotheses are tested in empirical results part. 
The results are compared with the researches conducted before in different stock 
exchanges or different countries and the results with the special conditions of capital 
markets and general economic developments in Turkey are interpreted. 
On the other hand, the regulations imposed by CMB and important events in 
financial markets which can affect IPO market are also explored in details with possible 
effects, at the beginning of empirical results part.  
The data used during this study, covers the period of 1990-2006, since the data 
before 1990 is not proper for a healthy analysis.  
 
 
 
 
 
 2 
1.1 Financing in Firms 
 
The firms need some capital for growing, for financing some projects or for other 
motives. The question is whether this need will be fulfilled by debt or equity. This 
question’s response was investigated by many researchers, especially after Franco 
Modigliani and Merton Miller (M&M) theory in 1958. They had argued that the 
company’s value is independent of its capital structure. They had added that the 
company’s best capital structure is one that supports the operations and investments of 
the business. First of their irrelevance propositions was related to capital structure; second 
proposition was that the dividend payout doesn’t affect the value of the company. But it 
was the first proposition of these two that has always attracted most of the attention. 
Pagano (2005) indicates that M&M produced the dividend invariance proposition mainly 
to deflect criticisms of their first proposition. 
 The proof of the theory was also so easy: 
Proposition I: VU =VL 
where VU is the value of an unlevered firm = price of buying a firm composed only of 
equity, and VL is the value of a levered firm = price of buying a firm that is composed of 
some mix of debt and equity. 
To see why this should be true, it is supposed that an investor is considering 
buying one of the two firms Unlevered (U) or Levered (L). Instead of purchasing the 
shares of the levered firm L, he would purchase the shares of firm U and borrow the same 
amount of money B that firm L does. The eventual returns to either of these investments 
would be the same. Therefore the price of L must be the same as the price of U minus the 
money borrowed B, which is the value of L's debt. 
This discussion also clarifies the role of some of the theorem's assumptions. It is 
implicitly assumed that the investor's cost of borrowing money is the same as that of the 
firm, which doesn’t need to be true in the presence of asymmetric information or in the 
absence of efficient markets. 
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When it was proposed for the first time, the M&M leverage irrelevance 
proposition raised much controversy and attracted much criticism also for methodological 
reasons. However, when M&M set out to prove their first proposition, they could not yet 
count on the well developed equilibrium models of securities pricing that it is found 
today in every finance textbook. This explains why they based their proof on a more 
fundamental and at the same time on less demanding notion than that of competitive 
equilibrium: they went for an arbitrage argument.1  
The arbitrage pricing is very essential for pricing derivatives and this is in a step 
further than equilibrium models. This was another cause of being cornerstone in finance 
for M&M’s theorem, although it is not valid in real world, with the assumptions 
mentioned above. 
Proposition II: rS = r0 + B/S (r0 - rB) 
• rS is the cost of equity.  
• r0 is the cost of capital for an all equity firm.  
• rB is the cost of debt.  
• B / S is the debt-to-equity ratio.  
This proposition states that the cost of equity is a linear function of the firm's debt 
to equity ratio. A higher debt-to-equity ratio leads to a higher required return on equity, 
because of the higher risk involved for equity-holders in a company with debt. The 
formula is derived from the theory of weighted average cost of capital (WACC). 
  
The assumptions made for these propositions to be true were: 
9 No taxes exist,  
9 No transaction costs exist,  
9 The markets are frictionless, i.e., the markets are efficient and there is no 
asymmetric information,  
                                        
1 Marc PAGANO, 2005, Working Paper No: 139 Centers for Economics and Finance, The Modigliani-
Miller Theorems: A Cornerstone of Finance 
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9 No bankruptcy Risk. 
Too many critiques were made about the theory’s assumptions; such as the ones 
about taxes or agency cost as made by Jensen and Meckling (1976), about a company’s 
operating and investment decisions. Besides, its cash flows were not independent from its 
debt-equity ratio. The rise of stock options keeps managers focused on shareholder’s 
value, etc. 
About taxes, M&M published a correction paper in 1963; according to this paper, 
it was possible to create a value with debt in the case of taxes, it is tax shield. 
 
Proposition I: VL = VU + TCB 
• VL is the value of a levered firm.  
• VU is the value of an unlevered firm.  
• TCB is the tax rate (TC) x the value of debt (B)  
This means that there are advantages for firms to be levered, since corporations 
can deduct interest payments. Therefore leverage lowers tax payments. Dividend 
payments are non-deductible. 
Proposition II: : rS = r0 + B/S (r0 – rB) + (1+TcB) 
• rS is the cost of equity.  
• r0 is the cost of capital for an all equity firm.  
• rB is the cost of debt.  
• B / S is the debt-to-equity ratio.  
• Tc is the tax rate.  
The same relationship stating that the cost of equity rises with leverage, because 
the risk to equity rises, still holds. The formula however has some implications for the 
difference from the WACC. 
The following assumptions are made in the propositions with taxes: 
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9 corporations are taxed at the rate TC on earnings after interest,  
9 no transaction cost exist, and  
9 individuals and corporations borrow at the same rate      
Another reason that capital structure matters in the real world is information 
asymmetries. Investors can be somewhat suspicious of equity offerings, managers may 
not be willing or able to tell all they know and drive down a company's stock price. This 
"insider's advantage" has been cited in much of the post-M&M literature as one of the 
reasons that decisions to issue debt or equity can affect the value of a company. 
Information asymmetry phenomenon which takes important place in M&M 
literature is explained in detail in following pages. 
  
The original M&M propositions are consisted of three closely related points2: 
  
Proposition I: The value of a company is dictated first by the earning power and 
riskiness of its assets, not by how those assets are financed.  
Proposition II: The cost of equity capital is an increasing function of leverage.  
Proposition III: In the authors' words, "The type of instrument used to finance an 
investment is irrelevant to the question of whether or not the investment is worthwhile." 
Having shown capital structure to be irrelevant for the company as a whole, M&M then 
extends irrelevance to the individual investment. In M&M's ideal world, issuing debt to 
finance a new plant won't make it a more profitable investment than issuing equity. 
 
The résumé of this story about choice between equity or debt is a little bit out of 
the subject of this research. The target of this study is defined as the timing of IPO, after 
having decided to finance by equity. This brief story about debt or equity financing is to 
mention the first step of financing decision. So the entrance is made by M&M theory 
which is very essential in finance literature. After that, the kinds of equity and debt 
financing are defined briefly, with their characteristics and their benefits to investors, in 
the following section. This makes us recognize potential IPO investors’ alternatives 
                                        
2 http://pages.stern.nyu.edu/~adamodar/New_Home_Page/articles/MM40yearslater.htm 
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investments and possible actions according to financial indicators, as this is also so 
important for firms which have intention to go public for timing issue. Then financing by 
first public offering is looked over.    
Types of financing are determined in the following section: 
 
In classical point of view, there are two types of financing in which any business 
can raise money, debt or equity; however there are also some that have the characteristics 
of equity and debt called “hybrid securities”. While the distinction between debt and 
equity is made in terms of bonds and stocks, its roots lie in the nature of cash flow claims 
of each type of financing. Debt is defined as any financing vehicle that is contractual 
claim on the firm (not a function of operating performance), creates tax-deductible 
payments, has a fixed life, and has priority claims on cash flows in both operating periods 
and bankruptcy. Conversely, equity is defined as any financing vehicle that is a residual 
claim on the firm, does not create a any tax advantage from its payments, has an infinite 
life, does not have priority in bankruptcy, and provides managerial control to the owner. 
Any security that that has characteristics from both is a hybrid security. 
 
Cash flows generated by the existing assets of a firm can be categorized as 
internal financing. Since these cash flows belong to the equity owners of the business, 
they are called internal equity. Cash flows raised outside the firm whether from private 
sources or from financial markets can be categorized as external financing. External 
financing can, of course, take the form of new debt, new equity or hybrids. 
A firm may prefer internal financing to the external one for several reasons. For 
private firms, external financing is typically difficult to raise, and even when it is 
available (through a venture capitalist, for instance) it is accompanied by a loss of control 
and flexibility. For publicly traded firms, external financing may be easier to raise, but it 
is still expensive in terms of issuance costs (in the case of new equity) or lost flexibility 
(in the case of new debt). Internally generated cash flows, on the other hand, can be used 
to finance operations without incurring large transactions costs or losing flexibility. 
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(Aswath DAMADORAN, Chapter 7: Capital Structure: overview of the financing 
decision, page 17)3
Equity 
Owner’s Equity 
The funds, brought to the company by the owners of the company, are referred as 
the owner’s equity and provide the basis for the growth to the company. However, this is 
the first stage in a small firm’s establishment and this is a financing type in a broad sense. 
Venture Capital 
These are funds made available for startup firms and small businesses with 
exceptional growth potential, especially in high-tech industries. This is a very important 
source of funding for startups that do not have access to capital markets. It typically 
entails higher risk for the investor, but it has the potential for above-average returns. 
Venture capitalists take concentrated equity positions. After beginning, they liquidate 
their position in financial markets; because of this, most venture capital funds have a 
fixed life of 10 to 15 years. 
Common Stock 
These are the securities representing equity ownership in a corporation, providing 
voting rights, and entitling the holder of a share of the company's, success through 
dividends and/or capital appreciation. In the event of liquidation, common stockholders 
have rights to the company's assets only after the bondholders, other debt holders, and 
preferred stockholders have been satisfied. Typically, common stockholders have the 
right to use one vote per share in election of the company’s board of directors (although 
the number of votes is not always directly proportional to the number of shares owned. 
Common shareholders also obtain voting rights regarding on the company-related matters 
such as stock splits and company objectives. In addition to voting rights, common 
shareholders also enjoy what are called "preemptive rights". Preemptive rights allow 
common shareholders to maintain their proportional ownership in the company in the 
event that the company issues another stock offering. This means that common 
                                        
3 www.hss.caltech.edu/courses/2005 
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shareholders with preemptive rights have the right but not the obligation to purchase as 
many new shares of the stock as it would take to maintain their proportional ownership in 
the company. 
Initial Public Offerings 
Initial Public Offerings (IPOs) are the first time a company sells its stock to the 
public. If the corporation chooses to sell ownership to the public, it engages in an IPO. 
Corporations choose to "go public" instead of issuing debt securities for several reasons. 
The most common reason is that capital raised through an IPO does not have to be repaid, 
whereas debt securities such as bonds must be repaid with interest. Despite this apparent 
benefit, there are also many drawbacks of an IPO. One of the main drawbacks to go 
public is that the current owners of the privately held corporation lose a part of their 
ownership. Corporations weigh the costs and benefits of an IPO carefully before 
performing an IPO.4
A direct public offering (DPO), similar to traditional IPO, is a stock's introduction 
to the stock market. The stock is offered to the public for the first time. Unlike the IPO 
shares for which it is used an underwriter to sell to public, DPO shares are purchased 
directly from the issuing company. Individual investors have limited opportunities to 
participate in IPOs, so DPOs give an average person a chance to invest in a public 
offering. However, because DPOs are typically low-profile, it can be difficult to study 
and locate these offerings. 
Besides, the sale of securities directly to institutional investors, such as banks, 
mutual funds, insurance companies, pension funds, and foundations are called as Private 
Placement. It does not require SEC registration in USA, provided that the securities are 
bought for investment purposes rather than resale  
Seasoned-Equity Offerings 
It is an issue of securities from an established company whose existing shares 
have exhibited stable price movements and substantial trading volume over time.5 Once a 
firm is publicly traded, it can raise new financing by issuing more common stock, equity 
                                        
4 http://www.investorguide.com 
5 http://www.answers.com 
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options or corporate bonds. Additional equity offerings made by firms that are already 
publicly traded are called seasoned-equity issues. 
 
Warrants 
Warrants are long-term securities that give a holder the right to buy a stock at a 
specified price, known as the subscription price. They are similar to long-dated call 
options. If the current market value of a stock is greater than the subscription price, the 
warrant has intrinsic value.6 Since their value is derived from the price of underlying 
common stock, warrants have to be treated as another form of equity. 
 
Contingent Value Rights 
A continent value right (CVR) provides the holder with the right to sell a share of 
a stock in the underlying company at a fixed price during the life of the right. Firm may 
offer a CVR when it believes that the stock is undervalued by the market. In this way it 
takes the advantage of this belief and send signal to the market about underestimation of 
the stock. 
Besides, Employee Stock Ownership Plan (ESOP) and Direct Reinvestment Plans 
(DRIP) automatically transform employee compensation and shareholder dividends, 
respectively into shares. These are also some other ways of issuing equity by issuing 
securities that can be converted into equity later.  
Debt 
Bank Debt 
The primary source of borrowed money for all private firms and many publicly 
traded firms has been commercial banks with the interest rate determined by these 
commercial banks is based on the perceived risk of the borrower. 
 
Bonds 
It is a debt instrument issued for a period of more than one year with the purpose 
of raising capital by borrowing. The Federal Government, states, cities, corporations, and 
                                        
6 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki 
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many other types of institutions sell bonds. Generally, a bond is a promise to repay the 
principal along with interest (coupons) on a specified date (maturity). Some bonds do not 
pay interest, but all bonds require a repayment of principal. When an investor buys a 
bond, he/she becomes a creditor of the issuer. However, the buyer does not gain any kind 
of ownership right to the issuer, unlike the situation in the case of equities. On the other 
hand, a bond holder has a greater claim on an issuer's income than a shareholder in the 
case of financial distress which is the case for all creditors. Bonds are often divided into 
different categories based on tax status, credit quality, issuer type, maturity and 
secured/unsecured security (and there are several other ways to classify bonds as well). 
The yield from a bond is made up of three components: coupon interest, capital gains and 
interest on interest (if a bond pays no coupon interest, the only yield will be capital 
gains). A bond might be sold at above or below par (the amount paid out at maturity), but 
the market price will approach par value, as the bond approaches maturity. A riskier bond 
has to provide a higher payout to compensate for that additional risk. 
Leases 
A firm often borrows money to finance the acquisition of an asset required for its 
operations. An alternative approach that might accomplish the same goal is to lease the 
asset. In a lease, the right to use the property is given by the firm to another person in 
return for paying the firm a fixed payment. These fixed payments are either fully or 
partially tax deductible, depending upon how the lease is categorized for accounting 
purposes. (Aswath DAMADORAN, Chapter 7: Capital Structure: overview of the 
financing decision, page 10)7
Hybrid Securities 
Convertible Debt 
Convertible Debt is a corporate bond, usually a junior debenture that can be 
exchanged, at the option of the holder, for a specific number of shares of the company's 
preferred stock or common stock. Convertibility affects the performance of the bond in 
certain ways. First and foremost, convertible bonds tend to have lower interest rates than 
non-convertible ones because they also accrue value as the price of the underlying stock 
                                        
7 www.hss.caltech.edu/courses/2005 
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rises. In this way, convertible bonds offer some of the benefits of both stocks and bonds. 
Convertibles earn interest even when the stock is trading down or sideways, but when the 
stock prices raise the value of the convertible increases. Therefore, convertibles can offer 
protection against a decline in stock price. In some cases, convertibles may be callable, at 
which point the yield will cease.8 Firms generally add conversion options to bonds in 
order to lower the interest paid on the bonds. 
 
Preferred Stock 
It is capital stock type which provides a specific dividend that is paid before any 
dividends are paid to common stock holders, and which takes precedence over common 
stock in the event of liquidation. Like common stock, preferred stocks represent partial 
ownership in the company, though preferred stock shareholders do not enjoy any of the 
voting rights of the common stockholders. Also unlike common stock, a preferred stock 
pays a fixed dividend that does not fluctuate, although the company does not have to pay 
this dividend if it lacks the financial ability to do so.9 The main benefit of owning 
preferred stock is that the investor has a greater claim on the company’s assets than a 
common stockholder has. Preferred shareholders always receive their dividends first and, 
in company’s bankruptcy, preferred shareholders are paid off before common 
stockholders. It is not tax-deductible. 
 
Option-Linked Bonds 
If a commodity company issues bonds by linking the principal and/or interest 
payments to the price of commodity it is a commodity-linked bond. The benefit to issue a 
security like this is that it tailors the cash flows on the bond depending on the cash flows 
from its assets so; it reduces the possibility of default. It can be viewed as a combination 
of a straight bond and a call option on the underlying commodity. 
 
 
 
 
                                        
8 www.investorwords.com 
9 www.investorwords.com 
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Mezzanine Financing 
 
Mezzanine capital has both the characteristics of equity and debt. It is debt loaned 
to your business that many times is not secured by hard assets. Mezzanine lenders are 
either institutions or lending groups who will loan money and work with management to 
help them to execute their business strategy. Mezzanine financing, also sometimes 
referred to as subordinated debt or financing, is a rarely used but viable financing option 
for small businesses in search of capital for rapid growth. Under this arrangement, an 
entrepreneur borrows some of the money that he or she requires to execute the next stage 
of company growth (whether through acquisition, expansion of existing operations, etc.), 
then raises additional funds by selling stock in the company to the same lenders. 
Mezzanine debt is usually unsecured or junior debt that is subordinate to traditional loans 
or senior debt.10  
Between all these financing possibilities, to find the most preferred one by firms is 
the crucial question. The financing hierarchy survey and pecking order theory should 
respond to this question.   
 
Hierarchy of Financing 
 
There is evidence that firms follow a financing hierarchy: retained earnings are 
the most preferred choice for financing, followed by debt, new equity, common and 
preferred; and convertible preferred is the least preferred choice one. For instance, in the 
survey by Pinegar and Wilbricht, managers were asked to rank six different sources of 
financing - internal equity, external equity, external debt, preferred stock, and hybrids 
(convertible debt and preferred stock) - from most preferred to least preferred. 
 
Survey Results on Planning Principles 
Ranking Source   Planning Principle cited 
1 Retained Earnings  None 
2 Straight Debt   Maximize security prices 
3 Convertible Debt   Cash Flow & Survivability 
                                        
10 http://business.enotes.com/small-business-encyclopedia 
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4 Common Stock   Avoiding Dilution 
5 Straight Preferred Stock  Comparability 
6 Convertible Preferred  None 
 
One reason for this hierarchy is that managers value flexibility and control. To the 
extent that external financing reduces flexibility for future financing (especially if it is 
debt) and control (bonds have covenants; new equity attracts new stockholders into the 
company and may reduce insider holdings as a percentage of total holding), managers 
prefer retained earnings as a source of capital. Another reason is it costs nothing in terms 
of issuance costs to use retained earnings, it costs more to use external debt and even 
more to use external equity (Aswath DAMADORAN, Applied Corporate Finance-1999, 
Chapter 7: Capital Structure: overview of the financing decision, page 248-249). 
 
Pecking Order Theory; 
According to Myers (1984), 
Contrast to the static trade-off theory, with a competing popular story based on a 
financing pecking order: 
1) Firms prefer internal finance. 
2) They adapt their target dividend payout ratios to their investment 
opportunities, although dividends are sticky and target payout ratios are only 
gradually adjusted to shifts in the extent of valuable investment opportunities. 
3) Sticky dividend policies, plus unpredictable fluctuations in profitability and 
investment opportunities, mean that internally generated cash flow may be 
more or less than investment outlays. If it is less, the firm first draws down its 
cash balance or marketable securities portfolio. 
4) If external finance is required, firms issue the safest security first. That is, they 
start with debt, then possibly hybrid securities, then perhaps equity as a last 
resort. There is no well-defined target debt-equity mix, because there are two 
kinds of equity:  internal and external, one at the top of the pecking order and 
at the other at the bottom. Each firm’s observed debt ratio reflects its 
cumulative requirements for external financing.  
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However, most companies start out by raising equity capital from a small number 
of investors, with nonexistent liquid market in which these investors wish to sell their 
stock. Because young firms frequently have much of their value represented by 
intangibles such as growth opportunities, rather than assets in place, outside investors 
face a difficult job of valuing them. With limited resources, however, the ability to grow 
rapidly will be constrained if external sources of capital are not used. Because of the 
discipline imposed by social networks, friends and relatives might be the next source of 
capital. The ability to disclose proprietary information to potential investors encourages 
the use of private financing, either from banks, “angels,” or venture capitalists. Angel 
financing is the term used for capital provided by wealthy individuals who aren’t part of 
formal venture capital organizations. If a company prospers and needs additional equity 
capital, at some point it generally finds desirable to "go public" by selling stock to a large 
number of diversified investors. Once the stock is publicly traded, this enhanced liquidity 
allows the company to raise capital on more favorable terms than to compensate investors 
for the lack of liquidity associated with a privately-held company. Existing shareholders 
can sell their shares in open-market transactions. With these benefits, however, some 
other costs arise. In particular, there are certain ongoing costs associated with the need to 
supply information on a regular basis to investors and regulators for publicly-traded 
firms. Furthermore, there are substantial one-time costs associated with initial public 
offerings that can be categorized as direct and indirect costs. The direct costs include the 
legal, auditing, and underwriting fees. The indirect costs are the management time and 
effort devoted to conducting the offering, and the dilution associated with selling shares 
at an offering price that is, on average, below the price prevailing in the market shortly 
after the IPO. These direct and indirect costs affect the cost of capital for firms going 
public.(Ritter, Initial Public Offerings, Contemporary Finance Digest Vol. 2, No.1 page1) 
Besides, going public provides the firm with more capital while at the same time 
allowing the original owners to diversify their holdings. The publicly traded price also 
provides management and shareholders with important outside information about the 
firm’s value. (Roger G. Ibbotson Jody L. Sindelar, Jay R. Ritter Initial Public Offerings, 
Journal of Applied Corporate Finance volume 1-2 1988, p.38) 
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About benefits of public markets, when we look into to the literature we see 
different claims; 
Zingales(1995) claims that, entrepreneurs helps facilitate the acquisition of their 
company for a higher value than what they would get from an outright sale. 
From another point of view Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1999) indicate that early 
in its life cycle a firm will be private, but if it grows sufficiently large, it becomes optimal 
to go public. 
Being public adds value to a firm according Maksimovic and Pichler (2001), as it 
inspires more faith in the firm from other investors, customers, creditors, and suppliers. 
And they also add being the first in an industry to go public sometimes confers a first-
mover advantage. 
Pagano, Panetta, and Zingales (1998) find that larger companies and companies in 
industries with high market-to-book ratios are more likely to go public, and that 
companies going public seem to have reduced their costs of credit. They also find that 
IPO activity follows high investment and growth, not vice versa. 
Ritter (1998) finds that for young companies, most or all of the shares being sold 
are typically newly-issued (primary shares), when with older companies, it is common 
that many of the shares being sold come from existing stockholders (secondary shares). 
Beginning in the mid-1990s in U.S., a growing number of small companies have 
gone public without using an investment banker which have come to be called direct 
public offerings (DPOs). An advantage for an issuing firm of a direct public offering is 
the possibility of reduced costs. However, it lacks of underwriter putting its reputation on 
the line, especially as regards due diligence and valuation. But in Turkey, according to 
the regulations of CMB, it is not possible to issue equity directly to the public. The issuer 
must sell securities via underwriter. 
These sample researches’ results given above show that financing decision and 
way are not only related to outside factors as economic environment, but also to firms’ 
age, size, financial aspect, industry, briefly to firms’ self-characteristics. So financing 
method taken by firms is a very dimensional type of decision. However the scope of this 
study is based on the firms which had already decided to go public for the first time. 
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If the equity financing is driven, the essential question is “when to issue equity?” 
If we ask the question in a more specific way, the question is “when to issue equity for 
more successful public offerings?” Success comes from higher demand for IPO or more 
capital. This is a look from the equity issuer firm’s perspective. However at the other 
side, there are investors who seek for the company stock by which they can increase their 
wealth. So they want to buy undervalued stocks although the issuer firm wants to sell 
stocks at highest price. There is a conflict of interest. Investors are not obliged to buy, 
however companies have to sell their shares, if they do not postpone IPO. So if it is 
postponed, company can maintain more funds in the case of some developments about 
environmental conditions, general economy or investor’s expectations, as well as 
company’s performance. Therefore, IPOs’ performance is not only related to the firms’ 
specific conditions. “What are other factors?”, “When IPOs are increasing?”, “When the 
demand for IPOs are increasing?”, “Does the offering price reflect the value of the 
company?” are the important questions for which the responses are looked during the 
finance history. 
During this study, an analysis enabling the comparison of IPO timing in Turkey 
and in other countries is conducted after exploring the studies made about this subject. 
Many researchers have developed some theories and have reached some results about 
IPOs during last 30 years. Some of them were interested with the pricing, aftermarket or 
long-horizon performance of IPOs, while some others attended to timing of IPO and hot 
markets or IPO waves. This study’s main purpose is to do research on the causes which 
have effect on swings of IPO. 
Before introducing arguments about IPO timing, there are some essential 
phenomenons to explore as these are assessed many times with IPO waves.  
Underpricing phenomenon reported by Ibbotson (1975) firstly and hot issue 
markets introduced by Ibbotson and Jaffe (1975) are cornerstones in IPO literature. 
Aftermarket performance, which is after first day to 3 or 5 years share price performance 
of IPO firms, is also broadly examined phenomenons in the literature. Underpricing, 
which will be explained in detail, is defined as IPO shares’ first day abnormal 
performance relative to the market. Hot issue markets refer to particular stock issues that 
have risen from their offering prices to higher than average premium in the aftermarket. 
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These periods are the ones where the volume of IPOs is also increasing. So, according to 
some studies, high initial return leads high volume and high number of IPOs.  
Is underpricing the only incentive for going public or can there be other reasons 
for IPO waves? Or Can high market returns, increasing growth in general economy, high 
market to book ratio, high volatility…etc. be the puller on the trigger of IPOs in a 
country? The IPO literature including essential researches where these questions’ 
responses were looked up are explained in detail in the following parts.  
Asymmetric information, adverse selection and moral hazard are also important 
but more general anomalies that are touched on in IPO literature.   
1.2 Main Phenomenons in IPO Market 
1.2.1 Asymmetric information  
 
It can be defined as information that is known to some people but not to other 
people.  
Information asymmetries can move along a difference in the cost of internal and 
external finance, i.e. making internal net worth more valuable, holding constant 
investment opportunities (this is a ‘lemon market’ problem in valuation).  
The classical argument is that some sellers with inside information about the 
quality of an asset will be unwilling to accept the terms offered by a less informed buyer. 
This may cause the market to break down, or at least force the sale of an asset at a price 
lower than it would command if all buyers and sellers had full information. This idea has 
been applied to both equity and debt finance. 
In debt market, a borrower who takes out a loan usually has better information 
about the potential returns and risk associated with the investment projects for which the 
funds are earmarked. The lender on the other side does not have sufficient information 
concerning the borrower. Lack of enough information creates problems before and after 
the transaction occurred. The presence of asymmetric information normally leads to 
adverse selection and moral hazards problems. 
For equity finance, shareholders demand a premium to purchase shares of 
relatively good firms to offset the losses arising from funding lemons. This premium 
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raises the cost of new equity finance faced by managers of relatively high-quality firms 
above the opportunity cost of internal finance faced by existing shareholders. 
Models of asymmetric information assume that managers’ private information 
gives them a superior ability to value their firm’s common stock. This information 
advantage creates an adverse selection problem since firms can exploit valuation errors 
on the part of investors (A window of opportunity for seasoned equity issuance? Bayliss 
and Chaplinsky p255). At the same time, investors are aware of the information 
asymmetry problem, then, they view the equity issue as high risk for overvalued firm’s 
announcement. So, it raises the cost of equity issue for firms that are not overvalued. 
Information Asymmetry causes two issues worth to discuss. 
Adverse Selection  
Akerlof (1970) first noted adverse selection problem (sometimes referred to as the 
lemon problem), which arises from the inability of traders/buyers to differentiate among 
the quality of certain products. 
The most cited example is the second hand car industry. Potential buyers of used 
car are not able to assess the quality of the car, since he lacks some information about the 
car. It can be a good used car, or a “lemon” which cause to have problem with it. Then 
the buyer is not willing to pay high price for the car, the price that the buyer pays must 
therefore reflect the average quality of the cars in he market, somewhere between the low 
value of a lemon and the high value of a good car. The seller knows if his car is lemon or 
a good car. If it’s a lemon, he will sell his car at the price which the buyer wants to pay. 
In other case, he won’t want to sell his car, so all the sellers whose car is peach will leave 
the market and only the lemons will stay in the market. 
There are three components to this theory: 
(1) There is a random variation in product quality in the market; 
(2) An asymmetry of information exists about the product quality; 
(3) There is a greater willingness for poor quality car seller to trade at low prices 
than higher-quality owners. Insurance and credit markets are areas in which adverse 
selection is important. 
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This refers to a situation in which sellers have relevant information that buyers 
lack (or vice versa) about some aspect of product quality. This is the problem created by 
asymmetric information before the transaction occurs.  
In the simplest case, lenders cannot discriminate price (i.e. vary interest rates) 
between good and bad borrowers in loan contracts, because the risk of projects is 
unobservable. Thus, when interest rates increase, relatively good borrowers drop out of 
the market, increasing the probability of default and possibly decreasing lenders’ 
expected profits. In equilibrium, lenders may set an interest rate that leaves an excess 
demand for loans. Some borrowers receive loans, while other observationally equivalent 
borrowers are rationed. 
In IPO side, like the car market, only issuers at worse than average quality are 
willing to sell their shares at the average price to the investors. Investors don’t want to 
pay for high price of high quality firms because of lack of information about the quality 
of firms. To distinguish themselves from the low quality firms, high quality issuers may 
signal their quality or leave the market without issuing. Better quality issuers deliberately 
sell their shares at a lower price than the market believes they are worth, which deters 
lower quality issuers from imitating. This situation may cause “underpricing” in IPO 
markets. 
The solution for eliminating adverse selection problem in financial markets is to 
eliminate asymmetric information by furnishing people by supplying funds with full 
details about the individuals or firms seeking to finance their investments activities. 
However, the system of private production and sale of information does not completely 
solve the adverse selection problem in securities markets. The people who do not pay for 
information take advantage of the information that other people have paid for, by 
following those people having already paid for the information. In this way, the 
undervalued firms’ securities’ price will go up with the increased demand. So the 
investors having the information cannot buy the securities at low price. It is not 
meaningful to pay for the information as realized by these investors. If all investors 
realize this, private firms and individuals may not be able to sell enough of this 
information to make it worth. Then less information is produced in the marketplace, and 
so consequently adverse selection will be still interfering with the sufficient functioning 
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of securities market. This problem is called as “free rider problem”. The free riders are 
investors who do not pay for the information and follow the having ones. 
Myers and Majluf (1984) suggest two ways in which the cost of adverse selection 
may be reduced. First, firms may experience lower adverse selection costs if investors 
interpret the equity issue decision favorably. They argue that firm-specific or 
macroeconomic conditions can effect investors’ interpretation of the motivation to issue. 
Firms that appear to have an attractive investment project because of strong capital 
spending experience reduced announcement date prediction errors. They also suggest that 
adverse selection costs can vary if the discrepancy between managers and investors’ 
information varies over time. 
Ritter (2002) suggests another method; an issuer may reduce the degree of 
information asymmetry surrounding its initial public offering by hiring agents (auditors 
and underwriters) who, because they have reputation for capital at stake, will have the 
incentive to certify that the offer price is consistent with inside information. Repeating 
business gives underwriters a role that issuing firms cannot credibly duplicate. Consistent 
with this (but not with market efficiency), the long-run returns on IPOs underwritten by 
less prestigious investment bankers are low. 
In general, models of asymmetric information suggest that the price reaction to 
equity issues is dependent on the ability of firms to signal their value and intent. For 
example, firm-specific characteristics such as high levels of capital spending may signal 
the presence of strong investment opportunities, while other characteristics such as high 
operating risk may indicate low debt capacity. These characteristics, therefore can 
condition investors to believe that equity is rational funding choice (“Is there a window 
opportunity for seasoned equity Issuance”. Mark Bayless Susan Chaplinsky; Journal 
of finance, volume: 51, no:1 p. 254) This is a contradiction to the Myers and Majluf 
(1984) view such that asymmetric information results in information costs that have 
sufficient magnitude to force firms into a financing ”pecking order”. The argument that 
external financing transaction costs, especially those associated with the problem of 
adverse selection, create a dynamic environment in which firms have a preference, or 
pecking-order of preferred sources of financing. Internally generated funds are the most 
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preferred, new debt is the second one, debt-equity hybrids are the coming ones, and new 
equity is the least preferred source. 
 
Moral Hazard  
Moral hazard is the consequence of asymmetric information after the transaction 
occurs. The lender runs the risk that the borrower will engage in activities that are 
undesirable from the lender’s point of view because they make it less likely that the loan 
will be paid back. The debt contract is a contractual agreement by the borrower to pay the 
lender a fixed amount of money at periodic intervals. When the firm has high profits, the 
lender receives the contractual payments and does not need to know the exact profits of 
the borrower. If the managers are pursuing activities that do not increase profitability of 
the firm, the lender does not care as long as the activities do not interfere with the ability 
of the firm to make its debt payments on time. Only when the firm cannot meet its debt 
payments, thereby being in a state of default, is there a need for the lender to verify the 
state of the firm’s profits. 
Related to IPOs, Kevin Rock (1986) indicates that the investor is compensated for 
his costly investigations into assets’ value and becomes informed investor and gets the 
remuneration of mispriced stock. This is an asymmetric information case. If there are 
informed and uninformed investors in the market, informed investors will give order for 
underpriced securities but not for overpriced, then uninformed investors will receive 
rationed stocks for underpriced IPOs but all their order for overpriced IPOs. Then he will 
revise downward his valuation of new shares. He does not participate in the new issue 
market until the price falls enough to compensate for the “bias” in allocation. This 
phenomenon is called “winner’s curse”. This is like the case in Turkey in previous years 
especially in 2004-2005. We can say that; then underwriter underprice the new IPOs for 
attracting uninformed investors and for avoiding potential loss, may be because of this, 
2006 IPOs’ initial returns were more successful in ISE. However Rock claims that issuers 
are uninformed too and the sufficient IPO discount cannot be known before issue. He 
indicates that issuer discloses ‘material information’ about its plans and activities to the 
market with prospectus. Indirectly, the firm and underwriter disclose their assessment of 
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the firm’s financial future, besides; the firm and its agents know less than all the 
individuals in the market combined, so issuers are uninformed. 
Nevertheless, Baker and Wurgler(2000) state that managers issue equity when 
they believe it is overvalued and repurchase equity or issue debt when they believe it is 
undervalued. Then temporary fluctuations have permanent effect on capital structure of 
firms. This is a contradictory argument to all underpricing theories, but in parallel with 
the theories of IPOs waves after high initial returns and stock market runups, since the 
stocks will be overvalued in IPOs. This is consistent with Lowry and Schwert’s saying 
which is, IPOs volume increases after high initial returns periods. 
1.2.2 Underpricing  
Underpricing is a very important anomaly in IPOs in financial markets. Although 
either as the main subject or as a part of theory, underpricing will be seen in the coming 
parts of the thesis, it is better to start with a clear definition. 
It is pricing of an initial public offering below its market value. When the offer 
price is lower than the price of the first trade, the stock is considered to be underpriced. A 
stock is usually underpriced only temporarily because the law of supply and demand will 
eventually drive it toward its intrinsic value. It is believed that IPOs are often underpriced 
because of concerns relating to liquidity and uncertainty about the level at which the 
stock will trade. The less liquid and less predictable the shares are, the more underpriced 
they will have to be in order to compensate investors for the risk they are taking. Because 
an IPO's issuer tends to know more about the value of the shares than the investor, the 
issuer must underprice its stock to encourage investors to participate in the IPO. 
Ibbotson (1975) reports that as the initial performance of IPOs, a positive trend is 
present; however it is not enough to reject the hypothesis that an investor in a single 
random issue has an equal chance for a gain or loss. But the likelihood of positive returns 
is higher than compared to negative returns. In addition, he asserts that positive initial 
returns are not inconsistent with efficient market so it means that new issue offerings are 
underpriced. 
Here are some scenarios suggested by Ibbotson (1975) about underpricing: 
(1) Regulations require underwriters to set the offering price below the expected value.  
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(2) Underpriced new issues ‘leave a good taste in investors’ mouths’ so that future 
underwritings from the same issuer could be sold at attractive prices. 
 (3) Underwriters collude or individually exploit inexperienced issuers to favor investors.  
(4) Firm commitment underwriting spreads do not include all of the risk assumption 
costs, so that the underwriter must underprice to minimize these risks.  
(5) Through tradition, or some other arrangement, the underwriting process consists of 
underpricing offerings with full (or partial) compensation via side payments from 
investors to underwriters to issuers. 
(6) The issuing corporation and underwriter perceive that underpricing constitutes a form 
of insurance against legal suits. For example, errors in the prospectus may be less likely 
to result in legal suits when the stock’s initial performance is positive. 
Investment bankers generally underprice initial public offerings and are fairly 
open about the fact that they do. Why don’t the offering firms express more outrage about 
the value left on the table by the underpricing? 
According to Loughran and Ritter (2002), issuers don’t get upset about leaving 
money on the table, because, the bad news that a lot of money was left on the table arrive 
at the same time that the good news of high proceeds and a high market price arrive. 
Because a lot of money is left on the table almost exclusively when it is packaged with 
good news, issuers rarely complain. 
However, Reuter’ (2006) findings report that mutual fund families retained the 
majority of the dollars left on the table in 1999. Besides since lead underwriters are able 
to capture some part of the dollars left on the table by underpricing through incremental 
brokerage business coming from investors seeking shares in IPOs, issuers should be upset 
for leaving money in the table. 
In addition to all these, Ibbotson and Sindelar (1994) attracts attention that when 
equally weighted computed average initial return tends to be overstated since smaller and 
lower priced issues tend to be underpriced by more in the short run. 
In addition to Ibbotson’s scenarios about underpricing listed above, there are some 
other theories of underpricing suggested during the years: 
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 Reasons for Underpricing 
 
a) Lemons Problem (adverse selection) in the Market  
Rational investors are anxious about lemons problem; only issuers with worse-
than-average quality are willing to sell their shares at the average price. To distinguish 
themselves from the pool of low-quality issuers, high-quality issuers may attempt to 
signal their quality. In these models, better quality issuers deliberately sell their shares at 
a lower price than the market believes they are worth, which deters lower quality issuers 
from imitating. 
 
b) The winner's curse hypothesis 
If the demand for stocks is strong, the rationed number of shares will be allocated 
to the investors; so the uninformed investors will have rationed shares if the share is 
undervalued but all the order if they are overvalued, since informed investors don’t want 
to have overvalued shares. This is an important phenomenon for underpricing. 
 
c) The market feedback hypothesis (Dynamic Information Acquisition) 
Benveniste and Spindt (1989), Benveniste and Wilhelm (1990), and Spatt and 
Srivastava (1991) argue that the common practice of “bookbuilding” allows underwriters 
to obtain information from informed investors. When bookbuilding is used, investment 
bankers may underprice the IPOs to induce regular investors to reveal information during 
the pre-selling period, which can then be used to assist in pricing the issue. This is like a 
renumeration for investors which assist in valuation period. 
 
- Bookbuilding means that the lead investment banker takes potential buyers and 
records who is interested in buying how much at what price. In other words, a 
demand curve is constructed. The offering is then priced based upon this 
information. 
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Ritter(1998) finds that countries using fixed price offerings typically have more 
underpricing than in countries using book-building procedures. 
Furthermore, Sherman (2000) noted that the average level of underpricing 
required to induce information revelation is reduced if underwriters have the ability to 
allocate shares in future IPOs to investors. Sherman and Titman (2002) argue that there is 
an equilibrium degree of underpricing which compensates investors for acquiring costly 
information. 
 
d) The bandwagon hypothesis 
If some potential investors decide to buy according to not only their own 
information about a new issue, but also other investors’ purchase, bandwagon effects may 
develop. If an investor sees that no one else wants to buy, he or she may decide not to buy 
even when there is favorable information. To prevent this to happen, issuer or investment 
bank may want to underprice an issue to induce the first few potential investors to buy, 
and start a bandwagon, or cascade, in which all subsequent investors want to buy 
irrespective of their own information. 
 
e) The investment banker's monopsony power hypothesis 
Investment bankers take advantage of their superior knowledge of market 
conditions to underprice offerings, which permits them to make less marketing effort and 
ingratiate themselves with buy-side clients. The investment bankers assure that people 
believe underpricing is a normal phenomenon for the market. 
However; Muscarella and Vetsuypens (1989) examine the investment bankers 
which go public find that; for the 38 investment banks that went public during 1970-87, 
the average initial return was 7.1 percent-an amount of underpricing comparable to that 
of other similar size IPOs. Ibbotson Sindelar and Ritter(1988) interpret this fact that 
presumably well-informed investment bankers also appear to underprice their own IPOs 
suggests that there may indeed be an “equilibrium” level of underpricing–a level which 
issuers, underwriters, and investors thus appear to accept as necessary to the process. 
Besides, venture capital firms invest in many companies that they expect to go 
public in the future; and accordingly they may wish to underprice current new issues if it 
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makes easier, in the future, to sell other new issues that they have financed. However, 
Christopher Barry, Chris Muscarella, John Peavy, and Michael Vetsuypens (Venture 
Capital and Initial Public Offerings) have found that venture capital-backed IPOs are 
underpriced by approximately the same amount as other IPOs of comparable size. This 
finding is inconsistent with the argument of underpricing reflects the systematic 
exploitation of disadvantaged issuers by underwriters, which would predict lower 
underpricing of venture capital-backed issues. (Roger G. Ibbotson, Jody L. Sindelar, Jay 
R. Ritter, 1988 “Initial Public Offerings” Journal of Applied Corporate Finance 1-2) 
  
f) Implicit Insurance Hypothesis 
Baron (1982) offers a different theory, similar to monopsony hypothesis, but 
differently from that, the issuer has less information than underwriter, to induce 
underwriter for the best effort, issuer accepts underpricing, because the issuer cannot 
monitor the underwriter without cost.  
Muscarella and Vetsuypens (1989), however, find that when underwriters 
themselves go public, their shares are just underpriced even though there is no monitoring 
problem. They may want to underprice their own offerings in order to make the case that 
underpricing is a necessary cost of going public as in the monopsony theory. 
At the other hand, Rajan and Servaes (2002) tried to explain underpricing with 
market conditions and find that it increases when investor sentiment (price insensitive 
part) decreases and feedback risk (demand of trend chasers who decide according to past 
price movements) increases. 
 
These theories are based on asymmetric information hypothesis, while there are 
also some possibilities in symmetric information case; 
 
g) The lawsuit avoidance hypothesis 
 This theory is based on the liability of the prospectus and since the price is in 
prospectus, one way of reducing the frequency and severity of future lawsuits is to 
underprice. Tinic (1988) argue that issuers and underwriters underprice to reduce their 
legal liability. He supports this argument, by reporting IPOs issued after Securities Act of 
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1933 exhibiting larger initial excess return than the IPOs before the Enactment of 
Securities Act where the liabilities of issuers and underwrites increased. Ibbotson (1975) 
also suggests that the regulations described in the Securities Act of 1933 and the 
Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 affect the initial performance of IPOs. On the other 
hand, Ritter (2002) asserts that leaving money on the table appears to be a cost-
ineffective way of avoiding subsequent lawsuits. 
However, Drake and Vetsuypens (1993) find that IPOs had average initial returns 
similar to control firms that did not get sued, where Ibbotson and Sindelar (1994) claim 
that legal liability considerations are at most a minor reason for underpricing.  
In Turkey, CMB registers the securities of the firm if the prospectus reflects the 
truth or it is reliable, but is not interested in price, i.e., doesn’t control the valuation 
methods or check the price if it is overvalued or undervalued. It is the business of the 
potential investors. If investor believes that IPO is overvalued, he will most probably not 
buy. 
 
h) The signaling hypothesis 
By underpricing in first issue, issuers guarantee seasoned offerings to be 
successful in the future. They follow a dynamic issue strategy, in which the IPO will be 
followed by a seasoned offering. However, various empirical studies show that the 
hypothesized relation between initial returns and subsequent seasoned new issues is not 
present. 
  
ı) The ownership dispersion hypothesis 
Issuing firms may intentionally underprice their shares in order to generate excess 
demand and so be able to have a large number of small shareholders. 
 
j) Risk-Averse Underwriter Hypothesis 
Especially for firm commitment IPOs, investment bank or underwriters 
underprice the shares for eliminating unsuccessful issue risk. In best efforts issue, for 
reputation of the underwriter, it may be present too. 
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In addition to these theories, sometimes Regulatory Constraints; as Underpricing 
in IPOs may be caused by regulatory requirements that offering prices be set lower than 
they otherwise would be or Political Motives; as issuers as well as investment bankers 
may be able to use allocations of underpriced IPO shares to pursue political objectives 
can be the causes of underpricing. 
Jonathan Reuter (2006) implicitly shows that, underpricing is a result of 
favoritism made by underwriters to mutual funds. The favoritism hypothesis says that lead 
underwriters will use allocations of underpriced IPOs to reward those institutions with 
which they have strong business relationships. 
Moreover, Ljungqvist (Pricing initial public offerings: Further evidence from 
Germany. European Economic Review 41) reports that a positive macroeconomic climate 
raises the average amount of underpricing. 
In this part, overallotment option is defined, as it has important effect on the first 
month price performance of stock offering.   
Overallotment options and stabilization 
Overallotment option is an agreement with which the issuer gives the investment 
banker the right to sell up to 15% more shares than guaranteed. The overallotment option 
is also called the Green Shoe option, since the first offering example was the February 
1963 offering of the Green Shoe Manufacturing Company. The advantage of preselling 
extra shares is that if many shares are “flipped,” that is, immediately sold in the 
aftermarket by investors who had been allocated shares, the investment banker can buy 
them back and retire the shares, just as if they had never been issued in the first place, just 
as stabilizer. While it is generally illegal to manipulate a stock price, investment bankers 
have legal authority make “stabilizing” bid after IPOs for a specified time period. (Initial 
Public Offerings, Jay R. Ritter 1998, Warren Gorham & Lamont Handbook of Modern 
Finance p.21) 
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1.2.3 Hot Issue Markets 
 
“Hot issues” refer to particular stock issues that have risen from their offering 
prices to higher than average premia in the aftermarket11. Hot issue markets are defined 
as average first month or aftermarket performance of new issues is abnormally high. 
Ibbotson and Jaffe (1975) focus on the prediction of “Hot issue” markets. They test the 
dependency of new issue premia (and aftermarket performance) in a given month on the 
premia (and aftermarket performance) of other new issues in the past months and then 
they examine the relationships between new issue premia, aftermarket performance, the 
frequency of offerings, and the performance of the markets. Finally the results for 
implications to the investors and issuers are analyzed.  
The existence of serial dependence in the series of average first month residuals 
(residual is the difference between the return of the new issue in the first month and 
market return) is investigated since it allows to predict the level of the first month 
performance in the future months, besides serial dependence in the series of average 
second month residuals are measured for testing the predictability of aftermarket 
behavior. According to the results, the first month series exhibit strong serial dependency, 
this means “hot issue” markets are predictable. The second month series are dependent 
but weaker than the first month’s series. This suggests that hot issue aftermarket is 
predictable. The first month differenced series exhibited negative dependency suggests 
that the first month series is a stationary12 process, not a random walk. 
Ritter (1984) finds as Ibbotson that IPOs are underpriced on average. Ritter (1998) 
finds the first order autocorrelation coefficient for the time series of monthly average 
initial returns as 0.62 and the first order autocorrelation coefficient for monthly volume 
figures as 0.88. Ibbotson, Sindelar and Ritter (1988)’s research the first order 
autocorrelation of monthly average initial returns is 0.62 for the full 28-year period 
(1960-1987; Roger G. Ibbotson and Jody L. Sindelar (1994) find that it is 0.66 for the 
period 1960-1992). As for the Howe and Zhang’s (2004) results for the period 1973-
                                        
11 Ibbotson (1975) 
12 A stationary time series is one whose statistical properties such as mean, variance, autocorrelation, etc. 
are all constant over time. 
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2002, the autocorrelation of monthly number of IPO series is 0.820 at lag 1 and 0.410 at 
lag 12. 
The relationship between new issue premium of an issue and its aftermarket 
performance is investigated, in Ibbotson and Jaffe’s research as well. According to 
regression result, the data does not suggest that any abnormal first month performance is 
erased in the second month. Neither they nor McDonald and Fisher (1972), Reilly and 
Hatfield (1979) do not find any negative relation between first month and aftermarket 
performance. And also, the relationship between new issue premia and past market 
performance’s investigation shows there isn’t any relationship. 
In his work “Stock Price Performance of New Common Stock New Issues”, 
Ibbotson finds that the distribution of initial returns was highly skewed, with a positive 
mean and a median near zero for the 120 IPOs during the period 1960-1969. 
Possible explanations about hot issue markets made by some authors are as 
following (The Market’s Problems With the Pricing of Initial Public Offerings Roger G. 
Ibbotson and Jody L. Sindelar, Journal of Applied Corporate Finance volume 7.1 (1994), 
p.72); 
Changes in Firm Risk: 
Jay R. Ritter, “The ‘Hot Issue’ Market of 1980,” has hypothesized that, since 
riskier issues tend to be underpriced to a greater extent than their less risky counterparts, 
“changing risk composition” might be able to account for the dramatic swings in the 
average initial returns. 
Positive Feedback or “Momentum” Strategies: 
Some investors follow “positive feedback” strategies, in which they assume that 
there is positive autocorrelation in the initial returns on IPOs. These investors are willing 
to bid up the price of an issue once it starts trading if other recent issues have risen in 
price. If enough investors follow such a strategy, they may end up causing the expected 
positive autocorrelation of initial returns in a kind of self-fulfilling prophecy. 
Windows of Opportunity 
Hot issue market cycles may exist because there are periods when IPOs can be 
sold at relatively higher price earnings and market-to-book ratios, or at higher levels 
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compared to other measures of value. This induces higher volume of new issues, and a 
relative willingness on the part of issuers to sell the offerings below the aftermarket price. 
Besides, if there are some periods where investors are overly optimistic, it is easy 
to see hot issue markets. 
 
1.2.4 Aftermarket Performance 
 
Another essential phenomenon taken into consideration in researches related with 
IPOs is aftermarket performance. This subject has attracted significant attention 
especially after underpricing is explored in many studies. 
According to the researches conducted about long-run performance of IPOs, there 
are unexpected results in the long-run:  
The table taken from Lougrhan and Ritter’s research (1995) in which 5 year stock 
price performance of initial public offerings and seasoned equity offering firms with 
nonissuing firms were compared shows the aftermarket performance of IPO’s in some 
countries. 
 
Table 1: Aftermarket Performance of IPO’s 
Country Authors Number of IPOs Period 
Aftermarket 
Performance 
Germany Ljunqwist 145 1970-90 -12.10%
Australia Lee, Taylor ve Walter 266 1976-89 -46.50%
Austria Aussenegg 57 1965-93 -27.30%
Brazil Aggarwal, Leal and Hernandez 62 1980-90 -47.00%
Canada Jog 130 1971-92 (-35.15%)-(-43.66%)
Chile Aggarwal,Leal and Hernandez 28 1982-90 -23.70%
Korea Kim, Krinsky ve Lee 99 1985-88 2.00%
USA Loughran ve Ritter 4753 1970-90 -20.00%
Finland Keloharju 79 1984-89 -21.10%
Japan Cai ve Wei 172 1971-90 -27.00%
UK Levis 712 1980-88 -8.10%
New Zealand Michael Firth 143 1979-87 -10.00%
Switzerland Loughran, Rydqvist and Ritter 162 1980-90 1.20%
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As it is seen in the table the long-run performance of new issues is not attractive. 
Some other researches conducted about this subject are given below: 
Koroli and Suret (2001) find that in first issues in Canada in 1991-1998 period, 
investors had negative return after 5 years of initial offering, although there was 20,57% 
return in first trading day in average.  
According to the Eric Brown (1999)’ work about the aftermarket performance of 
IPOs in UK between 1990-1995, the three year performance of 232 IPOs was %54 in 
average, however this return computed by “Buy and Hold Strategy (BHAR)” was %-
20,94 abnormal. 
Stoll and Curley (1970) find that IPOs have high initial returns but poor 
aftermarket performance. 
Buser and Chan (1987) report that in the period the 1981-1985, 1078 IPOs stock 
returns had 6,2% initial return and 11,2% of return within two years. Their findings are 
different such that IPOs do not underperform in the long-run. 
Finn and Higham (1988) find that in Sydney Exchange, between the years 1966 
and 1978, 93 firms’ stock which are issued for the first time had 29,2 % initial returns and 
%6,5 aftermarket returns. This long-run performance is very low compared to first day 
return.  
Finn and Uhlir (1989) report that in Frankfurt Exchange, within the period of 
1977-1987 the first performance of 97 IPOs’ stock was 21,5 %, whereas one year 
performance was below %7,4 than indices.  
Ritter (1991), in his detailed work, documents that 1526 stocks issued for the first 
time in New York Stock Exchange between 1975-1984 have a 14,3% first day return in 
average, continue with  positive return until the end of second month after the issue day 
and drop starting from the end of second month. 
In some researches, the aftermarket performance is analyzed or evaluated with 
other factors. In a study like this, Rajan and Servaes (1997) argue that firms with higher 
projected earnings-growth of analysts underperform compared to their benchmarks, in 
contrast, firms with the lowest growth projection outperform. So aftermarket 
underperformance is related to analysts’ overoptimism.  
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As recognized from the studies which examine the aftermarket performance of 
IPO firms, the aftermarket performance of new equity offerings is very low. But 
Loughran and Ritter (1995), in addition to aftermarket performance of IPO’s, look for the 
response of relative performance of IPO’s and seasoned equity offerings. They compare 
the results with the benchmark of non-issuing firms’ performance.13 They find that IPO 
or SEO significantly underperform relative to nonissuing firms for five years after the 
offering date; an investor would have invested 44% more money in the issuers than in 
nonissuers of the same size to have same wealth five years after the offering date. 
Bayless and Chaplinsky (1996) also try to respond, whether this poor performance 
is return reversal, since most SEOs occur after a period of high returns. But they find that 
extreme winners that do not issue dramatically outperform extreme winners that do issue. 
Besides, they document that the degree to which issuing firms underperform varies over 
time and the firms issuing during low volume of issue do not underperform much at all, 
whereas firm selling stock during high volume periods underperform more. This is very 
important point which shows that during high volume periods, the stocks may be 
overvalued. 
They report that this relative poor performance of issuers in the long-run is not 
attributable to differences in beta or to book-to market ratio. They also suggest that firms 
take advantage of windows of opportunity by issuing equity, when, on average, they are 
substantially overvalued. 
Ritter (1998) find that for IPOs that are stabilized, on average the price drops by 
about 4% in average, during the subsequent month. For the roughly two-thirds of issues 
that aren’t stabilized, there is a slight uptrend in price during the month after the issue. He 
also finds that when all IPOs are grouped together, the downtrend for stabilized issues 
and the uptrend for other IPOs tend to cancel out. Thus, in average, there is so little 
possibility for an abnormal performance, in the months after an IPO’s first day of trading. 
For IPOs that increase on the first day, trend is mostly to have a positive momentum 
during the following six months. This is especially true when there is relatively little 
                                        
13 They choose matching firm that not issued stock within the last five years and closest to issuer firm market 
capitalization. 
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flipping by institutions on the first day. (Initial Public Offerings, Jay R. Ritter 1998, 
Warren Gorham & Lamont Handbook of Modern Finance p.21) 
Nevertheless, Ritter (1998) find that, most firms going public have relatively high 
market-to-book ratios, and most of them are small capitalization stocks. Small growth 
stocks have very low returns in general, besides, if IPOs are compared with nonissuers 
that are chosen on the basis of market-to-book ratios and size, the underperformance is 
less than the situation where the nonissuers are chosen on the basis of only size. He also 
states that the underperformance is concentrated among firms that were younger and that 
went public in the heavy-volume years. IPOs that are not associated with venture capital 
financing, and those that are not associated with high-quality investment bankers, also 
tend to do poorly. 
As misvaluation of IPOs, Jain and Kini (1994) show that for 682 firms going 
public during the period 1976-1988, the median operating cash flow-to-assets ratio falls 
dramatically within three years after going public. Mikkelson and Shah (1994) also report 
that sales grow but total cash flows doesn’t grow sufficiently to justify high valuations at 
the time of offerings. Megginson (2000) report that in period the 1990-1996, although the 
profitability and real sales increase after privatization of 85 firms by selling shares to 
public, the operating performance drops after IPOs.  
Schultz (2001) makes another explanation if the IPOs go on successfully they are 
followed by an increasing number of IPOs. However, the last large groups of IPOs that 
are a relatively large fraction of the sample underperform. And also if underperformance 
is measured by weighting each IPO equally, it is examined that the high volume periods 
carry a larger weight, resulting in underperformance, in average. 
Another finding is that share price drops at the end of the lockup period as 
Bradley, Jordan, Roten, and Yi (2001), Field and Hanka (2001), and Brav and Gompers 
(2002) document. “Lockup Period” is the period (3 to 6 months after the first issue) 
where pre-issue shareholder cannot his shares. Then in this way the aftermarket 
performance becomes low. 
The theories about poor long-run performance are: 
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a) The divergence of opinion hypothesis 
One argument is that investors who are most optimistic about an IPO will be the 
buyers. If there is a great deal of uncertainty about the value of an IPO the valuations of 
optimistic investors is much higher than those of pessimistic investors. As time goes on 
and more information becomes available, the divergence of opinion between optimistic 
and pessimistic investors becomes narrow, and consequently, the market price drops. 
 
b) The impresario hypothesis 
The "impresario" hypothesis argues that the market for IPOs is subject to fads and 
that IPOs are underpriced by investment bankers (the impresarios) to create the 
appearance of excess demand. This hypothesis predicts that companies with the highest 
initial returns should have the lowest subsequent returns. 
  
c) The windows of opportunity hypothesis 
The windows of opportunity hypothesis predicts that firms going public in high 
volume periods are more likely to be overvalued than the other IPOs. 
However, some research and comments show that it is crucial to be careful in 
evaluating aftermarket performance when it is compared to the market. Long-run returns, 
even if remarkably low, are sufficiently noisy to make any statistical inference says Ritter 
and Welch (2002) and they give the example of Brav’s (2000) research where -40% 
abnormal return shouldn’t be accepted as underperformance since non-IPO firms with 
similar size and book-to market ratio performed poorly as well. However, despite such 
examples, it is not enough for being able to reject the reality of IPOs’ underperformance 
in the aftermarket.  
On the other hand, the recent bubbles in US including internet firms IPOs makes 
this aftermarket performance phenomenon more puzzling. Even if there is systematic 
long-run underperformance, it is difficult or impossible to exploit it in a reliable and 
consistent manner, as seen in the example of many short sellers who loss a great deal of 
money on internet bubble IPOs. 
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2 Literature Review 
 
Some researches about underpricing and long-run performance are mentioned in 
the previous parts of the dissertation. In this part, mostly studies that are interested in 
timing in IPO markets are presented in addition to the research results about underpricing 
and long-run performance and other important theories related to IPO markets. Because 
these anomalies are not completely dependent from each other, it seems crucial to 
interpret them together. 
Ibbotson and Sindelar (1994) argue that there are three anomalies associated with 
IPOs: (1) first-day returns that average 10-15% (2) cycles in both the volume of new 
issues and the magnitude of first-day returns, and (3) long-run underperformance. 
According to them, these anomalies are interrelated such that periodic overoptimism by 
investors creates “windows of opportunity” which results in poor long-run performance. 
In contrast, firms that issue during low-volume periods typically experience neither high 
initial price run-ups nor subsequent long-run underperformance. And more importantly, 
they add that these anomalies are much more seen for smaller, younger companies that 
are going public. This is consistent with evidence suggesting inefficiencies in markets for 
smaller-cap stocks. 
For long-run underperformance, they state that the young firms perform poorer; 
which is consistent with the higher average initial returns of young and small companies, 
since higher initial returns lead to long-run underperformance. On the other hand, Shiller 
(1990) finds that the long-run performance of IPOs should be negatively related to the 
short-run underpricing. Surprisingly, the long-run underperformance was present for the 
firms that go public during the high-volume years whereas it was absent for cold-issue 
markets. Loughran and Ritter (2002) find that the underperformance of IPOs lasts a full 
five-year period after the offering. 
Ibbotson and Sindelar want to show that young and small companies’ long-run 
performance is normally poor. Besides, windows of opportunity which also creates hot 
IPO markets cause lemon problem, so the long-run performance is poor. Long-run 
performance difference between hot and cold market prove this argument. When 
investors are overoptimistic, the information asymmetry supports this phenomenon.   
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Myers and Majluf (1984) also develop their theory in timing according to 
asymmetric information approach: 
 They start by explaining the negative price reaction in issue announcement; if the 
managers have favorable inside information, if it acts in the interest of old stockholders14, 
they will not issue share even there is a good investment opportunity on the table. The 
cost of equity issuing to old shareholders may outweigh the project’s NPV. As it can be 
expected, investors know their ignorance and interpret the firm’s decision not to issue as 
good news and to issue as bad or less good news. Of course this affects the price 
investors are willing to pay. On the other hand, Miller and Rock (1982), in their model of 
dividend policy under asymmetric information, explain that if the amount of investment 
and external financing is held fixed, the cash dividend paid by the firm reveals larger than 
expected cash flow, and stock price increases. A larger than expected external financing 
reveals lower than expected cash flow to the firm, which is bad news for investors. So 
new issue announcement cause to stock price drop.  
In Myers and Majluf’s model, the firms and old stockholders are comfortable 
when the financial slack15 is high, because the lack of lack means the loss of chance to 
issue security when it is overvalued, since the investors know the requirement to issue 
equity for firm, which is a bad signal for the market. They suppose that it can be time for 
equity issue, when value of assets in place is low and overvaluation is high.  
Financial slack may be increased by restricting dividends when investments 
requirements are modest or by issuing equity when asymmetric information is reduced 
according to Myers and Majluf. 
From another perspective, Rock (1986) claims that high initial return is not the 
result of overoptimistic demand but the compensation for high uncertainty. 
About hot issue markets of 1980’s, Ritter (1984) makes an implication of Rock’s 
model which says if the uncertainty is high the underpricing is also high for 
compensating the investors for this uncertainty. He argues that if there is autocorrelation 
in the risk composition of firms conducting IPOs, then the realized average initial returns 
should be autocorrelated as well. He finds that for the 1977-1982 period, the higher risk 
                                        
14 Stockholders before new issue  
15 Cash, liquid, assets or unused borrowing power 
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(means lower sales in Ritter’s model) firms have substantially higher average initial 
returns than the larger firms have, consistently with Rock’s hypothesis. The 
heteroskedasticity implication of Rock is also supported; higher risk categories 
(depending on firms’ size according to their sales figures) have greater variation of the 
initial returns. However for hot issue markets, there is no evidence for supporting this 
hypothesis; for each category of sales, average initial returns is higher during hot issue 
periods. When Ritter separates 1977-1982 period into two categories, one with natural 
resource and one non-natural resource IPOs, average initial returns were much higher 
during the period when oil sector’s market value peaked, however there was any evidence 
that hot issue market occurred. So, underpricing and hot issue markets can be present in 
industry basis according to him. 
Besides, Ritter shows that, the hot issue market for natural resource in 1980s with 
strong evidence was because of monopsony power hypothesis. There was no evidence for 
institutional lag hypothesis and speculative bubble hypothesis. 
Most importantly, Ritter interprets the difference between the behavior of natural 
resource and non-natural resource sectors as strong evidence of market segmentation. 
There is small degree of underpricing for established firms. So, while this expected 
underpricing appears to have cyclical component, the amplitude of the cycle is relatively 
small, so that issuing firms do not have to be overly concerned with market-timing 
considerations. 
Ritter speaks about two possible scenarios for what happens at the end of hot 
market, when the volume of IPOs increases and when average initial returns are low. The 
first possibility is that low return is the result of the decreased demand. Ritter indicates 
that this is not a good time for going public. The other possibility is that investment 
bankers are valuing IPOs at higher multiples, so with unchanged demand, less money is 
left on the table. This is the best time for going public. Since he finds strong evidence for 
monopsony power hypothesis, his result is clear: For issuing firms, the best time going 
public is after hot issue markets when the volume is high. 
Ritter, in his study made in 1998, finds that, earnings per share of the companies 
that are going public typically grow rapidly within the years before to go public, but then 
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actually decline in the first few years after the IPO. During the first two quarters after 
going public, firms rarely have negative earnings surprises. It is an important indicator of 
information asymmetry. 
In addition, Ritter and Welch (2002) say that, in the 1960s and 1970s, it was 
unusual for a prestigious investment banker to take a firm public that did not have at least 
four years of positive earnings. In the 1980s, four quarters of positive earnings was still 
standard. In the 1990s, fewer and fewer firms met this threshold. However, they find that 
the increase in the fraction of firms with negative earnings is not a primary cause of the 
increase in underpricing over time. 
About underpricing and IPO waves again, Loughran and Ritter (2002) find that, 
money left in the table in IPOs, defined as the number of shares sold times the difference 
first-day closing price and the offer price, is 9.1 million USD in average. So issues are not 
overvalued according to Lougrhan and Ritter. This amount was 27 million for the period 
of 1990-1998. Krigman, Shaw and Womack (“Why do Firms Switch Underwriters?”, 
Journal of Financial Economics 60, 2001) report that issuers retain the lead underwriters 
for subsequent offerings, although there were severe underpricing in their IPOs. This 
shows that leaving money on the table don’t disturb issuers. Loughran and Ritter argue 
that the prospect theory explains this puzzle. Prospect theory suggests that issuer care 
about the change in their wealth rather than the level of wealth, so preissue shareholders 
are comfortable with the increase in the price of retained shares. Because of this, issuers 
bargain more with underwriter for IPO price when demand is unexpectedly weak. They 
also report that the IPOs leaving most money on the table are whose their offer price 
revised upward. 
Prospect theory says that people value gains and losses differently and, as such, 
they base their decisions on perceived gains rather than perceived losses. Thus, if a 
person were given two equal choices, one expressed in terms of possible gains and the 
other in possible losses, people would choose the former. It is also known as "loss-
aversion theory". 
In addition, Loughran and Ritter claim that average first day return is predictable 
based on public information, i.e., market movement. Since first-day returns are 
predictable based on lagged market returns and lagged market returns are correlated for 
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IPOs whose preselling period overlaps, this produces autocorrelation in first day returns. 
They try to develop an equilibrium model for Ibbotson’s hot issue markets theory, by 
determining the cause of autocorrelation of first day-returns. In addition, they claim that 
hot and cold issue markets are the result of book-building method. 
In parallel to Lougrhan and Ritter’s arguments, Lowry and Schwert (2002) show 
that there a significant positive relation between initial returns and future IPO volume, so 
increased numbers of companies go public after observing that IPOs are being 
underpriced by the greatest amount.16 They reach negative correlation between current 
initial returns and past numbers of IPOs, along with strong positive correlation between 
current initial returns and future numbers of IPOs. Like Ibbotson and Jaffe (1975), they 
find that both the number of IPOs and the average initial returns are highly 
autocorrelated. Besides, they announce that the behavior of the number of IPOs is not the 
result of variation in registration times. Ritter (1998) also states that high initial returns 
tend to be followed by rising IPO volume.  
For the high initial returns’ explanation, once again Loughran and Ritter’s (2002) 
prospect theory explanation should be mentioned. It argues that initial returns are related 
to public information that becomes available during the registration period. In addition, 
Hanley (1993) finds that initial returns are related to private information learned in this 
period. Van Bommel and Vermaelen (2000) show that firms with higher initial return 
spend more money on investment after the IPO, suggesting that initial returns are 
positively related to the market’s assessment of the firm’s prospects. By the same way, 
Stoughton, Wong, and Zechner (2001) find that firms with higher first-day returns should 
gain larger market share in the product market. So, as Benveniste, Busaba, and Wilhelm 
(2002) note that the information produced by firms that go public influences not only 
their own production decisions but also those of their rivals; the decision to go public is 
also related to rival firms’ action.   
These results give the idea that the initial returns’ correlation is significant 
between the same type of firms and the number and timing of IPOs should be influenced 
by firm type and industry or sector. Not surprisingly, Lowry and Schwert find that the 
                                        
16 Initial returns equal the difference between the underwriters’ valuation of the firm, as represented by the offer price, 
and the secondary market’s valuation. 
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serial correlation in initial returns is entirely driven by changes in the types of firms that 
go public over time and by information that becomes available during the registration 
period but is only partially incorporated into the offer price. 
Importantly, they show that the level of recent average initial returns contains no 
information about the expected underpricing of new IPOs. It is to say; firm cannot 
determine the level of underpricing by timing of IPOs. Then, the average initial returns of 
these firms are largely unpredictable. 
Consistent with their prior findings (2002, Lowry and Schwert, Working papers), 
they find that the price update has an asymmetric effect on initial returns. Thus, the initial 
return responds more to positive price updates than to negative price updates. Investment 
bankers and issuing firms incorporate negative information more fully into the offer price 
than positive information. This is consistent with underwriters trying to avoid losses on 
overpriced issues while allowing informed investors to share the gains on underpriced 
issues. 
They also find that high initial returns are associated with longer registration times 
in future months. Essentially, this result seems strange since it is possible that high initial 
returns lead so many companies to file IPOs rapidly and decrease in the registration 
period of IPOs; however as in the case of Turkey IPO market, there are high number of 
applications for registration in hot periods and CMB17 can not be able to process the 
registration statements in a timely manner, or that investment banks cannot provide 
service to all of these firms simultaneously, resulting in longer registration period. 
Lowry and Schwert decompose initial return to the expected and unexpected part, 
and find that expected initial return has little power to predict number of IPOs but the 
unexpected initial return is a highly significant predictor. This means that the relevant 
information must be related to either information learned during the registration period or 
to the incremental information provided by the secondary market at the time of the offer, 
but not to the types of companies going public. When the information which becomes 
available during a new offering’s registration period, is positive, company experiences a 
positive initial return and a larger number of other companies choose to go public, 
resulting in an increase in the numbers of subsequent filings and offerings. 
                                        
17 Capital Markets Board of Turkey 
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Ibbotson, Sindelar and Ritter (1988) prove in their research one more time that 
following hot periods, there tend to be periods of “heavy” volume accompanied by 
relatively low initial returns (and thus less underpricing). They also find that the cycles in 
underpricing allow one to predict next month’s average initial return based upon the 
current month’s average with a high degree of accuracy. The first order autocorrelation of 
monthly average initial returns was 0.62 for the full 28-year period (1960-1987); in their 
following study, Ibbotson and Sindelar found that it was 0.66 for the period 1960-1992. 
In addition to this, the persistence of volume from month to month was even stronger, the 
first-order autocorrelation of monthly volume was 0.88; Ibbotson and Sindelar (1994) 
find that it was 0.89 for the period 1960-1992. High-volume months are almost always 
followed by high-volume months, with the exceptions being associated with sharp market 
drops, such as October 1987 crash. 
As it is recognized from researches presented, there is powerful relationship 
between IPO density and initial return performance of IPOs. Hot IPO markets and high 
initial returns are all events which bread each other. 
Ibbotson, Sindelar and Ritter  also measured the correlation between the average 
initial return and the number of new offerings. The correlation using contemporaneous 
yearly data is 0.12, while the correlation of the average initial return with the following 
year’s number of new offerings is 0.49. They interpret these correlation results between 
the average initial returns and contemporaneous and following year number of offerings, 
as evidence that initial returns lead volume. Because it takes at least several months from 
the decision to go public until the offering is consummated, it appears that many firms 
initiate the process when they observe a very receptive market to the offerings of other 
firms, especially for firms in their own industry. 
They find that:  
(1) Initial public offerings are significantly underpriced, on average; 
(2) The more established an issuer and hence the less investor uncertainty about 
the firm’s real value, the lower the amount of underpricing;  
(3) Hot and cold performances come in waves, the persistence of which is 
predictable;  
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(4) Cold issue markets have average initial returns that are not necessarily 
positive;  
(5) The number of new offerings also comes in waves of heavy and light activity 
which are highly serially correlated;  
(6) Underpricing appears to lead the number of new offerings by roughly six to 
twelve months. 
Since consecutiveness, presence and importance of high number or volume and 
systematic underpricing periods’ are presented, although it is not fully in the scope of this 
study, it is useful to touch on going public decision from the perspective of company’s 
characteristics themselves. As special conditions of firms have importance on the 
decision to go public, it is not so easy to differentiate them from outside factors’ such as 
the effects of general market conditions on this decision. So within this part these 
characteristics are mentioned time to time, but the core point is seen as the timing 
according to outside factors. 
Zingales (1995) determines the decision to go public as the result of value-
maximizing decision made by an initial owner who wants eventually to sell his company. 
This decision contains two factors inside it. By selling to dispersed shareholders, the 
owner maximizes his proceeds from the sale of cash flow rights, however by directly 
bargaining with a potential buyer, he maximizes his proceeds from sale of control rights. 
Initial owners time IPOs and going private transactions according to their expectation. 
So, the present value of cash flow rights is high when the level of stock prices is high, 
there is an increase in IPOs activity. 
Related to this, Mikkelson and Shah (1994) report a 29% turnover in control in the 
five years following the IPO for established firms and 13% for IPOs of young start-up 
companies. So, established firms go public more than start-ups. This argument is opposite 
to that of Ibbotson and Sindelar which state that new firms go public. However, the 
conventional wisdom is that going public is a stage in the growth of company but this 
does not mean that all companies should go public in the growth period. It is a choice as 
Pagano, Panetta and Zingales (1998) point out. 
Fundemantally, as mentioned in the introduction part young firms mostly prefer 
venture capital or angel financing, since new firms carry greater uncertainty, so investors 
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should not be willing to participate in this firm’s offering. When young firm have grown 
with venture capital, anyway venture capitalist liquidate his position in IPO market. So in 
general, “young companies go public” belief is not valid, nonetheless, in hot markets, 
with investors’ overoptimism, or in some periods like technological boom in 1990s, it can 
be possible for some short period.  
Moreover, Chemmanur and Fulgheri (1999) found that, firms in European 
Countries go public at much later age than firms in USA. 
Not maturity but about value or financial appearance of firms going public, Altı 
(2006) reports that the average cold-market firm’s IPO proceeds amount to 54% of its 
pre-IPO asset value. The same ratio for the average hot-market firm is 76% and market 
timers issue more equity than their capital needs. Besides, Eckbo (2005) find that IPO 
firms are of average size and have low M/B ratio. But it is important to make clear that 
this M/B ratio is related to firm, not the market of which the effect on IPO market is 
explored in future pages.  
Pagano, Panetta and Zingales (1988) examine Italian IPO market and they observe 
companies before going public and the bank credits for being able to see if the cost of 
credit affects the timing of IPOs. 
They define the cost of going public as follows: 
Adverse Selection 
As investors are less informed than the issuers about the true value of the 
company, this information asymmetry affects the average quality of the companies going 
public and the price of the share and the level of underpricing.  
Administrative Expenses and Fees 
Besides the direct costs such as registration fees, underwriting fees, there are also 
yearly auditing, dissemination of accounting information costs, stock exchange fees etc. 
Loss of Confidentiality 
The disclosure of information such as R&D, projects or future marketing 
strategies may be crucial for companies as they can loose their competitive advantage.   
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And they define the benefits of going public as: 
Overcoming borrowing constraints: 
Gaining access to financial source as an alternative to banks is the main advantage 
of going public. The opportunity to access public markets for funds should be particularly 
appealing for companies with large current and future investments, high leverage, and 
high growth. 
 
Greater Bargaining Power with banks 
Banks gain access to the privileged information more easily. As also Rajan (1992) 
points out, IPO firms supply more information to the investors; it gains competitive 
advantage and lowers cost of credit which means greater bargaining power with banks.  
Liquidity and Portfolio Diversification 
The decision of going public affects the liquidity of a company’s stock and the 
scope for diversification by the initial holders of the company. Liquidity should also 
lower the cost of bank credit since the stocks are given to banks as collateral and they can 
be sold in stock exchanges. Besides, taking a company public provides with owners the 
opportunities for diversification by divesting from the company and reinvesting in other 
assets. 
Monitoring 
The stock market provides a managerial discipline device by exposing the markets 
assessment of managerial decisions. 
Investor Recognition 
Investors mostly invest in a small fraction of shares by ignoring other public 
companies. In this case, if their awareness of IPO can be increased with the help of an 
advertisement, the stock prices become higher; as Merton (1987) shows, it is higher when 
more investors are aware of the company’s securities. 
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Change of Control 
Control of the company adds some premium to the stock price of the company. 
Zingales (1995) claims that the decision of going public means value maximization 
activity of the owner who eventually wants to sell it. By going public, the initial owner 
changes the proportion of cash flow and control rights. But by still retaining control he 
proceeds all extra money from dispersed shareholders. For 2004-2005 IPO market in 
Turkey, Savaşkan (2005) argues the IPOs were priced as the control of the firm was 
transferred to the investors, i.e. as the firm’s was sold to a single purchaser.  So offering 
price was overvalued and the aftermarket performance was low. 
Windows of Opportunity 
During the periods in which stocks are mispriced, the companies recognizing that 
other companies in their industry are overvalued have incentive to go public. (Ritter 
1991, The long-run performance of initial public offerings, Journal of Finance 46, 3-27) 
The cost and benefit equilibrium is an important factor in going public decision 
according to Pagano, Panetta and Zingales (1998). When the financing needs are 
increasing, the probability of being listed increases too. Contrary to expectations, both the 
relative cost of bank credit and a firm’s leverage has negative impact on the likelihood of 
an IPO, however, the concentration of bank credit appears to increase the likelihood of an 
IPO. They also argue that company’s size is an important determinant of an IPO; an 
increase of one standard deviation in the sales logarithm, which is a proxy for the firm 
size, results in an increase of 33% in the probability of IPO.  
 When they make the analysis of ex-post consequences of IPOs, they find that the 
profitability drops permanently after IPO; it is a further support to the windows of 
opportunity hypothesis, but it is different than the case of Degeorge and Zeckhauser 
(1993) which points out that the firms go public when the profitability is unusually high 
and the decrease in profitability after IPO is a regression to the mean. They explore that 
this permanent drop is the result of adverse selection and moral hazard; companies go 
public when profitability is about to decline permanently and controlling shareholders 
have a greater incentive to extract private benefits at the expense of minority 
shareholders. They also make clear that companies’ capital expenditures decrease after 
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the decision to go public so they tend to go public to rebalance their capital structure after 
implementing substantial investment plans. As additional information, the relative costs 
of credit drop after IPO but this drop weakens after three years according to Pagano, 
Panetta and Zingales’ results. 
As additional and interesting information about Italian IPO market, the initial 
owners still retain a stake much larger than 50% after going public; so they still have 
control over firms. This ratio is 44% in USA and 35% in Britain. Similar to Italy, in 
Turkey, the family companies don’t want to transfer control to other shareholders. 
However, even though the controlling group always retains a large controlling block after 
IPO, the control turnover rate is abnormally high in Italy and this is consistent with 
Zingales’ (1995) argument that IPOs are undertaken to maximize the incumbent proceeds 
of sale of the company.  
Over the debate of age of company going public, Pagano, Panetta and Zingales 
point out that in Continental Europe, large and mature companies go public. They 
interpret this situation as a greater visibility of listed companies to tax and legal 
authorities. This makes small firms to abandon the idea to go public considering higher 
tax pressure and more regulations in Europe than in USA. The Economist (January 25, 
1997) identifies two other possible obstacles in IPO markets for European small 
companies. These are the lack of institutional investors specialized in venture capital and 
the absence of a liquid stock market dedicated to small firms. 
Stoughton, Wong and Zechner (2001) say that firms often go public when they 
have substantial cash in their balance sheet. So they go public by other motives than cash 
rising. They argue that firms go public for image and publicity, then, being the first firm 
going public gives strategic advantage. Going public decision’s effect in rival firm is 
explored by Slovin, Sushka and Benedeck (1991). According to results, negative 
announcement effect of going public on rival firms is about -1%. By contrast, Ward 
(1997, Going public and product market reactions, Unpublished manuscript, Vienna: 
University of Vienna, Department of Finance) argues that the average effect of IPO 
announcements on rival firms depends on the motive given in the prospectus. 
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As recognized from Stoughton, Wong and Zechner’s argument, competition, 
image, publicity or similar issues sometimes may become the first motive for firms while 
deciding to go public, and take precedence over firm’s or market’s financial situation. 
When the financial motives are maintained again, it is seen that in their study in 
which it is looked for the response of the question about the timing of the equity issue or 
debt issue of the firms and the price reaction of the market to these firms’ decisions, Jung, 
Kim and Stulz (1995) find strong support for the agency model’s ability for explaining 
the firm’s decision between three models: the pecking-order model, the agency model 
and the timing model. Pecking-order model was defined in recent pages. 
The timing model says that if equity is overpriced and the market underreacts to 
equity issues, management maximizes the wealth of existing shareholders by issuing 
equity. This hypothesis assumes that the firms issue equity according to past and current 
market returns. 
On the other hand, the agency model says that managers seek for maximizing their 
own objectives at the expense of shareholder’s value. By the way, if the managers’ 
objective is in the same direction with shareholders’ benefits, such as growth objective, 
equity issues are worth for shareholders, but not otherwise. 
In addition, Jung, Kim and Stulz find that firms issuing equity are of IPO types: 
(i) firms with valuable investment opportunities that seek financing to grow profitably 
and (ii) firms that do not have valuable investment opportunities and have debt capacity. 
Firms without valuable investment opportunities have negative stock price reaction 
compared to firms with valuable ones. They claim that some firms issue equity to benefit 
management rather than shareholders. They show that some firms with poor investment 
opportunities issue equity and experience substantially higher asset growth than debt-
issuing firms. However, their share price drops significantly after issue. This can be seen 
consistent with the timing model in terms of overvaluation argument, but on the other 
hand they assert that it is inconsistent with timing model; the firms that have valuable 
investment opportunities which are not recognized by the financial markets should not be 
issuing equity. In this way their equity is underpriced. If such is the case, they could issue 
debt.  However hot issue markets are not explicable by this result. 
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Jung, Kim and Stulz; Pagano, Panetta and Zingales; Stoughton, Wong and 
Zechner and other researchers’ arguments mentioned above are much more related to 
firms’ special conditions than general market conditions, although market conditions 
cannot be omitted in some specific firm conditions. 
From market perspective, Lee, Shleifer, and Thaler (1991) and Lerner (1994) 
suggest that IPO volume is related to various forms of market irrationality. But this is an 
argument which makes all debate about IPO market timing null, as well as other theories 
related to stock markets, since it is not logical to talk about firms’ or investors’ systematic 
actions, if they are all irrational. 
Rajan and Servaes (1997) find positive relation between analyst following and 
IPO underpricing. Analysts are overoptimistic about IPO, even about the earning growth 
prospect of IPO firms. Then the investors following analysts are optimistic. They report a 
positive relation between the number of IPOs coming to the market in a given industry 
and earning-growth projections of analysts for recent IPOs in these industries. In this way 
they argue that analysts have great effect in investors’ decisions nevertheless, Erdoğan, 
Palmon and Yezegel (2007) argue that, market participants do not appear to react 
strongly to analyst recommendations. According to them, this result may be because of 
inaccessibility of analyst recommendation ratings to the public, but whichever the cause 
is analyst recommendations receive less attention. at means stock analysts do not have the 
stock picking ability, thereby analysts’ reflections in Turkey do not have effect in neither 
IPOs and nor aftermarket performance. 
Subrahmanyam and Titman (1999) defend government intervention in their study 
and they argue that in emerging economies, small government actions that stimulate the 
stock market can have snowball effect and the market can be more liquid and efficient 
with new IPOs and this in turn induces more firms to go public. Because, as stock 
markets become more liquid and informationally efficient, they are more attractive source 
of capital. Subrahmanyam and Titman also claim that public financing is preferred when 
serendipitous information for resource allocation is important; however, private financing 
is preferred when information relevant to resource allocation is costly to obtain. 
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Serendipitous information is information which investors may obtain by chance, 
in their day-to-day activities. For example an analyst analyzing a firm can come across 
information about another firm or when if competition is high in an industry there can be 
more serendipitous information since monitoring is high. This information type is more 
common in developed financial markets. Subrahmanyam and Titman are more interested 
in information costs and government effect. If these two are thought together for IPO 
market, it is obvious that in an emerging market where all information is available and 
the government assures the transparency, IPOs increase.  
Hoffmann-Burchardi’s (1999) clustering model of IPOs is based on the positive 
industry information feedback. This information is common-value component in the 
wake of price determination. This factor might represent the prospects for industry or 
business cycle. So the model of Hoffmann-Burchardi, in a market where both 
entrepreneurs and investors do not have complete information about industry prospects, 
assume that if the signal of the first IPO is good, the risk-averse entrepreneur of second 
firm decides to go public, since risk of remaining private is increasing. This risk increases 
when the firm’s value variance increases. It means that if the uncertainty about the state 
of the industry rises after the first IPO, the waiting strategy involves the risk for both 
high- and low-quality firms, that another high-quality firm precedes with an IPO and 
reveals poor industry prospects. Then risk-averse entrepreneurs of high or low quality 
firm type will always independently choose to go public in the first period in able to 
avoid the risk of a total loss.  
Second effect, which triggers hot issue markets, depends upon whether the 
expected IPO proceeds rise to a larger extent than the expected private firm value after 
one firm in the industry has gone public. This in turn depends on whether investors’ free-
ride on the industry information revealed in the first IPO. If the marginal benefit of 
further information production does not outweigh its costs, investors' uninformed 
valuation of the firm can increase to a larger extent than the expected private firm value.  
On the other hand, Chemmanur and Fulgheri (1999) argue that firms with longer 
track records, meaning older ones, will have lower costs of information acquisition for 
outsiders, so firms go public when a sufficient amount of information about them has 
accumulated in the public domain. Then older firms don’t need to compensate the 
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investors for costs of information by lowering share price. Younger firms, with greater 
information acquisition cost, choose venture capitalist by envisaging the premium of non-
dispersed shareholder and bargaining power of venture capitalist. In a first look, this 
argument may seem in contradiction with theories of underpricing, however it take into 
account all the time but not only hot or cold issue markets for going public decision and 
all the firms in all industries, so not only a specific period of time where some anomaly 
can be seen. Nevertheless, Chemmanur and Fulgheri (1999) argue that firms which have 
larger capital requirements and firms in industries where the technological uncertainty is 
high choose the public equity markets, although they are at earlier stage in their life. They 
also mention that, hot issue market arises when there is a productivity shock in a 
particular industry.  
In parallel with Chemmanur and Fulgheri, Jovanovic and Rousseau (Why Wait? 
A Century of Life before IPO) report that the electricity-era at the beginning of 20th 
century and information technology–era in 1990s leaded to younger firms to go public 
and M/B ratio was high for these periods. However, in general of the century, older firms 
went public mostly. Jovanovic and Rousseau’s findings support the idea that young firms 
benefit from windows of opportunity and that established firms go public mostly.  
From another point of view, Lerner, Shane, and Tsai’s (2003) results suggest that 
periods of low IPO volume represent times when private firms “can not” access the 
equity markets on favorable terms, thus it forces them to enter into less favorable 
financing arrangements. Specifically, they find that during periods of low equity 
issuance, the agreements signed between small biotechnology firms and major 
corporations are less successful and more likely to be renegotiated, compared to those 
agreements signed during periods of higher equity issuance. 
Stoughton, Pong and Zechner (2001) argue that firms above a critical quality level 
decide to go public, whereas firms with low quality levels stay private. So the 
underpricing phenomenon is because of unexpected high product quality. It is an 
argument contrary to many hypotheses however, for example it means that there isn’t any 
windows opportunity for firms if their quality is not high or if the quality is high there 
mustn’t be bad performance in the long-run. 
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 Stoughton, Pong and Zechner also argue that, if prior issuers’ initial market size is 
important and the initial prospectus of the first firm going public reveals more 
information, than the subsequent IPOs in such industries will be in waves.    
Rajan and Servaes (2002), in their study where they research whether two of 
market conditions, investor sentiment or price-insensitive demand; and feedback trader 
risk or the propensity of investors to chase trends, gain explain three anomalies and their 
relationship with some risks and IPOs; underpricing, windows of opportunity for new 
issues and long-term underperformance, find that underpricing is positively related to 
feedback risk, but it is negatively related to size and the economic effect of sentiment on 
underpricing is small. They also report that the long term excess returns decrease with 
sentiment, decrease with feedback risk, but result in feedback risk isn’t significant in all 
levels. The effect of sentiment is larger. Rajan and Servaes also find that the size is 
negatively effects the long-run performance and they estimate the results may simply 
reflect the poor performance of small firms over the 1980s. They report that an increase 
in sentiment significantly affects the number of initial public offerings coming to market. 
They also look for whether IPOs coming to market when their industry is ‘overvalued’ 
relative to the rest of the market. At first look, it seems different than Ritter and 
Loughran’s finding arguing that IPOs come to market when the overall market peaks, but 
they find consistent results with Ritter and Loughran’s findings. Besides, they report that 
the number of IPOs coming to market is significantly related to past investment growth in 
that industry, but not to future investment growth. 
From another point of view, Helvege and Liang (2002) find that IPOs in hot (high 
volume) markets are not more concentrated in particular industries than IPOs in cold 
markets; during periods of high IPO volume, offerings are more likely to arise from many 
of these industries, leading to lower concentration measures of industry clustering. They 
also recover that most industries’ hot markets occur at about the same time, i.e., when the 
market for IPOs in general is hot. It is never the case that the overall market is hot as a 
result of only one or two industries’ issuance, and it is very rarely the case that any 
industry is hot when the overall market is cold. This is very sharp claim against the 
argument which supports industry based hot markets.  
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In addition to their findings about sectoral analysis, they find little support for the 
models which says hot market firms are better quality firms with greater asymmetric 
information than cold market firms, besides they do not find support for the long term 
performance view that hot market firms are sharply weaker. 
Again about the debate between young and innovative firms and the older ones 
for going public, Helvege and Liang state that there is no clear support for theories that 
hot market firms are more likely to be start-ups in highly innovative sectors, or to have a 
greater desire to change their ownership, since they find hot market IPOs have less R&D 
and more fixed assets, and do not exhibit faster sales growth in the five years following 
the IPO than cold market IPOs. This argument is in the same parallel with Mikkelson and 
Shah’s (1994) and Pagano, Panetta and Zingales’ (1998) findings suggesting that mature 
firms go public more than start-up firms and is also supporting the profitability argument 
of Degeorge and Zeckhauser (1993). 
Lastly, as additional information, they report that hot market IPOs actually has 
higher institutional ownership than the cold market IPOs and the demand of IPOs is an 
important determinant of IPO cycles. Helvege and Liang’s findings are very interesting 
and important, as they dealt with the subjects that are neither examined nor maintained 
before. 
Another essential research is the one published by Lowry in 2002. In his research, 
he determines the objective as examining three potential explanations for the variation in 
IPO volume. One common perception regarding IPO volume is that it simply varies with 
the business cycle. During economic expansions, economy-wide demand for capital is 
higher and therefore more firms go public. A second widely held viewpoint is that the 
variation in IPO volume is primarily driven by changes in investor optimism. The popular 
press contains many examples of this viewpoint as “The [current] rule in the IPO market 
seems to be: Buy it at any price” (Wall Street Journal, May 20, 1996, p. C2), and “When 
[investors] get bearish, you can’t go public. But when they go bullish, just about anyone 
can go public.” (Wall Street Journal, April 19, 1999, p. C1.) Finally, the lower numbers 
of IPOs during periods of high uncertainty potentially reflect a lemons problem, and this 
is a third explanation of the observed fluctuations in IPO volume. Variation in investors’ 
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uncertainty regarding the true value of firms may cause the adverse-selection costs and 
therefore to fluctuate IPO volume over time. 
Three proposed explanations for variation in aggregate IPO volume are defined: 
the capital demands hypothesis, the information asymmetry hypothesis, and the investor 
sentiment hypothesis. 
As the information asymmetry hypothesis was defined before, the capital 
demands and the investor sentiment hypothesis are defined here: 
The capital demands hypothesis says that variation in IPO volume is caused by 
changes in private firms’ aggregate demand for capital. General economic conditions 
vary over time. When conditions are better and expected growth in the economy is 
higher, companies tend to have higher demands for capital. This hypothesis is not 
different from Ibbotson and Sindelar’s (1994) overoptisim narration. 
The investor sentiment hypothesis posits that variation in the level of investor 
optimism causes the costs of issuing equity and therefore IPO volume to fluctuate over 
time. During some periods, investors are overly optimistic and are willing to pay more for 
firms than they are worth. During these periods, the costs of going public are especially 
low. Consequently, a large number of firms find it optimal to go public. In contrast, 
during periods of low sentiment, investors may undervalue firms, causing IPO volume to 
be low. Similarly, Lee, Shleifer, and Thaler (1991) conclude that changes in investor 
sentiment significantly affect IPO volume over time.  
According to Lowry, results indicate that changes in firms’ demands for capital 
and changes in the level of investor optimism explain a substantial portion of the 
variation in IPO volume. Adverse selection costs are marginally significant and appear to 
be of secondary importance.  
The findings of Lowry are: industry-level dynamics in the stock market have a 
significant effect on the number of companies going public, as evidenced by the 
significance of the average industry M/B ratio and industry returns. Second, capital 
demands and investor sentiment both contribute significantly to the observed fluctuations 
in IPO volume. Information asymmetry is only marginally significant in these industry 
level regressions. Finally, industry factors have a substantial effect on IPO volume, 
incremental to market-wide dynamics.  
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In addition, Lowry suggests that there are significant negative relations between 
post-IPO raw firm returns and IPO volume and between post-IPO market returns and IPO 
volume. However, surprisingly he doesn’t find any relation between abnormal IPO 
returns and IPO volume. Firms go public successfully when they and also other similar 
firms are valued especially highly by the market. This is a supporting finding for 
industrial segmentation claims as similar firms are mostly in the same industry.  
Ritter and Welch (2002) also interpret evidence on the going public decision as 
suggesting that firms go public in response to favorable market conditions, but only if 
they are beyond a certain stage in their life cycle, similar to findings of Shah’s (1994) and 
Pagano, Panetta and Zingales’ (1998).  Ritter and Welch also argue that IPOs have a high 
level of systematic risk. This is in accordance with belief that IPOs tend to be risky 
stocks. 
According to Lowry (2002), both the M/B ratio and the MB-returns interaction 
term are significantly positive, indicating that the number of companies going public 
varies significantly with the stock market. More firms go public when the average M/B 
ratio is especially high. In addition, market returns have a significant effect when the 
market-wide ratio is also high. Market return and market level are crucial indicators in the 
decision of going public, since when market level is high and expectations are good 
enough after high return period, it is possible to catch success in public offerings, with 
increasing investor optimism.  
Pagano, Panetta and Zingales (1998) also suggest that the industry market-to-book 
ratio appears to be the most significant determinant of the probability of listing. 
Baker and Wurgler (2000) also show that firms issue relatively more equity 
around market peaks, just prior to periods of low market returns. Besides, Ritter (1991) 
finds that IPO volume is negatively related to post-IPO stock returns. 
In addition, Lowry and Schwert’s (2002) findings suggest that positive 
information learned during the registration period indicates that other companies can go 
public at higher valuations than they had previously expected. This interpretation is 
consistent with the prior findings of Lowry (2002) that more companies tend to go public 
when the average market-to-book ratio (M/B) of public firms in their industry is 
especially high. 
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Schultz (2002), in his study where he evaluates timing and long-run performance 
of IPOs together like Benninga, Helmantel and Sarig, argues that the poor aftermarket 
performance is consistent with an efficient market and it is real. More firms go public 
when they can receive a higher price for their shares, so IPOs will cluster when the 
market level is high and there are more offerings at peaks. This is pseudo market timing. 
However, issuers didn’t know prices were at a peak when they issued stock. If prices had 
kept rising, even more offerings would have been forthcoming until prices eventually fell 
and offerings dried up. So it is assumed that managers don’t have the ability to time the 
market. This is an argument refusing that hot IPO markets are predictable. 
Market level and market return are the indicators which can be easily observed 
and they don’t need detailed analysis for issuers. In Turkish capital market, it is expected 
to see strong relationship between market level and return with IPO market. When 
general economy performs well, stock market returns increase, so indirectly it is also 
expected to see causality between GDP growth rate and hot IPO markets. 
So, if the analysis is directed to more general factors, as macroeconomic 
indicators, Benninga, Helmantel and Sarig (2003) explain hot market phenomenon as 
changes in macroeconomic conditions simultaneously affect multiple industries and 
companies, firm profitability tends to be positively correlated. This is in the same parallel 
with Lowry’s findings. In particular, good economic circumstances positively affect the 
cash flows of many firms. Since when cash flows are high firms go public and reprivatize 
in their model when cash flows are low, these cash flow changes cause to create IPO 
waves. This argument should be present for Turkish IPO market, since there is very broad 
belief that hot markets come only with good economic circumstances. 
On the other hand, Benninga, Helmantel and Sarig report that if in 
macroeconomic conditions are good and in this way firm’s cash flows are high, there are 
IPO waves, but since good economic conditions affect the cash flows of both publicly 
traded and privately held firms, the cash flows of publicly traded firms are high as well. 
Thus, IPO waves coincide with times of relatively high share prices. In parallel, going-
private transactions (by an MBO, LBO, or otherwise) will also occur in waves, and that 
these waves will coincide with times of relatively low stock prices. 
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So findings and arguments of Benninga, Helmantel and Sarig are based on cash 
flows of firms and consequently IPO waves caused by the changes in cash flows. 
Moreover, according to them, cash flows are high when economic circumstances are 
better. Besides, good economic circumstances create high share price, so IPO waves 
coincide with high market level. The cash flow channel is only a level in this chain and 
adding this channel to the analysis is not enough to make an impression of fresh idea. 
However, this is another way of showing the positive effect of good macroeconomic 
conditions on IPO market.   
They also argue that since the correlation between the cash flows of firms within 
the same industry is likely to be greater than the cross-sectional correlation, hot issue 
markets are observable in industry basis. There are other supporters of industrial hot 
markets. 
An interpretation about underperformance of IPOs from Benninga, Helmantel and 
Sarig, asserts a relationship between poor aftermarket performance and timing. They try 
to explain the underperformance in the long-run by their model in which the IPO firm has 
the option to reprivatize, with its implication for owner strategies and firm risk. They 
argue that the value of the firm as the sum of two values: the ‘‘public’’ value of the risky 
cash flows and the value of the option to reprivatize. This decomposition of firm value 
implies that firm risk also has two components: cash-flow risk and the risk of the 
reprivatization option. Since small and new IPO firms have lower cash flow risk and 
since the reprivatization option is relatively higher for these firms, the cash flow risk is 
lower than older firms. In brief, they say that newly listed firms, when cash flows pass 
over the threshold between stay private and go public, go public, however since these 
new issue firms’ cash flow risk is low, the discounted future cash flow is also low, 
therefore, the aftermarket performance of stock is also low. So, Benninga, Helmantel and 
Sarig implicitly assume that the relatively new firms go public, opposite to many 
researches mentioned before. 
Directly opposite argument comes from Altı (2002) who tries to cluster IPOs, 
parallel to the findings of Pagano, Panetta and Zingales (1998) which report that most 
IPO firms don’t have urgent funding needs and firms’ public offering decision is driven 
by the effort of timing the market, the hot market is formed by the followers. Meaning, 
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the outcome of an IPO reflects information that was previously private; this diminishes 
the pricing uncertainty for later issuers and induces more IPOs. High offer price 
realizations provide strong spillover effect and trigger more IPOs than low price 
realization do. Because the high price realization decreases the information asymmetry. 
This means firms go public not when they need funds but when they believe that they 
timed IPO. He also finds that the beginning of the hot market is very sensitive to the 
market conditions, where later it decreases. So he touches on the market conditions effect 
on IPO market. Altı also report market condition effects in IPO market. According to 
him, the pioneers are more quality firms with high growth potential where followers are 
more likely to sit on the cash. Competition among informed investors increases the issuer 
quality as institutional investors’ participation result in IPO clusters where both the 
pioneers and followers are less likely to sit on the cash. This is a supporting argument for 
windows of opportunity hypothesis. 
In the first look, Altı’s and Schultz’s arguments are seen completely opposite, as 
Schultz claim that managers are not able to time to market, where Altı reports that firms 
only time market and don’t act according to financing needs. However, both of the two 
researchers represent that when market level is high, some firms benefits from this 
opportunity. But, in Altı model the quality firms go public first, firm which want to sit on 
cash follows and hot markets arise, where in Schultz’s model, firms go public until prices 
fall in the market. The only difference is that going public decision when market return is 
high is called pseudo market timing by Schultz, where Altı evaluates this as rational 
market timing. 
Boehmer and Ljungqvist (2004) analyzed 330 privately-held companies in 
Germany, which announced their intention to go public between 1984 and 1995. In 
contrast to great number of studies in this area, they started from the private firms. It is 
partially because of German IPO market’s characteristic, since it takes approximately 2 
years after announcement to go public and it is long-enough to analyze the conditions 
before IPOs. However, it gives the possibility to see the firm’s decision, in lieu of proxy 
for all firms’ decision to go public; i.e., IPO waves. 
According to the results of Boehmer and Ljungqvist (2004), IPO announcements 
are preceded by high stock index returns in the IPO candidate’s industry, firms tend to 
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announce IPO plans after increases in the volatility of share prices in their industry, 
consumer confidence which is used as proxy for macroeconomic conditions peaks in the 
announcement year and declines thereafter. Compared to other variables, such as M/B 
ratio, market return, economic indicators, return volatility is less examined in the analyses 
made before about IPO markets. For Turkey IPO market case, both stock market return 
volatility’s and exchange rates volatility’s effect on new issues is represented in the 
empirical results part of this study.  
Boehmer and Ljungqvist’s (2004) analysis of variables between the private firms’ 
the announcement date and IPO date, which is 2 years in average, shows that, increase in 
industry-adjusted sales growth, in industry-adjusted earnings growth, in industry-adjusted 
return on sales and in proxies for firm-level value drivers, rises the probability of going 
public. Besides, the stock market performance of the issuer’s industry increases the firm’s 
probability of going public. In addition, firms are more likely to complete an IPO when 
macroeconomic conditions improve. But this is valid when macroeconomic condition 
proxied by the index of consumer confidence, as none of GDP growth, forward-looking 
indicators of business conditions, and capacity utilization is significant. Nonetheless, 
GDP growth rate is used for macroeconomic condition proxy, in this study. 
Like Pastor and Veronesi, Boehmer and Ljungqvist report that firms prefer going 
public when uncertainty about their future profitability is high in Germany data, however 
its importance is modest. As additional information, family firms are less likely to go 
public in Germany, as in Turkey. 
However, Boehmer and Ljungqvist argue that the median M/B ratio in the sample 
firm’s industry has no effect in the decision to go public, in contrast many researches, 
especially Pagano and Zingales’ one (1998). In the same parallel, Pastor and Veronesi 
argue that market level, i.e. M/B ratio, cannot predict IPO waves. 
Pastor and Veronesi (2005) develop a model where they reach remarkable 
conclusions. They do not agree with any mispricing story, so with any information 
asymmetry theory. They develop a model in which fluctuation in IPO volume arises in 
the absence of any mispricing, and in which IPO volume is more closely related to recent 
changes in stock prices than to the level of stock prices. They try to develop a model of 
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optimal IPO timing in which IPO volume fluctuates due to time variation in market 
conditions. They define market conditions as having three dimensions: expected market 
return, expected aggregate profitability, and prior uncertainty about the post-IPO average 
profitability in excess of market profitability. They state that market conditions indeed 
appear to vary in these dimensions. Time variation in expected market return is consistent 
with empirical evidence on return predictability. Time variation in expected aggregate 
profitability is related to business cycles. Time variation in prior uncertainty seems 
plausible as well according to them. For example, technological revolutions are likely to 
be accompanied by high prior uncertainty, because they make the prospects of new firms 
highly uncertain. 
They solve for the optimal time to go public, and show that private firms are 
attracted to capital markets especially when market conditions are favorable in the sense 
that expected market return is low, expected aggregate profitability is high, and prior 
uncertainty is high. 
Pastor and Veronesi claim that at any point in time, private firms are waiting for 
an improvement in market conditions, i.e., for a decline in expected market return or for 
an increase in expected aggregate profitability or prior uncertainty. When market 
conditions improve sufficiently, many inventors exercise their options to go public, thus 
creating a cluster of IPOs, or an IPO wave. 
They find that IPO volume is positively related to recent market returns, which 
suggests that many firms go public after expected market return declines or after expected 
aggregate profitability increases. Another implication in their model is that IPO volume is 
more closely related to recent changes in stock prices than to the level of stock prices. 
Firms are induced to go public by improvements in market conditions, and these 
improvements lift stock prices at the same time. However, IPO volume is not necessarily 
high when the level of stock prices is high because the high price level is a result of 
cumulative improvements in market conditions, and many private firms that had been 
waiting for such improvements went public while prices were rising. Consistent with 
these arguments, they find that IPO volume is significantly related to recent market 
returns, but unrelated to the level of the aggregate M/B ratio. Important point is that this 
evidence is not the overvaluation story (mispricing theory). 
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They find IPO volume is negatively related to changes in market return volatility, 
contrary to the findings of Boehmer and Ljungqvist, and positively related to changes in 
aggregate profitability and to changes in the difference between the return volatilities of 
new and old firms.  
Pastor and Veronesi (2005) agree with Ritter and Welch’s (2002) conclusion that 
“market conditions are the most important factor in the decision to go public.", but as 
explained they point out three dimensions of market conditions that appear especially 
relevant. They also answer the Ritter and Welch’s statement “perhaps the most important 
unanswered question is why issuing volume drops so precipitously following stock 
market drops." by saying that when market conditions worsen, stock prices drop and IPO 
volume declines because private firms choose to wait for more favorable market 
conditions before going public. 
There is a very broad literature in IPOs, some part of them; especially the ones 
related to timing and hot market were explored and different findings, ideas and debates 
were represented during this session. Stock market level, market returns and initial return 
have positive effect on IPO market according to majority. General economic conditions, 
especially GDP growth don’t attract as much attention as market indicators. General 
economy has non-negligible effect on stock market indicators, so when general economy 
performs well, it is expected that to have a well- performed stock market as well, in this 
way, researchers should have chosen to deal with market variables. Stock market price 
volatility is not included in most of analyses, as many as GDP growth rate. Industrial and 
sectoral effect and overoptimism or asymmetric information are other phenomenons 
associated with hot IPO markets. Researchers are so far away from reaching to a 
consensus about these facts compared to stock market variables. 
After exploring essential theories and arguments about timing on new issue 
markets, there are some other findings which are not directly related but which are in 
touch with IPO markets. 
Altı (2006) reports that hot-market firms pay their pre-IPO shareholders large 
special dividends financed out of the IPO proceeds. This finding is consistent with 
windows of opportunity hypothesis, in this way; shareholders liquidate their positions 
relatively easily. 
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Altinkilic and Hansen (2000) argue that high volume may increase the cost of 
going public: when the IPO calendar is crowded, underwriters may offer less attractive 
terms. It is in contrast with Ritter’s argument. 
Seasoned Equity Offerings (SEO) is one step further of IPOs but it is expected 
that the same conditions can affect unseasoned and seasoned equity offerings. 
Hyuk, Masulis and Nanda (1993), in their work, want to show that, firms sell 
seasoned equity offerings when they face lower adverse selection costs, which occurs in 
periods with more investment opportunities and with less uncertainty about assets in 
place. This is consistent with the thought that large number of firms issue common stock 
or they choose to raise funds with equity financing in expansionary phases. Equity issue 
announcements are predicted to convey less adverse information about equity values in 
such periods. So they extend Myers-Majluf model by adding the debt issue into the 
model. 
They find that the relative frequency of monthly corporate equity to debt offers is 
positively related to expansionary phases of the business cycle and stock price volatility. 
Unlike the earlier results of Marsh (1982) and Taggart (1977), they find no evidence of a 
significant interest rate effect. They do find evidence of a positive impact of prior stock 
market price changes on the frequency of equity and convertible debt offers relative to 
straight debt offers.  
Besides, the results of Hyuk, Masulis and Nanda show that business cycle 
variables have significant explanatory power in report of the magnitudes of the excess 
announcement period stock returns. In addition, the relative volume of equity issues in 
the announcement month is significantly positively related to announcement period stock 
returns. They state that these findings are consistent with the adverse selection model’s 
prediction that periods of economic growth are associated with both greater volumes of 
equity issues as well as lower adverse selection costs. The stock price increase is 
significantly negatively related to the market’s price reaction to the equity offering 
announcement. Several other issue characteristics as leverage change and shareholder 
concentration are also statistically significant. 
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So for seasoned equity offerings, Hyuk, Masulis and Nanda report that 
information asymmetry drops and equity issues increases in business expansionary 
phases. Economic growth is not directly associated with first offerings; however they 
included stock price volatility in their analysis.  
Bayless and Chaplinsky (1996) look for windows of opportunity by linking the 
decision to issue seasoned equity with the cost of issue. They argue that if information 
costs deter significantly equity issue, then periods of reduced information costs should be 
periods of relatively high issue volume. They do not claim that macroeconomic factors 
are not important on issue decision but they aren’t exclusive factor that motivates issuing. 
The windows of opportunity are defined to be time periods when information costs are 
reduced for all firms. The cumulative announcement date prediction errors18 for equity 
issue are less negative during these periods. Besides, observed variations in 
announcement date prediction errors are independent of the characteristics of the issuing 
firm.  
Bayless and Chaplinsky state that, in general, in the models of asymmetric 
information, the price reaction is dependent of the issuing firm’s ability to signal their 
value and intention. High level of capital spending and high operating risk means low 
debt capacity. In parallel to this argument, Myers and Majluf (1984) argue that, if firms 
are able to persuade investors that characteristics are not because of overvaluation but 
because of firms’ other reasons, the price reaction will be lower. Bayless and Chaplinsky 
see this argument as; the influence of firm characteristics on announcement date 
prediction error suggests that hot and cold markets could result from the clustering of 
certain types of firms in high and low volume periods. However, Jean Helvege and Nellie 
Liang (2002) find evidence that hot or cold markets are no related to industry or firms 
characteristics.  
   Bayless and Chaplinsky find that identical firms experience lower prediction error 
during hot market than cold or normal markets. They suggest that observed differences in 
prediction errors are not attributable to differences in market or macroeconomic 
conditions. Nor it is because of a time trend. They argue that the use of volume to define 
hot issue markets reveals other causes for windows of opportunity when information 
                                        
18 Prediction error is the excess return in stock at the seasoned equity announcement day  
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costs are reduced. They estimate the hot market issuer would give up $13 million in 
average in additional equity value, if they were issued in cold markets. They also report 
that investors react differently to firm and market characteristics in hot and cold markets 
in ways that suggest greater concern for firm specific information, and indirectly 
asymmetric information, in cold markets. They find that windows of opportunity for 
equity issue result at least partially from reduced levels of asymmetric information.  
So Bayless and Chaplinsky claim that equity issue is increasing when information 
asymmetry is diminishing. They interpret windows of opportunity differently from other 
researchers as Jindra’s results suggest that firms are significantly more likely to have 
seasoned equity offerings when they are overvalued.19
In addition, in their study where the effect of secondary public offerings of shares 
by state owned corporations in ISE are focused on, Erdoğan, Albayrak and Tata (2007) 
conclude that cumulative average returns before and after the issue indicates asymmetry 
in the investor side. Anyway ISE was determined an emerging market where regulations 
appear to fall short to maximize informational symmetry, according to Erdoğan, Palmon 
and Yezegel (2007). So it is not so easy to talk about reduced information asymmetry 
during equity offering periods, also for Turkish capital market. 
As it is recognized, seasoned equity offerings are expected to increase in reduced 
information costs and expansionary phases of business cycles or when the market level is 
high according to the results of researches mentioned above. These findings are similar to 
IPO Market researches results. 
For more concrete relationship between SEOs and IPOs, Howe and Zhang (2004), 
in their study where the SEO and IPO relationship is examined, finds that high IPO 
volume causes high SEO volume, but, after the SEO market gets hot, the IPO market 
turns cold or normal. Besides, the SEO market is less volatile than IPO market. The IPO 
hot or cold markets last longer than those of SEOs. 
Howe and Zhang also report that all the hypotheses, information asymmetry, 
investor sentiments, future investment opportunities, and timing, can explain IPO cycles, 
but to varying degrees, however when all these hypotheses are examined in one 
                                        
19 Jindra, J., 2001. Seasoned equity offerings, valuation, and timing. Unpublished working paper. 
Cornerstone Research, Menlo Park, CA. 
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regression, there is support for asymmetric information, future investment opportunities 
and timing hypotheses, but not for investor sentiments. 
Until here, essential research results about timing in IPOs and some theories about 
public offerings are detailed to form a comparative base for Turkish IPO and market data 
analysis. There are data analysis results and comments on these results in following 
sections. 
 
3 The Model 
 
The literature on Initial Public Offerings offers a wide variety of explanations to 
justify the dramatic swings in the volume and number of IPOs observed in the market. 
According to some researches conducted on this area, IPOs pick up after value changes in 
some financial or economic variables, or vice versa. Since some results of these 
researches were already detailed in the literature review part, they are given briefly in this 
part in order to compose the model; 
Lowry (2002) Pastor and Veronesi (2005) found that the IPO volume is positively 
related to business cycles. Baker and Wurgler (2000) Liang and Helvege (2002) showed 
that firms issue relatively more equity around market peaks, just before the periods of low 
market returns where Pastor and Veronesi (2005) found that IPO volume is positively 
related to recent market returns but not to the level. 
Lowry and Schwert’s (2002) findings were consistent with the previous  findings 
of Pagano, Panetta, and Zingales (1998), Lowry (2002) and Schultz (2002) that more 
companies tend to go public when the average M/B of public firms in their industry is 
especially high. 
Ibbotson and Jaffe (1975) showed that the offerings’ density was increasing when 
initial return was higher than the average.  
The findings of Pastor and Veronesi (2005) support that IPO volume was 
negatively related to the changes in market return volatility while those of Hyuk, Masulis 
and Nanda (1993) show that the relative frequency of monthly corporate equity to debt 
offers was positively related to stock price volatility. Similar to Hyuk, Masulis and 
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Nanda, Boehmer and Ljungqvist (2004) argue that firms tend to announce IPO plans after 
increases in the volatility of share prices in their industry. 
 
In the light of these findings, the simple model was composed as following; 
(# of IPOs) = f (GDP%, r, Return, Level, Vol, InR, Volexc) 
 
# of IPOs = Number of IPOs completed 
GDP% = GDP Growth Rate 
r = Real Interest Rates 
Return = Market Return 
Level = Market Level (M/B Ratio, P/E Ratio) 
Vol = Market Volatility 
InR= Initial Return 
Volexc = Exchange Rates Volatility 
 
 In Turkish economy, exchanges rates are important indicators and, the great effect 
of economic turbulence was first seen in exchange rates, with the devaluation of Turkish 
Lira in 1994, 1997, 2000 and 2001 financial crises. Dollarization rate in Turkey was 
57.6% in 2001. Although, in recent years, this rate showed a tendency to drop, it was still 
high, and the Dollarization was 37.5% in bank deposit and 45% in financial instruments 
in 2005.20 In this way, exchanges rates were also used in the model. As the researches 
mentioned above were mostly conducted in countries where dollarization or inflation 
rates were low, this variable was naturally omitted. 
According to results reached in the previous researches and some expectations 
about Turkish IPO Market, the following hypotheses were suggested within the scope of 
this study:  
• Good economic conditions, such as increase in GDP growth rate and low 
exchange rates volatility are followed by increase in IPOs activity in Turkish market.  
                                        
20 Dolarizasyon / Ters Dolarizasyon, Presentation 03.11.2005 Eskişehir, Süreyya 
SERDENGEÇTI  
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• Increase in stock market variables, i.e. market level, market return, market 
return volatility, have positive effect on Turkish IPO market. 
• IPO swings come with high initial return, although there is no clear 
precedence between high initial return and IPO waves. 
• High interest rates cause the crowding out effect, as a different investment 
opportunity. 
 These hypotheses were first evaluated by statistical and graphical analysis without 
introducing any test, after that, correlation; simple and hierarchical regressions were 
conducted.  
      
4 The Methodology and Data 
 
The Istanbul Stock Exchange (ISE) as a public legal entity where capital market 
instruments are traded was founded in 1986. By the end of 2006, there are 325 firms 
listed in ISE Stock Market. The number of investor is approximately 1 million and 
market capitalization is about $164 million. Foreign investors’ share in stock market is 
70% according to clearing house data. The IPOs completed in ISE Stock Market between 
1990 and 2006 is the interest area of this study and the analyses about IPO swings 
according to this period’s IPOs and other variables. 
For the empirical analysis, the data was taken from ISE, CMB, Treasury, Finnet, 
IBS Analiz and Central Bank of Turkey. There are 304 IPOs in total, between the years 
01.01.1990-31.10.2006 (1990-2006), according to the data taken from ISE. The analysis 
started from 1990 as the data before 1990 was not reliable. Besides, analysis was made in 
a yearly manner as the number of IPOs was not enough to make an analysis on a monthly 
basis. However, when analysis was made in yearly basis, the time horizon was very short 
and there were only 17 samples, which made the sample size inadequate for regression 
and other analyses. In order to overcome this problem one to four years bunch sample 
was used, so that more than 60 samples was used. The data became self-repeating with 
this operation but it is critical to mention that this entails the assumption that the number 
of IPOs in the future would follow a similar pattern and average values were assumed to 
be like intermediate value which represents virtual year value.       
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Table 1 shows the number of IPOs, the volume, the type of issue and average free 
float rate of IPOs in a yearly manner. Investment trust companies are obliged to have free 
float rate greater than 49% according to capital market legislation. Since they tend to 
increase the average, free float rate was calculated with investment trust company 
included as well as excluded. Besides, Table 1 contains number of IPOs, methods of 
offering used in first offerings, nominal and total volume of IPOs. According to table, the 
number of IPOs was highest in 1990 and 2005 with 35; total volume was highest in 2000 
with 2.8 billion USD. 
Table 2 contains all the values of variables per year which were used in empirical 
analysis. Number and volume of IPOs per year, interest rates, market returns, market risk 
premium (Rm-Rf), volatility in stock market and in exchange rates, market level and 
initial return per year were all included in the table. 
For bunch of years shown in the tables 1 and 3, the mean of the years were taken, 
for example the number of IPOs in the period 1990-1992 is calculated by the sum of IPOs 
in every year and divided by the number of years; because of this, the number of IPOs 
were sometimes expressed in decimal places. 
 
5 Empirical Results 
 
Before dealing with empirical results, it is aimed to match the high number of IPO 
periods with some regulations made by CMB or with some other important developments 
in capital markets and in stock markets in ISE. This list of developments in Turkish 
Capital Market between 1990 and 2006 was maintained from the official site of CMB of 
Turkey. Regulations and forensic changes which can be effective in IPO market were 
interested with, than general economic changes as these were included in the empirical 
results part . 
With Decree No. 32 regarding The Protection of The Value of The Turkish 
Currency amended in 1989, the capital inflows and outflows were set free, after that, as 
the investment in Turkish capital markets was easier, the number of public firms and 
trading volume increased gradually, as well as since Turkish economy was an emerging 
economy, it was very interesting market for foreign capital. In this way, ISE, where 55 
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stocks were trading until the end of 1989, had 112 IPOs in 1990-1995 with the 
participation of foreign investors, today approximately 65% of shares of public firms in 
ISE, are held by foreign investors, according to Clearing House data. After mentioned 
this critical decree for all Turkish economy, as the period examined in this study covered 
time interval 1990-2006, the regulations affected possibly IPOs in ISE in this period was 
dealt with. 
The regulations, imposed in period 1990-2006, that were thought to be important 
in Turkish IPO market are displayed in the table below, the most important regulations 
were tried to be determined. 
Year Regulations Expected Effect 
1992 
Changes in Capital Market Law: Shift to registration system from 
permission system in IPOs. 
Easier access to 
Stock Exchange for 
firms 
1993 Communiqué on disclosure system is amended 
More information 
in stock exchange, 
more credible 
capital markets and 
efficient markets 
1994 The settlement time for stock exchange is extended (T+2) 
Increase in 
Liquidity 
1995 
Disclosure system is revised and public companies are obliged to 
publish financial statements much more detailed. 
More information 
in stock exchange, 
more credible 
capital markets and 
efficient markets 
1995 
Communiqué on Margin trading, shortselling and lending and 
borrowing of securities is amended 
Increase in 
Liquidity 
1999 The List of stocks that can be subject to margin trading is extended 
Increase in 
Liquidity 
2003 
The amendment of  Private Pension Plan and Publicly offering of 
private Pension funds   
Institutional 
Investors and 
increasing demand 
for stocks 
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2004 Foundation of Exchange Traded Funds Market  
Increase in 
Liquidity 
2004 
Changes in Communiqué on principles regarding registration with 
the CMB and sale of shares: Amendment of Green Shoe Option and 
Transactions Providing Price Stability After Public Offering 
Expected increase 
in demand for stock 
of IPOs, so 
increasing in public 
offerings. 
 
In 1992, changes in CML and in system of public offerings ensured to become 
public to willing firms, in the case of all the information in the prospect and financial 
statements were obvious and true. So the procedure of permission of CMB was 
eliminated. In registration system, CMB is investigating only the accuracy of information 
in the prospect, in the case of some requirements is met; the potential investor, in the lieu 
of CMB, decides about company. An increase in the numbers of IPOs was expected since 
the level of CMB authorization was picked up. 
In 1993, communiqué on Special Cases of Public Disclosure provided more 
accurate information to potential investors and credibility of publicly traded firms 
increased. So a rise in demand in stock market and in IPOs was assumed. 
In 1994, the settlement time was extended to T+2, especially for huge funds 
which invest in emerging markets, for capital placement one day is very important period 
of time, so lengthening of settlement period has annulled the disadvantage of ISE in 
competition with other exchanges in emerging markets. It was assumed to have positive 
effect on IPOs, with increasing demand for Turkish stocks. 
With same motives in the amendment of communiqué on Special Cases of Public 
Disclosure, it was presumed that if information is disseminated more accurately and 
quickly, in the world where capital inflows are mobile, the funds holders prefer credible 
markets. Moreover, they look for companies where corporate governance rules are 
applied, so detailed information is essential. 
Communiqué on Margin trading, shortselling and lending and borrowing of 
securities was amended in 1995. Naturally, the volume and credit line in the money, the 
opportunity of selling when the market breaks down increase the liquidity and trade 
volume in the market, in this way in publicly traded firms in theory. In addition, 
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extension of listing on margin trading, in 1999, might also increase liquidity in the 
market. 
All the time, institutional investors were important in the development of stock 
markets. Private Pension Plan is an important and working properly system in Turkey, so 
it supplies considerable funds for markets including stock markets. So this event was also 
included in the table for this function. The foundation of Exchange Traded Funds Market 
in 2004 was included for similar reasons. 
Finally, the direct regulation with IPOs was the changes in Communiqué on 
principles regarding registration with the CMB and sale of shares provided the possibility 
to use green shoe option by IPO firms and transaction possibility Providing Price 
Stability After Public Offering for intermediary institutions, so in this way, the price 
stabilization and blocking of price drop just after offering was expected to bring more 
IPOs to the market.   
Greenshoe option is legally referred to as an over-allotment option, a provision 
contained in an underwriting agreement which gives the underwriter the right to sell 
investors more shares than originally planned by the issuer. This would normally be done 
if the demand for a security issue proves higher than expected. A greenshoe option can 
provide additional price stability to a security issue, since the underwriter has the ability 
to increase supply and smooth out price fluctuations if demand surges too high. 
Greenshoe options typically allow underwriters to sell up to 15% more shares than the 
original number set by the issuer, like in Turkey. 
Price stabilization ensure the possibility to buy shares as long as the price gets 
below the offering price, to brokerage firm acting in public offering and the brokerage 
firm mentioned in the prospectus after the shares begin to be traded on the stock 
exchange, provided that the prospectus consists in enough disclosure. Transactions 
providing price stability after public offering are applicable at most for 30 days after the 
date beginning of trade on the stock exchange in Turkey. 
When the number of IPOs in ISE by year is remembered; 
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Years Number of IPOs 
1990 35 
1991 23 
1992 13 
1993 16 
1994 25 
1995 29 
1996 27 
1997 29 
1998 20 
1999 10 
2000 35 
2001 1 
2002 4 
2003 2 
2004 12 
2005 9 
2006 14 
Table: Number of IPOs in ISE in 1990-2006 
 
It is seen that, in years 1994-1998, there were 130 IPOs, may be the hottest sub-
period for 17 years period, although many investors lost their savings because of 1994 
crisis. In this pattern, it is possible that the regulations made in these years (1993-1995 
from table) have contribution. The same thing is true for 2003 and 2004 regulations, but it 
is not possible to claim strongly that these are the only cause of increase in the numbers 
of IPOs, when their contribution can not be disregarded. 
Before introducing the empirical results, the historical development of Turkish 
Capital Market between 1990 and 2006 was explored since Turkish Capital Market is an 
emerging market and regulations imposed during this period and other important 
economic events have undeniable impact in all market, in this way in IPOs. So, following 
analyses were healthier in the light of this historical analysis. 
In the table 1, there are the number of IPOs, the volume, the type of issue and 
average free float rate of IPOs in a yearly manner. Investment trust companies are obliged 
to have free float rate greater than 49% according to capital market legislation, so, they 
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increase the average. Because of this, free float rate is presented with investment trust 
companies included as well as excluded. 
According to Capital Market Legislation and Turkish Commercial Code, first time 
issuing equity is possible in three ways; i.e. by gradual foundation which is not used too 
much as it is a hard process, by capital increase and by shareholder sale methods. By 
gradual foundation, the firm is founded for issuing equity to the public and beginning 
from the start-up day it is a public company. The already established firm which is not a 
public one can become publicly traded by actual shareholder’s sale of own shares to the 
public or by capital increase method. Naturally, both of these last two IPO methods can 
be used at the same time. According to table 1, in period 1990-2006, 142 times 
shareholder issue method, 119 times capital increase method, 38 times both of two and 
only 3 times gradual foundation method are used in 304 IPOs realized. The data of issue 
method in two IPOs committed in 1990 couldn’t be reached.   
In the same period, the mean of the number of IPOs was 18 per year. 1990 and 
2005 were the years with the highest average of 35. After the liquidity crisis in November 
2000 and devaluation in February 2001, there was only 1 IPO in 2001, 4 in 2002 and 2 in 
2003. The effect of devaluation in 1994 and Asian crisis in 1997 doesn’t seem as 
powerful as crisis in 2001.  As future analysis shows, there was no significant 
relationship between growth rate and number of IPOs, it can be because of the situation 
that during the years 1994 and 1999 where the GDP growth rate was negative, there is no 
decrease in both of number and volume of IPOs contrary to year 2001 where number of 
IPOs and GDP growth rate slowed down sharply; moreover there was an increase in 
1994. When the volume of IPOs was analyzed, the highest amounts were seen in 2000 
and 2005, however the second highest was in year 2005 although the number was only 9. 
This is because of high free float rate and issue of 4 ITC, since in 1990 the average free 
float rate was only 17.95%.  
As the inflation rate was too high in Turkey especially between years 1990-2002 
(74.59% in average), the volume was more reliable when it was expressed in USD terms. 
It was 2,806,222,339 USD in year 2000, when in 1990 where the same number of IPO 
have realized, it was only 985,310,872 USD. In 2002, the IPO volume was only 242.654 
USD. In 2005, 1,743,964,256 and in 2006, 929,464,658 were the amount raised by first 
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time issuing equity. During this period 38 ITC was issued to public and 142 of 304 issues 
was made by shareholder issue, 119 by capital increase method and 38 by both. Although 
after 1995 issuing by capital increase method has risen, the weight of shareholder issue 
was greater because of high utilization between 1990 and 1995. Gradual foundation 
method was used only 3 times in these 17 years; it is not often preferred as it is very long 
and hard period. 
As the main aim of this study was to see the comovements of number of IPOs or 
IPO volume with other variables, i.e. GDP growth rate, return in the market, volatility of 
the return in the market, M/B ratio, initial return of IPOs and interest rates, all these 
variables’ relationship with IPO market were analyzed by order for the period of 1990-
2006. The following sections explain results reached in these analyses.  
Business cycles or economic growth was an important factor for all industry and 
financial markets actors. So there are many researchers interested with business cycles 
and IPO timing.  
Briefly, studies conducted on this subject were as following; 
 
Lowry (2002) determined his objective as examining three potential explanations 
for the variation in IPO volume and one of this was if IPO volume is that it simply varies 
with the business cycle. He argued that when conditions are better and expected growth 
in the economy is higher, companies tend to have higher demands for capital.   
Pastor and Veronesi (2005) found that IPO volume is positively related to changes 
in aggregate profitability and time variation in expected aggregate profitability is related 
to business cycles. So the IPO volume is positively related business cycles. 
Hoffmann-Burchardi’s (1999) clustering model of IPOs was based on the positive 
industry information feedback. This information was common-value component in the 
wake of price determination. This factor might represent the prospects for industry or 
business cycle. So the model of Hoffmann-Burchardi, in a market where both 
entrepreneurs and investors do not have complete information about industry prospects, 
assumed that if the signal of the first IPO is good, the risk-averse entrepreneur of second 
firm decides to go public, since risk of remaining private is increasing. In this way, 
according to them, if the economic conditions are good, remaining private increases the 
risk and the number of going public firms increase since they don’t want to take risk. 
 75 
 These variables and the number or volume of IPOs are presented for comparison 
in the same graphs which are presented at the end part of this study.  
 
Years Number of IPOs Growth Rate Total Volume(USD) 
1990 35 9.4 985,310,871.9 
1991 23 0.3 391,627,012.4 
1992 13 6.4 94,423,549.9 
1993 16 8.1 152,446,679.0 
1994 25 -6.1 270,480,024.6 
1995 29 8.0 246,782,514.6 
1996 27 7.1 167,921,615.7 
1997 29 8.3 420,376,565.8 
1998 20 3.9 383,348,400.8 
1999 10 -6.1 90,722,366.2 
2000 35 6.3 2,806,222,339.0 
2001 1 -9.5 242,654 
2002 4 7.9 56,467,358.4 
2003 2 5.9 11,252,272.7 
2004 12 9.9 482,575,184.7 
2005 9 7.6 1,743,964,255.7 
2006 14 5.0 929,464,657.6 
 Table: Number and volume of IPOs in ISE and GDP growth rate per year 
 
 Table above and the graph 1 and 2, reveals that there was a comovement between 
the number of IPO and the GDP growth rate, when the growth rate decreased, the number 
and volume of IPO decreased too, or vice versa. Only in 1992 and 1994 and 2006 there 
was inverse relationship between these variables. This makes us to think that there may 
be high correlation between GDP growth rate and number or volume of IPOs. The table 
below shows the change rates of these variables. 
 
Years Number of IPOs GDP Growth Rate Total Volume(USD) 
1991 -34.29% -96.27% -60.25% 
1992 -43.48% 1733.89% -75.89% 
1993 23.08% 27.16% 61.45% 
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1994 56.25% -174.74% 77.43% 
1995 16.00% 230.69% -8.76% 
1996 -6.90% -10.46% -31.96% 
1997 7.41% 16.43% 150.34% 
1998 -31.03% -53.49% -8.81% 
1999 -50.00% -257.82% -76.33% 
2000 250.00% 204.15% 2993.20% 
2001 -97.14% -250.47% -99.99% 
2002 300.00% 183.23% 23170.68% 
2003 -50.00% -26.06% -80.07% 
2004 500.00% 68.69% 4188.69% 
2005 -25.00% -23.23% 261.39% 
2006 55.56% -34.21% -46.70% 
 Table: Percentage Change in the Number and Volume of IPOs in ISE and GDP Growth Rate 
 
According to the results in the table above, although the direction of variables’ 
change were same, variances are not same, i.e., the percentage change in GDP growth 
rate and number of IPOs, even volume, were very different from each other. In addition, 
percentage change volume and the number of IPO volume were very different from each 
other. But it must be confessed that as the number of IPO in ISE is very low and the 
number of publicly traded firms is only about 400, the percentage change evaluation 
could be deceitful, because as in the example of 2001 to 2002, increase in number of IPO 
from 1 to 2 means 100% change, overblown increase. But the decrease from 35 to 1 is 
only about 97% decrease, so percentage change can be fallacious if the number is low. 
The critical point was the direction of these two variables by year. In 13 of 17 sample 
years, the change in direction of these variables was same. If total volume with GDP 
growth rate was examined it was recognized that in 12 years, the volume changes in the 
same direction with GDP, i.e., increases when GDP growth rate increases, or vice versa. 
Because, in 1995, 2005 and 2006, IPOs’ total volume and IPOs numbers changed in 
opposite direction relative to previous year. In the light of these facts, the core point is 
that according to the results, the GDP growth rate, so economic conditions have 
considerable impact on IPOs in Turkey. Although same conclusion in regression analysis 
was expected to appeared, the percentage change rate differences threatened the possible 
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significance of regression analysis for these two variables. This is analyzed in depth in 
following pages. 
If these variables were compared, i.e. total volume and GDP, by accepting the 
values in year 1990 as 1 and by expressing following years in relative number, the results 
in table below were reached: 
Years Relative IPO Volume(USD) Relative GNP(USD) 
1990 1.00 1.00
1991 0.40 1.00
1992 0.10 1.05
1993 0.15 1.19
1994 0.27 0.88
1995 0.25 1.13
1996 0.17 1.22
1997 0.43 1.28
1998 0.39 1.37
1999 0.09 1.23
2000 2.85 1.33
2001 0.00 0.97
2002 0.06 1.20
2003 0.01 1.59
2004 0.49 1.99
2005 1.77 2.39
2006 0.94 2.52
Table: Relative Values of IPO Total Volume and GDP (Base Year: 1990) 
 
The relative results in the graph 3 reveals that there is no obvious comovement of 
yearly GDP growth rate and yearly IPO total volume in ISE especially in period 1999-
2001. However, if this period is omitted, this relative analysis makes us hopeful about the 
effect of economic conditions in IPO market in Turkey. 
Interest rate is another important indicator of general economy. GDP growth rate 
should be low when interest rates are high since investment and consumption component 
of GDP are low, so inflation rate is expected to be low too. However, in the long-run, as 
the saving rate increases when interest rates are high, the growth rate would increase. In 
relation to this, if hot IPO markets are present when GDP growth rate is high, it is 
expected to have inverse relationship between interest rates and IPO volume. 
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Nevertheless, according to the numbers and graph 4, this relationship was not seen. 
However if inflation rates were not reckoned, analysis might be wrong. Because, real 
interest rates are more significant for saving and consumption as potential investor will 
decide according to real rates, so more significant for GDP. When real rates were 
considered, expected results were more present than the nominal interest rates’ case. But 
in the countries where the interest rates and inflation rates were too high, sometimes 
hyperinflation was present, like the 1990-2001 period in Turkey, the interest rates, GDP 
growth rates, saving and consumption relations in normal economies, i.e. low inflation 
rates, were broken down. In this way, after 2001 there were more logical relationships. 
  
Years 
Number of 
IPOs 
GDP 
Growth 
Rate Total Volume(USD) 
Interest 
Rate(12_months;end of 
the previous year ) 
Real 
Interest 
Rates 
1990 35 9.4 985,310,871.9 58.83% -5.45%
1991 23 0.3 391,627,012.4 59.35% -1.06%
1992 13 6.4 94,423,549.9 72.70% 1.56%
1993 16 8.1 152,446,679.0 74.24% 8.27%
1994 25 -6.1 270,480,024.6 74.76% 3.68%
1995 29 8.0 246,782,514.6 95.56% -29.93%
1996 27 7.1 167,921,615.7 92.32% 16.27%
1997 29 8.3 420,376,565.8 93.77% 14.01%
1998 20 3.9 383,348,400.8 96.56% -2.53%
1999 10 -6.1 90,722,366.2 95.50% 25.77%
2000 35 6.3 2,806,222,339.0 46.73% -22.06%
2001 1 -9.5 242,654 45.64% 6.61%
2002 4 7.9 56,467,358.4 62.50% -6.03%
2003 2 5.9 11,252,272.7 48.19% 18.44%
2004 12 9.9 482,575,184.7 28.59% 10.23%
2005 9 7.6 1,743,964,255.7 22.06% 12.74%
2006 14 5.0 929,464,657.6 20.38% 12.66%
Table: Interest Rate, Market Return and IPOs 
 
In the analysis above, the interest rates for following year was taken as the 12 
months’ rates of the last year’s December, because it was assumed that sample investor 
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decides to invest his money in bank deposits for 1 year in January first, regarding to rates 
for last one year, or looks for another alternative like capital markets. The interest rates 
were computed as interest rates minus inflation rates at the end of the last year. 
 
Years Number of IPOs 
Interest Rates(End of 
last year_12 Months) Total Volume(USD) 
1990 35 58.83% 985,310,871.9 
1991 23 59.35% 391,627,012.4 
1992 13 72.70% 94,423,549.9 
1993 16 74.24% 152,446,679.0 
1994 25 74.76% 270,480,024.6 
1995 29 95.56% 246,782,514.6 
1996 27 92.32% 167,921,615.7 
1997 29 93.77% 420,376,565.8 
1998 20 96.56% 383,348,400.8 
1999 10 95.50% 90,722,366.2 
2000 35 46.73% 2,806,222,339.0 
2001 1 45.64% 242,654 
2002 4 62.50% 56,467,358.4 
2003 2 48.19% 11,252,272.7 
2004 12 28.59% 482,575,184.7 
2005 9 22.06% 1,743,964,255.7 
2006 14 20.38% 929,464,657.6 
Table: IPOs and Interest Rates (RF) 
 
According to the results in the table above and to graph 5, the expected inverse 
relationship between interest rates and number of IPOs wasn’t seen clearly, but when the 
numbers were explored in details, it was recognized that, the dramatic decrease in interest 
rates come with dramatic increase in IPOs, or vice versa, as in 1992, number of IPOs 
decreased from 23 to 12 when interest rates increased by 20%, as in 2000, it increased 
from 10 to 35 when interest rates slowed down from 95% to 45%, as in 2004. The moral 
of the story is that when interest rates stay almost same, the number of IPO changes, it 
isn’t amazing as the interest rates are not only factor that affect IPO market, however 
shocks in this indicator cause to changes in IPOs, at least for samples above. 
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Market return can be thought to be most important factor in IPO market, since 
offered stocks will be traded in stock exchange. Besides, if the expectations about market 
are fine, selling shares is easier for IPO firms. Nevertheless, these factors, i.e. the 
indicators evaluated with IPOs, were correlated with each other. The correlation table of 
these indicators is given at the end of this section. 
The timing model says that if equity is overpriced and the market underreacts to 
equity issues, then management maximizes the wealth of existing shareholders by issuing 
equity. This hypothesis means that the firms issue equity according to past and current 
market returns. 
When prior studies are explored;  
Baker and Wurgler (2000) showed that firms issue relatively more equity around 
market peaks, just prior to periods of low market returns.  
Pastor and Veronesi (2005) found that IPO volume is positively related to recent 
market returns, which suggests that many firms go public after expected market return 
declines or after expected aggregate profitability increases. At same time, they evaluated 
market returns from different view and they argued private firms are attracted to capital 
markets especially when market conditions are favorable in the sense that expected 
market return is low. 
In market return calculation, ISE-100 indices daily returns were used. It was 
computed in two ways: cumulative and simple return then as the interest rates are ones of 
Central Bank of Turkey, it was accepted as risk-free rate and Net Return in the market 
was computed as Market Return minus Risk Free Rate (RM- RF). 
Cumulative return was computed by: 
          N=K     
CRM  = ∑((PN/PN-1) – 1) 
        N=1  
CRM: Cumulative Return in the Market 
PN: Closing value in nth day 
PN-1: Closing Value in (n-1)th day 
 
Simple Return is computed by:      
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RM  = ((PN/PN-1)-1)  
RM: Simple Return in the Market 
PN: Closing value in nth day 
P1: Closing Value in first day 
 
ERM=CRM-RF 
ERM: Excess Return in the market
RF: Risk-free Rate 
 
Both cumulative and simple returns were computed per year, for the period 1990-
2006. According to the results in the table below and the graph 6, the cumulative return 
was smoother than simple return per year, as expected.  
 
Years Simple Return(ISE100) Cum Return(ISE_100) 
1990 46.81% 53.65%
1991 34.03% 45.11%
1992 -8.18% -3.15%
1993 414.98% 172.51%
1994 31.95% 47.13%
1995 47.55% 46.77%
1996 140.79% 92.91%
1997 271.45% 145.97%
1998 -22.76% -5.47%
1999 498.31% 192.95%
2000 -37.59% -29.37%
2001 47.95% 58.11%
2002 -23.81% -17.57%
2003 82.28% 68.15%
2004 36.67% 35.14%
2005 63.81% 52.44%
2006 2.77% 6.56%
Table: Market Returns 
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The return in the market was very high in 1993, 1996, 1997 and 1999 with values 
greater than 100%. Besides, in 1992, 1998 and 2002, there was negative return in ISE 
according to the indices. For computing excess return, simple return and 12 months-
interest rates values at the end of the last year were used, since assumed that, buy and 
hold strategy (BAH) was used by sample investor. The cumulative excess return was 
showed in the table for references and comparison with simple excess return, but it was 
not used in analysis and graph, because this was computed by cumulative return minus 
12_months-interest rates, instead of computing by subtracting daily interest rates from 
daily return. When the excess return was added in the analysis, the results in the table 
below were reached. 
 
Years 
Number 
of IPOs 
IPOs' Total 
Volume 
Int 
Rates 
Simple 
Return(ISE100) Rm-Rf 
Cum 
Return(ISE_100) Rm-Rf 
1990 35 985,310,871.9 58.83% 46.81% -12.02% 53.65% -5.18%
1991 23 391,627,012.4 59.35% 34.03% -25.32% 45.11% -14.24%
1992 13 94,423,549.9 72.70% -8.18% -80.88% -3.15% -75.85%
1993 16 152,446,679.0 74.24% 414.98% 340.74% 172.51% 98.27%
1994 25 270,480,024.6 74.76% 31.95% -42.81% 47.13% -27.63%
1995 29 246,782,514.6 95.56% 47.55% -48.01% 46.77% -48.79%
1996 27 167,921,615.7 92.32% 140.79% 48.47% 92.91% 0.59%
1997 29 420,376,565.8 93.77% 271.45% 177.68% 145.97% 52.20%
1998 20 383,348,400.8 96.56% -22.76% -119.32% -5.47% -102.03%
1999 10 90,722,366.2 95.50% 498.31% 402.81% 192.95% 97.45%
2000 35 2,806,222,339.0 46.73% -37.59% -84.32% -29.37% -76.10%
2001 1 242,654 45.64% 47.95% 2.31% 58.11% 12.47%
2002 4 56,467,358.4 62.50% -23.81% -86.31% -17.57% -80.07%
2003 2 11,252,272.7 48.19% 82.28% 34.09% 68.15% 19.96%
2004 12 482,575,184.7 28.59% 36.67% 8.08% 35.14% 6.55%
2005 9 1,743,964,255.7 22.06% 63.81% 41.75% 52.44% 30.38%
2006 14 929,464,657.6 20.38% 2.77% -17.61% 6.56% -13.82%
Table: IPOs and Market Return 
 
The graph 6 and the numbers above displays that the number of IPOs and the 
market return in the same year do not seem in relation with each other, however, if 
 83 
analysis was made with the RM-RF of the last year and IPO market of actual year, there 
was some stronger relationship between these variables: 
 
Years Number of IPOs RM-RF(Last Year) IPOs' Total Volume 
31.12.1990 35 ∗409.00% 985,310,871.9
31.12.1991 23 -12.02% 391,627,012.4
31.12.1992 13 -25.32% 94,423,549.9
31.12.1993 16 -80.88% 152,446,679.0
31.12.1994 25 340.74% 270,480,024.6
31.12.1995 29 -42.81% 246,782,514.6
31.12.1996 27 -48.01% 167,921,615.7
31.12.1997 29 48.47% 420,376,565.8
31.12.1998 20 177.68% 383,348,400.8
31.12.1999 10 -119.32% 90,722,366.2
31.12.2000 35 402.81% 2,806,222,339.0
31.12.2001 1 -84.32% 242,654
31.12.2002 4 2.31% 56,467,358.4
31.12.2003 2 -86.31% 11,252,272.7
31.12.2004 12 34.09% 482,575,184.7
31.12.2005 9 8.08% 1,743,964,255.7
31.12.2006 14 41.75% 929,464,657.6
Table: IPOs and Previous year’s Market Return 
 
In 1990, there were 35 IPOs after 410% excess return in the market in 1989, the 
negative returns in 1990 and 1991 caused to colder issue markets in 1991 and 1992; 
although there was negative return in 1992 there was an increase in the number of IPOs 
in 1993. Positive excess market returns in 1996 and 1997 provided high volume in 
following years. The great impact of market return on IPO market in 1999, 2000 and 
2001 was seen; so the comovement was clear. The graph 8 also shows this situation 
explicitly. Besides when the IPO volume was added in the analysis, the correlation 
between IPO volume and previous year’s excess return was seen obviously in graph 9. 
                                        
∗ 1989 (RM1989 –RF1989=4.93-0.84) 
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It should be considered that in 1990, 4 and in 1991, 9 privatizations took place by 
initial public offerings. Privatization by Public Offering is successful, like other IPOs, 
when economic environment is convenient, but it is a bit different than private company 
public offering. Because the privatization waves come with the policy of the government 
and the process is much longer than private company’s offering process. It means that, 
government tries best for timing privatization, as private company, however the 
governments make their plans for longer time horizon compared to private company and 
they act according to a program specified in advance. It is not easy to drop off some 
decisions when the conditions are not as expected for government, since the structure of 
government is bureaucratic. So, there might be a lag of years between the decision of 
privatization and the privatization waves themselves. Besides, the politicians can have 
decision according to other arguments different than market conditions. In summary the 
aim is to show that the privatizations by IPO or another way can emanate from other 
reasons as well as good economic condition, such as political issues, thus, by taking into 
account, the possible lag between decision and privatization, 23 IPOs including 9 
privatizations in 1992 can be misleading. After negative market return in 1990, the 
decrease in the number of IPOs in 1991 had been smoothed by privatizations same year. 
May be the lag was 2 or more years, high market return in 1989 caused to increase 
privatizations in 1991 or in following years. 
On the other hand, in parallel to Subrahmanyam and Titman (1999) argument 
which assert that in emerging economies, small government actions that stimulate the 
stock market can have snowball effect, this privatization waves might have positive effect 
in IPOs in Turkish market during these years. 
 After completing the analysis about market yield effect on IPOs, market level 
influence in them was examined in detail. 
The market level is so important in IPO timing according to many researchers as 
it is mentioned before.  M/B ratio, proxy of market level, is essential in IPO waves like 
Liang and Helvege (2002) indicated, some others argued that not market level but market 
returns before IPO, so market movements are critical for hot issue markets, like Pastor 
and Veronesi (2005) stated. 
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Pastor and Veronesi developed a model and in which IPO volume was more 
closely related to recent changes in stock prices than to the level of stock prices. They 
found that IPO volume was significantly related to recent market returns, but unrelated to 
the level of the aggregate M/B ratio. They noted also that market conditions were related 
not only to IPO volume but also to stock prices, as represented by the firms' ratios of 
market to book value of equity (M/B). IPO volume was then naturally related to stock 
prices as well. This was an important and different interpretation than many researchers’ 
findings. Besides, Boehmer and Ljungqvist (2004) found that the median M/B ratio in the 
sample firm’s industry has no effect in the decision to go public.  
 Nevertheless, in general, many researchers indicated that market levels, so M/B 
ratio is an important puller on the trigger for IPOs and many firms go public when this 
ratio in general market is high.   
 As it was given in detail before, these researches can be passed off only by brief 
repetition; Schultz (2002) also argued that more firms go public when they can receive a 
higher price for their shares, so IPOs will cluster when the market level is high and there 
are more offerings at peaks.  
Jovanovic and Rousseau (Why Wait? A Century of Life before IPO) also reported 
that the electricity-era at the beginning of 20th century and information technology–era in 
1990s leaded to younger firms to go public and M/B ratio was high for these periods.  
Lowry and Schwert’s (2002) findings was consistent with the prior findings of 
Pagano, Panetta, and Zingales (1998) and Lowry (2002) that more companies tend to go 
public when the average M/B of public firms in their industry is especially high. 
Lowry (2002) also indicated that both the M/B ratio and the M/B-returns 
interaction term were significantly positive, indicating that the number of companies 
going public varies significantly with the stock market. More firms go public when the 
average M/B ratio is especially high. In addition, market returns have a significant effect 
when the market-wide M/B ratio is also high. This is a little bit different point of view, 
for IPO market to move, the high market return should be present in the market where 
M/B ratio is high.  
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In this study, main aim was to find any relationship between general market level 
and IPOs number and volume; firms’ or industry’ ratio weren’t dealt with, since the 
number of IPOs and data were not sufficient for this type of more micro analysis.   
 In the table below, there are M/B ratio and number and volume of IPO by year. 
The M/B ratios were taken from ISE annual activity report and ISE web page.21 For the 
table below, the comovement of market and IPO number or volume for the same year 
were searched. If there was, it would meant that the market and IPO number increases at 
the same time or book value decreases, but it was not so expected when the market 
conditions were getting better. 
  
Years Number of IPOs Total Volume(USD) M/B Ratio 
1990 35 985,310,871.9 4,05 
1991 23 391,627,012.4 2,59 
1992 13 94,423,549.9 1,67 
1993 16 152,446,679.0 6,78 
1994 25 270,480,024.6 5,09 
1995 29 246,782,514.6 3,71 
1996 27 167,921,615.7 4,52 
1997 29 420,376,565.8 8,31 
1998 20 383,348,400.8 3,21 
1999 10 90,722,366.2 7,70 
2000 35 2,806,222,339.0 3,02 
2001 1 242,654 3,71 
2002 4 56,467,358.4 2,01 
2003 2 11,252,272.7 2,16 
2004 12 482,575,184.7 1,51 
2005 9 1,743,964,255.7 2,11 
2006 14 929,464,657.6 1,92 
        Table: IPOs and Market Level 
 
Numbers and graph 10 don’t display significant relationship between these 
indicators for all picture of the period of 17 years starting from 1990. There is only sub-
                                        
21 http://www.ISE.gov.tr/veri.htm 
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period 1990-1994 which can be interpreted as there can be a relationship, but this is not 
satisfying.  
Like market returns, when lagged results were evaluated, there was more 
significant comovement between M/B ratio of previous year and number of IPOs. This is 
healthier analysis since firms take decisions according to the past. M/B ratio is a market 
level in one time during a year. For example, M/B ratio for 2000 was taken as December 
M/B ratio, so it was assumed that in year 2001, firms decided according to the end of 
December ratio. Of course, in reality, these decisions are not taken according to the last 
month’s value, but, the level was taken from the end year at the first step.    
 When the numbers and graph 11 were analyzed in depth, there was clear 
comovement of M/B of previous year and actual number of IPOs. It can be state that 
firms decide to go public according to the past price level of the market. 
 
Years Number of IPOs M/B Ratio(Previous year  end) 
12/31/1990  35 4,12 
12/31/1991  23 4,05 
12/31/1992  13 2,59 
12/31/1993  16 1,67 
12/31/1994  25 6,78 
12/31/1995  29 5,09 
12/31/1996  27 3,71 
12/31/1997  29 4,52 
12/31/1998  20 8,31 
12/31/1999  10 3,21 
12/31/2000  35 7,70 
12/31/2001  1 3,02 
12/31/2002  4 3,71 
12/31/2003  2 2,01 
12/31/2004  12 2,16 
12/31/2005  9 1,51 
12/31/2006  14 2,11 
Table: IPOs and previous year M/B ratio 
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 As it was seen in detail during this study, may be the most interesting 
phenomenon in IPO market were underpricing, initial return in IPOs and hot issue 
markets. After mentioning about high first day initial returns in research of SEC, Ibbotson 
(1975) reported that the positive mean initial performance of IPOs was present and 
asserted that positive initial returns were not inconsistent with efficient market so it 
means that new issue offerings are underpriced. After this determination, underpricing 
has been tested in many countries. According to the results, the underpricing was present 
in many countries’ IPO market. In this way, too many theories are developed about 
underpricing. As until here these theories are explored in detail they are not repeated once 
again. 
The studies made in Turkey, in ISE are as below; 
Güzelhan and Ağar (1991) found that in IPOs realized during the period January 
1989-March 1991, first day return was 2.6%, first week return was 9.5%; first month 
return was 9.5% in average, so they argued that there was underpricing in ISE for this 
period.   
Aydoğan and Yıldırım (1992) examined 33 IPO fulfilled between December 1989 
and April 1991. They explored that these IPOs supplied 1.2% return in first day, -0.1% in 
twentieth day and -18% after 100 day, however they added that the results were not 
statistically significant. In addition to this, they found that, the underpricing was more 
present in IPO of Public Participation Administration (PPA). When the 25 private sector 
and 8 PPA IPOs were examined separately, the private sector average initial return was 
1.3 % at the end of first day, 0.4% in twentieth day and -10.7% in 100. day, but PPA 
average was 0.7% at the end of first day, -98% in twentieth day and 30.4% in 100. day. 
Increase in returns of PPA IPO after 100 day showed that there is intervention of PPA for 
pulling on the trigger of other IPOs according to Aydoğan and Yıldırım. This 
interpretation supported my argument about privatization mentioned in the relationship 
interest rate, market return and IPOs part, so the privatization doesn’t have to take place 
in the same conditions with private sector IPOs. 
Kıymaz (1999), in his study where he examined 1990-1996 period’s initial and 
aftermarket performance of 163 public firms in ISE, found that IPOs were underpriced 
 89 
13.6% on average. This rate was 12.2% for manufacturing sector, 15.3% for financial 
institutions and 18.5% for other sectors. First day abnormal returns were %13.1 in all 
IPOs, 11.7% in manufacturing sector, 15% in financial institutions and 17.6% in other 
sectors.  
Teker and Ekit (2003) found that for 34 IPOs fulfilled in ISE in the year 2000, 
first three day abnormal return was positive and statistically significant; however, return 
was negative and statistically insignificant for 30. day. In the same study, they dealt with 
the investment strategy, according to the IPO method. If the market is a bullish one, IPOs 
should be invested without caring the IPO method and if the motivation behind offering 
is providing extra capital for the firm, investing in it but closing the position after three 
days should be preferred, but for all other IPOs, the position should be closed at first day, 
according to their results. But if the market is a bearish one, investor can invest to all type 
of IPOs, but for capital increase method, he should sell his shares after 4 days of first 
trading day and for all other IPOs, the position should be closed at first day. 
  Özer (1999) examined November 1989-December 1994 period and showed that, 
IPOs provide positive return in first three days and abnormal return is highest at the first 
day. First three days movements are independent than market. Although there is some 
relationship between IPOs and market at all, she couldn’t find between ISE and seasonal 
IPOs. This relationship began to appear in following days after 3. day and there was no 
important difference between market and IPOs return. Although daily returns were not 
different than market, as the returns increased cumulatively, the effect of first 3 days 
continued until 250. day. In this study first day average raw return was 12.41%, raw 
returns was changing between -10.7% and 233.3%, but the first day standard deviation 
was 31.17%, Finansbank and Gentaş’s first day returns were too high22, so when these 
outliers were excluded first day average return was 8.47% and standard deviation was 
15.7%. Abnormal first day return was 12.24% and 8.35% when Finansbank and Gentaş 
were excluded.  
Ayden and Karan (2000) argued that there was no underpricing phenomenon in 
IPOs fulfilled between 1992 and 1995, according to their study where 36 months’ 
performance of IPOs were examined. 
                                        
22 233.3% and 134.29% in order. 
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Yaşar (1997) found that, in IPOs of 1995, the raw return was -47.7% at the end of 
first day, -49.3% at the end of first week, -43.5% at the end of first month and again -
43.5% at the end of first three months.  When the effect of market was excluded, the 
returns were -47%, -47.7%, -50% and -51%, for first of day, week, month and three 
months in order. The results for 1996 was so different, the raw return was 3.9% at the end 
of first day, 7.6% at the end of first week, 11.7% at the end of first month and again 
39.3% at the end of first three months. But when Çelebi Hava Servisi A.Ş. was excluded 
with its 226% raw return in first trading day, first day return was 2.8%, first week return 
was 4.2%, first month return was 6.4% and first three month return was 34%. For 
abnormal returns, the results were, 2.3% and 1.2% in first day, 5.8% and 2.5% in first 
week, 4.8% and -0.2% in first month,  1.2% and -0.1% in first  three month, with outlier 
included and excluded, in order. But the results weren’t statistically significant according 
to analysis.  In this study, the results showed that there was no underpricing for the year 
1995 but there was for 1996. 
Kıymaz (1997) examined IPOs of manufacturing sector in period 1990-1995 long-
run performance and found 11% abnormal return in 30 months after first offering. When 
this analysis was separated in sub-sector, there was %29.7 abnormal return in insurance 
sector, 59% in Leasing/Factoring sector, 16.9% in Holding/Investment sector and -20.2% 
in banking sector. So for this analysis it is not possible to talk about the long-run 
underperformance. 
Küçükkocaoğlu and Alagöz (2006), in their work where they examined the 
methods used in IPOs in ISE, using 1993-2005 firm and issued data, compared the book 
building mechanism and the fixed price offer available in the ISE. The empirical analysis 
revealed significant first day underpricing of 7.13% in fixed price offers and 10.61% in 
book building mechanism. 
 So when all these results made about ISE are interpreted, it is concluded that 
there is underpricing phenomenon for first day and there is underperformance of IPOs in 
general.  
Ibbotson and Jaffe (1975) focused on the prediction of “Hot issue” markets. Hot 
issue markets were defined as average first month or aftermarket performance of new 
issues was abnormally high. During these periods, the offerings’ density was increasing, 
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so it was named hot issue markets. Then many theories were developed for this 
phenomenon, mentioned before in this study. After that, the poor long-run performance 
of IPOs was in common across many countries IPO market and so on. It is not gone 
ahead about these theories, but the cause of repeating them here, is remembering before 
seeing the initial market return and IPOs relationship. 
So although there are so many researches about underpricing or long-run 
performance about ISE, there is not enough study about timing of IPOs and about initial 
return and IPOs relationship. Main purpose is to catch some comovement or causal 
relationship between IPO number and initial return.  
 
Years Number of IPOs IPOs' Total Volume 
Average Initial Raw 
Return 
Average Initial Abn 
Return 
1990 35 985,310,871.9 25.01% 24.21% 
1991 23 391,627,012.4 5.86% 5.94% 
1992 13 94,423,549.9 5.71% 4.79% 
1993 16 152,446,679.0 13.51% 12.84% 
1994 25 270,480,024.6 5.00% 5.55% 
1995 29 246,782,514.6 12.99% 13.49% 
1996 27 167,921,615.7 7.28% 6.90% 
1997 29 420,376,565.8 10.41% 11.86% 
1998 20 383,348,400.8 7.77% 7.82% 
1999 10 90,722,366.2 12.21% 9.79% 
2000 35 2,806,222,339.0 8.24% 8.02% 
2001 1 242,654 4.76% 3.89% 
2002 4 56,467,358.4 -3.87% -2.11% 
2003 2 11,252,272.7 5.25% 5.92% 
2004 12 482,575,184.7 1.65% 2.34% 
2005 9 1,743,964,255.7 6.03% 7.19% 
2006 14 929,464,657.6 6.73% 7.83% 
Table: IPOs and Initial Return Ratio 
 
When the results were analyzed, it was recognized that there is underpricing 
phenomenon in Turkish IPO Market, between 1990 and 2006. In some of years, this was 
more significant, as in 1990, 1993, 1995, 1997 and 1999. But in the study made by 
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Savaşkan (2005), although the first day average return was positive in 2004 and 2005, 9 
of 17 IPOs’ first day return were negative. When the researches made before and other 
countries’ cases are taken into account, the short-term and long-term performance of 
IPOs in ISE decreased too much. Küçükkocaoğlu and Alagöz’s (2006), Savaşkan’s 
(2005) and this study’s results showed that the performance was below the past and other 
countries. The mean first day raw return of 304 IPOs, between 01.01.1990 and 
31.10.2006, was 7.91% and abnormal return was 8.02% according to the results in the 
table above. Besides in 2004-2005 the mean first day raw return of 17 IPOs was 1.8% 
and abnormal return was 2.81% according to Savaşkan (2005). When these results are 
compared to Kıymaz (1999), Kıymaz (1997), Özer (1999), Teker and Ekit (2003), the 
decreasing aspect of IPOs first day return after 1990 are present.  
The graph 12 and the table above show that initial raw return and initial abnormal 
return move in parallel as expected so only abnormal one was used in the analysis. Then, 
the graph 13 displays that there is some period of comovement as 1990-1993 periods or 
1995-1998 periods, but it is not possible to say that there is important relationship 
between them. When the initial return of previous year and actual number of IPOs were 
analyzed, as in graph 14; some comovement in periods, such as 2003-2006, 1990-1994 
were present. But it was not easy to speak about strong correlation according to the 
graphs. 
There was not a strong relationship, opposite to our expectations, according to the 
graphs, but it will be analyzed according to the regression results too. 
 
May be researches weren’t interested in market volatility as much as business 
cycles, initial returns or market level, but there are also some variables’ volatility’s 
relationship with IPO market examined.  
For instance, according to the results of Boehmer and Ljungqvist (2004), firms 
tend to announce IPO plans after increases in the volatility of share prices in their 
industry. 
 Besides, Pastor and Veronesi (2005) found IPO volume was negatively related to 
changes in market return volatility.  
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Hyuk, Masulis and Nanda (1993) also dealt with stock market volatility and 
reached the result that the relative frequency of monthly corporate equity to debt offers 
was positively related to stock price volatility. 
In the graph 15 there are 100 days stock market moving average volatilities in 
ISE. The volatility in ISE increased in 1991 after gulf war, in 1994 after the devaluation, 
in 1998 after systemic effect of Russian crisis in Turkey and in 2001 after liquidity crisis 
at the end of 2000 and the devaluation at the beginning of 2001. There is a clear decrease 
starting from 2002 until the end of 2006. So, as in Turkey after 2001, there was a 
systematic decrease in inflation and stable growth rate in GDP. It presents that stock 
market volatility decreases when expectations are good, then, when expectations are good 
there are money flows to emerging markets as Turkey example. In this way there is 
economic growth financed by cash inflows, i.e. direct investment or portfolio investment 
or short-run capital inflows. By the way, if there is a correlation between economic 
growth and IPO market, it is expected to see hot issue markets when market volatility 
decreases, or vice versa.   
In the table below, there are average stock market volatility, GDP growth rates 
and number and volume of IPOs by year. 
 
Years Number of IPOs 
GDP 
Growth 
Rate IPOs' Total Volume Vol(ISE_100) 
1990 35 9.4 985,310,871.9 3.51% 
1991 23 0.3 391,627,012.4 3.60% 
1992 13 6.4 94,423,549.9 2.08% 
1993 16 8.1 152,446,679.0 2.57% 
1994 25 -6.1 270,480,024.6 3.91% 
1995 29 8.0 246,782,514.6 2.50% 
1996 27 7.1 167,921,615.7 2.00% 
1997 29 8.3 420,376,565.8 2.99% 
1998 20 3.9 383,348,400.8 4.02% 
1999 10 -6.1 90,722,366.2 3.39% 
2000 35 6.3 2,806,222,339.0 3.74% 
2001 1 -9.5 242,654 3.90% 
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2002 4 7.9 56,467,358.4 3.00% 
2003 2 5.9 11,252,272.7 2.55% 
2004 12 9.9 482,575,184.7 1.76% 
2005 9 7.6 1,743,964,255.7 1.53% 
2006 14 5.0 929,464,657.6 1.93% 
Table: Average stock market volatility, GDP growth rates and number and volume of IPOs in 1990-2006 
 
It is seen from the numbers above that except 2002-2006, it is not possible to say 
that there is an inverse relationship between volatility and number of IPOs and GNP 
growth rate. When the previous years’ volatility and number of IPOs were analyzed there 
wasn’t any expected relationship too. According to the graph 16 there isn’t any 
comovement between these variables. 
Until now there were only analysis of the graphs of number or volume of IPOs 
with other variables and some interpretations introduced by considering historical events 
as privatization or financial distress in Turkey. These variables’ relationship with IPOs 
according to statistical data was also analyzed. Beginning from this part they are shown; 
so in first step there are correlation results briefly, after that the bivariate and multiple 
regression results and some comments about them will be present. 
 
Correlation Analysis 
 
Correlation is used to describe the observed relationship between instances of two 
events. A systematic pattern can be seen in the occurrences of events that are correlated. 
When the events involve numbers, a positive correlation means that as one increase, the 
other increases as well. A negative correlation means that as one increase, the other 
decreases. Correlation does NOT imply causation in any way. In other words, just 
because two events are correlated does not mean that one causes another, or has anything 
to do with the other; correlations deal only with observed instances of events, and any 
further conclusions cannot be inferred from correlation alone. Strong correlation, 
however, does often warrant further investigation to determine causation.23
                                        
23 http://www.biochem.northwestern.edu/holmgren/Glossary/Definitions/Def-C/correlation.html 
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In the light of the definition above, from the table below, the relationship of the 
variables with each other is seen but there is not causality. 
Variables 
Number 
of IPOs 
GDP 
Growth 
Rate 
IPO 
Volume 
(USD) 
Interest 
Rates 
Simple 
Return 
ISE100 
Cum 
Return 
ISE100 Rm-Rf 
Vol 
ISE_100 
Initial 
Raw 
Return 
Initial 
Abn 
Return Volexc P/E M/B 
Number of IPOs 1.00                         
GDP Growth Rate 0.28 1.00                       
IPO 
Volume(USD) 0.42 0.27 1.00                     
Interest Rates 0.37 -0.11 -0.46 1.00                   
Simple 
Return(ISE100) -0.07 -0.16 -0.30 0.42 1.00                 
Cum 
Return(ISE100) -0.03 -0.19 -0.37 0.41 0.96** 1.00               
Rm-Rf -0.20 -0.16 -0.20 0.00 0.86** 0.91** 1.00             
Vol(ISE_100) 0.25 -0.58** 0.00 0.36 -0.03 -0.04 -0.20 1.00           
Initial Raw Return 0.59* 0.14 0.16 0.29 0.37 0.41 0.32 0.18 1.00         
Initial Abn Return 0.62** 0.23 0.19 0.25 0.31 0.37 0.29 0.14 
0.99*
* 1.00       
Volexc -0.28 -0.73** -0.22 -0.20 -0.24 -0.13 -0.05 0.37 -0.35 -0.36 1.00     
P/E -0.48* -0.19 -0.25 -0.09 -0.11 -0.17 -0.15 0.21 -0.46 -0.46 0.32 1.00   
M/B 0.30 -0.25 -0.21    0.64** 0.83** 0.84 0.63** 0.32 0.47 0.44 -0.05 -0.10 1.00 
**  Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
*  Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
Table: Correlation Table between the variables’ series in the period 1990-2006 
 
The results in the correlation table display that there is high positive correlation 
between number of IPOs and initial raw and abnormal return. Normally, the abnormal 
and raw return are approximately same thing, so they had 0.99 correlation between them 
and in this way,  raw return was excluded and only abnormal was used one for initial 
return and IPOs relationship. As expected, the correlation coefficients of simple market 
return, cumulative market return and market return minus risk free rate (Rm-Rf) had 0.96, 
0.91 and 0.86 correlation, so only Rm-Rf  was evaluated in the analysis.  
When relationship between IPOs and initial return was explored once again; 0.62 
correlation coefficient was high enough, consequently, there are more IPOs in ISE when 
IPOs’ initial first day return were high. This can be natural result of competition between 
the firms which went public, it is to say, if there are many IPOs, potential investor have 
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many choices, so firms have to set price lower for successful offering. On the other hand, 
it can be because of, like Ibbotson and Sindelar (1994) argued that overoptimism by 
investors creates “windows of opportunity” and increase on the demand for IPOs creates 
more IPOs and more demand for new stocks. In this way high initial return and above 
average number of IPOs were seen concurrently. However there were not strong 
relationship between number and volume of IPOs, the coefficient was only 0.42. This 
may be because of inverse movement of number and volume of IPOs 1994-1995 and 
2004-2006, in addition to this, as stated before, the percentage change of number and 
volume was very different, so this caused low coefficient. But if this kind of relationship 
has been seen between these two variables, which were naturally expected to have very 
high coefficient, coefficients between other variables can be evaluated according to this 
peg. So, 0.62 (significant) coefficient of correlation for initial return and number of IPOs 
was very important relationship for this data.  
Besides, although it was not significant, there was same direction relationship 
between number of IPOs and interest rates variables, different than assumed. When 
interest rates increase it is expected that IPOs slow down. This pattern has been seen for 
volume of IPOs and interest rates, so the capital allocated in IPOs decrease when 
opportunity cost increases. But it is obvious that inverse relationship for number and 
volume will cause problem in interpreting the following results.  
Increase in market return came with decrease in IPOs, this negative relationship 
was not as strong as volume for number of IPOs or cumulative and simple return, but 
same for Rm-Rf, surprisingly, 0.20. GDP growth rate and IPOs had positive but 
insignificant correlation of coefficient and it was almost same for number and volume of 
IPOs (0.27).  
When market level variables and IPOs were analyzed, P/E ratio and IPOs 
relationship was negative for each of volume and number of IPOs, while M/B ratio had 
negative comovement with volume but positive with number of IPOs. Although these 
coefficients were not so high (only the coefficient of P/E and number of IPOs was 
significant -0.48), market level and IPOs relationship was inverse for P/E ratio.  But it 
requires an alert on time; this result which shows that negative relationship is present for 
IPOs and market level, is never a contradictory to many researchers’ argument that IPO 
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clusters when the market level is high. Because many firms go public after M/B or P/E 
ratios are at the top, so when hot issue markets are present it is expected that market level 
decreases. Besides it is also parallel to the argument that IPOs increase after market 
returns increase. But once again, negative relationship between M/B and P/E ratio distorts 
the analysis. 
Not directly related to the scope of this dissertation, the high correlation 
coefficients between other variables were differentiated. The relationship between stock 
market volatility and GDP growth rate was negative with -0.58. It means that when risk 
increases in capital markets, Turkey economy growth which is pulled on trigger by 
consumption financed by portfolio investment breaks down, i.e. when capital inflows 
slow down. The same situation is present for exchange rates’ volatility and GDP growth 
rate for the same reasons with significant and high correlation coefficient. 
Market returns and P/E ratio have very strong relationship between them, since 
when prices increase return also increase; however according to results, in Turkish capital 
market, there had inverse relationship between market returns and M/B ratio and between 
M/B and P/E ratio in (in addition very weak relationship) trivially. 
 The correlation table for actual year’s number and volume of IPO and previous 
years’ values for other variables is showed below. Although, correlation coefficient 
doesn’t give any causality result about variables, comovement between previous years’ 
values and actual year’s values may give some idea about pursuit of previous year’s 
financial aspect for IPOs. 
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Number of 
IPOs 
GDP 
Growth Rate 
IPO 
Volume 
(USD) 
Interest 
Rates 
Simple 
Return 
(ISE100) Rm-Rf 
Vol 
(ISE_100) 
Initial 
Raw 
Return 
Initial 
Abn 
Return Volexc M/B P/E 
Number of IPOs 1                       
GDP Growth Rate -0.16 1                     
IPO 
Volume(USD) 0.42 -0.19 1                   
Interest Rates 0.62** -0.12 0.00 1                 
Simple Return 0.71** -0.19 0.57* 0.42 1               
Rm-Rf 0.66** -0.18 0.60* 0.31 0.99** 1             
Vol(ISE_100) -0.08 -0.60** -0.23 0.27 -0.05 -0.09 1           
Initial Raw Return 0.59* 0.04 0.16 0.48 0.37 0.32 -0.07 1         
Initial Abn Return 0.62** 0.03 0.19 0.43 0.40 0.36 -0.15 0.99** 1       
Volexc -0.16 -0.71** -0.22 -0.23 -0.28 -0.26 0.38 -0.27 -0.22 1     
M/B 0.61** -0.25 0.28 0.61** 0.72** 0.67** 0.29 0.09 0.10 -0.04 1   
P/E -0.43 -0.18 -0.17 -0.14 -0.15 -0.14 0.15 -0.35 -0.31 0.33 -0.12 1 
Table: Correlation Table between the variables’ series in the period 1990-2006 (variables-1) 
 
Surprisingly, previous year’s variables had closer relationship with following 
year’s number of IPOs except GDP growth rate. Market return increase in previous year 
had 0.66 correlations with this year’s number of IPOs. It is not unexpected situation since 
stock market returns increase leads hot markets as Pastor and Veronesi (2005) found. 
Besides, market level increase had positive relationship with number of IPOs and 
coefficient was 0.61 and it was significant. However, as M/B and P/E ratios were not 
correlated, moreover coefficient correlation was negative, once again P/E ratio had 
negative relationship with number of IPOs, but it was insignificant. Initial returns had 
again positive and high relationship with number of IPOs. This was in the same parallel 
with the findings of Ibbotson, Sindelar and Ritter (1988), that contemporaneous year 
initial returns’ have strong relationship with next year’s number of issues and that initial 
returns lead volume. Besides, previous year’s return had positive and significant 
relationship with both of number and volume of IPOs.  Increase in previous year’s initial 
return came with increase in this year’s IPOs, as actual year. This time, we are 
comfortable with M/B ratio and number of IPOs, since there was 0.62 (significant) 
coefficient of correlation.   
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It is amazing to see again positive and high relationship with interest rates and 
IPOs. But we should recognize that the variables which show a level as, M/B, P/E and 
interest rates ratios had more unexpected results; M/B ratio had significant and positive 
relationship with interest rates, no relationship with P/E ratio.  It may be because of 
variable’s characteristic itself, since the level is essential than changes in variables. 
Besides, as stated before, during 90s high inflation rates in Turkey caused unexpected 
results for economic and financial analysis. It was more logical to deal with real interest 
rates; when the correlation for real interest rates and number of IPOs were computed, 
coefficients were -0.5024, so we are comfortable with this result as the sign was negative. 
So, arguing these relationships is dropped out until regression results. 
Regression Analysis 
 
Regression measures the same relationship between two variables as correlation 
does, in correlation two variables are standardized before examining the relationship. In 
regression analysis, the relationship is expressed in the original units of the two variables. 
In this analysis the response of if one variable predict significantly another, rather than 
significant relationship between them as correlation does, is looked for. 
Linear regression provides an R-Squared value for the historical data.  If this 
value is too small, the data is not linear, so the original assumptions must change.  If R-
Squared is large enough, then the linear regression will provide the best prediction of the 
second move each day based on the first move. R-Squared is a statistical term saying how 
good one term is at predicting another. More generally, a higher value of R-Squared 
means to predict one term from another can be better predicted. R-Squared is named also 
Coefficient of Determination and shows amount of variability in dependent variable that 
can be explained by the independent variable.  
There are a response variable Y and an explanatory variable x, and then the 
simple linear regression model for Y on x is given by 
Yi = β0 + β1xi + εi                   i =1,...,n. 
 
                                        
24 Not shown in tables. 
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where β0 and β1are unknown parameters, and the εi are independent random 
variables with zero mean and constant variance for all i=1,2…..,n. 
The parameters β0 and β1 are called regression parameters (or regression 
coefficients), and the line h (x) = β0 + β1x is called the regression line or the linear 
predictor. The regression parameters β0 and β1 are unknown, non-random parameters. 
They are the intercept and the slope, respectively, of the straight line relating Y to x. 
If the regression model is applied for the analysis made in this study, the response 
variable is number or volume of IPO, where GDP%, r, Level, Vol, InR, Volexc and Return 
are explanatory variables: 
Yi = β0 + β1GDP% + β1r+ β1vol+ β4M/B+ β1Ret+ β1InR+ β1 Volexc+εi                   
GDP% = GDP Growth Rate 
r = Real Interest Rates 
Return = Market Return 
Level = Market Level (M/B Ratio, P/E Ratio) 
Vol = Market Volatility 
InR= Initial Return 
Volexc = Exchange Rates Volatility 
 
In the following parts, the regression equation was conducted with all explanatory 
and response variables; at first step, the simple regression equation for all variables was 
used, and after that the hierarchical regression was used according to the simple 
regression results. So the regression model given above is the one which comprehends all 
these regression equations used during the empirical analysis. 
T-Test and F-Test were used to test the statistical significance of coefficients of 
explanatory variables. The hypothesis the coefficient of explanatory variable was 
different than 0 was tested. 
H0: β1 = 0 
H1: β1 ≠ 0 
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Regression Results 
In this study, the purpose of regression analysis was to investigate the role of 
some variables denoted before in explaining changes in number of IPOs, or hot or cold 
issue markets. Hierarchical Regression Analysis (HRA) was employed, as well as simple 
regression, in order to determine the influence of variables as predictors of IPOs and to 
find out if some variables contributed to explanation of IPO changes after controlling 
some variables which have high correlation with IPOs. 
Simple regression analysis was conducted at first step. There are four tables 
below; these are results of simple regression analysis with all independent variables with 
dependent variable number or volume of IPOs. As in correlation analysis, it was also 
used the independent variables’ previous year’s values with dependent variable’s actual 
year values once again for being able to see the predictability of next year’s IPO pattern 
with this year variables. In addition to this, as defined above, the increased data∗ was 
used, for same processes, i.e., actual or previous year independent variables. Increased 
data was computed by adding the one year value, two years average value, three years 
average value and four year’s average value of variables. For interest rates the compound 
interest rate four 2 or 3 or 4 was computed, than one year interest rate was calculated. 
This data was used in regression for being able to eliminate the possibility of missing 
some significant results, because of low number of data between 1990 and 2006 (only 
304 IPOs in aggregate). 
Tables display the standardized regression coefficients (β), which shows the 
significance and relative importance of that variable in the equation; R2, which is the 
variance explained in the outcome variable, Adjusted R2, which is adjusted for simple 
size, is displayed here in able to understand the low data effect on results. F statistic 
shows the significance of the change for each step. It will be useful in hierarchical 
regression. 
 
 
 
                                        
∗ Sometimes it is named by “bunch of years”, as the purpose is increasing data in this process, during data 
examination, we use “increase data” term 
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 ** p<.01 and * p<.05 
Reg Results 
Independent Variables Beta (stcoef) R2 Adjusted R2 F for Change 
GDP Growth Rate 0.28 0.079 0.017 1.279
Interest Rates(End of last Year) 0.367 0.135 0.077 2.341
Simple Return(ISE100) -0.07 0.005 -0.061 0.074
Cum Return(ISE100) -0.032 0.001 -0.066 0.015
Rm-Rf -0.202 0.041 -0.023 0.636
Vol(ISE_100) 0.316 0.1 0.04 1.665
Initial Raw Return 0.575* 0.331 0.286 7.42*
Initial Abn Return 0.62** 0.384 0.343 9.367**
Volexc -0.278 0.077 0.016 1.253
P/E -0.482* 0.233 0.181 4.545*
M/B 0.297 0.088 0.028 0.247
Table: Regression Results; variables explaining number of IPOs in 1990-2006 
According to the regression results of number of IPOs and all independent 
variables used during this study, only initial abnormal return was significant in 0.01 level 
and P/E ratio and initial raw return were significant at 0.05 level. In the table, initial raw 
and abnormal return, simple and cumulative return are shown together, but in future 
tables, there are only abnormal and simple return in the analysis. Initial raw return had 
significant relationship with dependent variable, as abnormal one had. M/B ratio had 
positive but insignificant relationship. As regression measures the same relationship 
between two variables as correlation does, the results were same, so analysis passes to 
hierarchical regression after dealing with increased data, by not loosing so much time in 
analysis of actual and previous year’s normal data.25 As the simple regression results 
were same with correlation results, normal data simple regression results for previous 
year with number of IPOs and simple regression results with volume of IPOs are 
displayed in tables 4-6, but not here. 
 
   
 
                                        
25 Normal data term is used to determine 1990-2006 variables, i.e., N=17 and average values excluded. 
 103
** p<.01 and * p<.05 
Reg Results 
Independent Variables Beta (stcoef) R2 Adjusted R2 F for Change 
GDP Growth Rate 0.13 0.017 0.001 1.031 
Interest Rates(End of last Year) 0.604** 0.365 0.355 34.519** 
Simple Return(ISE100) 0.147 0.022 0.005 1.322 
Rm-Rf -0.1 0 -0.017 0.006 
Vol(ISE_100) 0.285* 0.081 0.066 5.308* 
Initial Abn Return 0.706** 0.498 0.49 59.591** 
Volexc -0.262* 0.069 0.053 4.431* 
M/B 0.546** 0.298 0.287 25.514** 
P/E -0.588** 0.346 0.335 31.476** 
Table: Regression Results; variables explaining number of IPOs in 1990-2006 (increased data) 
 
Reg Results 
Independent Variables Beta (stcoef) R2 Adjusted R2 F for Change 
GDP Growth Rate 0.003 0 -0.17 0.001 
Interest Rates(End of last Year) 0.693** 0.48 0.471 55.396** 
Simple Return(ISE100) 0.665** 0.443 0.433 47.462** 
Rm-Rf 0.569** 0.323 0.312 28.666** 
Vol(ISE_100) -0.128 0.016 0 1.004 
Initial Abn Return 0.706** 0.498 0.49 59.591** 
Volexc -0.182 0.033 0.017 2.064 
M/B 0.631** 0.398 0.388 39.66** 
P/E -0.625** 0.391 0.381 38.495** 
Real Interest Rates  -0.090 0.008 -0.058 0.122 
Table: Regression Results; variables explaining number of IPOs in 1990-2006 (increased data-previous 
year) 
Reg Results 
Independent Variables Beta (stcoef) R2 Adjusted R2 F for Change 
GDP Growth Rate 0.074 0.005 -0.011 0.331
Interest Rates(End of last Year) -0.447** 0.2 0.187 14.997**
Simple Return(ISE100) 0.147 0.022 0.005 1.322
Rm-Rf -0.186 0.035 0.019 2.161
Vol(ISE_100) 0.149 0.022 0.006 1.367
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Initial Abn Return 0.123 0.015 -0.001 0.922
Volexc -0.132 0.017 0.001 1.068
M/B -0.195 0.38 0.022 2.368
P/E -0.145 0.021 0.005 1.293
Table: Regression Results; variables explaining IPO Volume in 1990-2006 (increased data) 
 
Reg Results 
Independent Variables Beta (stcoef) R2 Adjusted R2 F for Change 
GDP Growth Rate -0.124 0.015 -0.001 0.932
Interest Rates(End of last Year) -0.071 0.005 -0.012 0.306
Simple Return(ISE100) 0.4333** 0.187 0.174 13.824**
Rm-Rf 0.474** 0.225 0.212 17.383**
Vol(ISE_100) -0.082 0.007 -0.01 0.407
Initial Abn Return 0.123 0.015 -0.001 0.922
Volexc -0.282* 0.079 0.064 5.17*
M/B 0.17 0.029 0.013 1.785
P/E -0.167 0.028 0.012 1.729
Table: Regression Results; variables explaining IPO Volume in 1990-2006 (increased data-previous year) 
 
According to regression results maintained with increased data, it is recognized 
that IPO volume and independent variables were not significantly related, as normal data 
analysis. For coming year, only interest rates can predict number of IPOs, with 
coefficient -0.447. If the previous year data was taken into analysis, coefficient of interest 
rates was not significant this time, but simple return and abnormal return (Rm-Rf) had 
significant relationship. Besides, previous year’s exchanges rates volatility had negative 
and significant relationship with actual year’s IPO volume. These results were expected 
ones, since if the return in the market increases, the volume of IPO is anticipated to 
increase too, besides, if risk, i.e., market volatility increases, IPOs should decrease. 
However, volume of IPO hadn’t significant relationship with GDP, initial return and 
market level indicators. 
The results with the number of IPOs revealed much more significant relationship 
with independent variables. Especially previous years’ results figured out expected 
patterns; simple returns, abnormal market return, initial abnormal return, M/B ratio 
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should predict significantly number of IPOs of next year. These findings are similar to 
many researchers’ empirical evidence explained during this study.  
P/E ratio had significant but negative relationship for actual and next year’s IPOs. 
It is obliged to say something about this situation; it may be because of that when firms’ 
earnings decrease, P/E ratio increases, firms earnings decrease when the market 
conditions getting worse, in this way bad conditions cause to firms to renounce offerings. 
This argument deals with denominator of the fraction since nominator is almost same for 
P/E and M/B ratio, so it is not so meaningful to evaluate it. 
Once again, the positive relationship between interest rates with number of IPOs 
was amazing for both previous and actual year results, so it should be repeated that high 
inflation rates could distort analysis. When analysis was made with real interest rates, 
coefficient was -0.398 and significant for actual year and -0.264 and significant in 0.05 
level for previous year. However R2s were very low; 0.16 and 0.07 in order, ultimately 
the coefficients were negative for this time. Although R2 was not low as nominal interest 
rates, it is very important to betray the real and nominal interest rates differences effect in 
results, in countries where hyperinflation was present. 
As defined before, R2 (Coefficient of Determination) is an important indicator 
about predictability of dependent variable by independent variable.  If R2 is 100% then 
given the value of one term, the value of another term should be perfectly predicted.  
More generally, a higher value of R2 means that it may be better predicted one term from 
another. It shows amount of variability in dependent variable that can be explained by the 
independent variable. When R2 figures were looked in detail for normal data analysis, 
initial abnormal return’s R-squared was about 39%, it was almost enough to predict the 
dependent variable, although coefficient was significant. Adjusted R2 results were 
normally lower. From table 4, R-squared pattern was much better, with 43% for abnormal 
return, 37% for M/B ratio and once again 38.4% for initial abnormal return.  
With increased data, R2s increased, besides adjusted ones were not so lower than 
non-adjusted R2. Abnormal return had 50%, P/E ratio 35%, interest rates 36% coefficient 
of determination. Previous year data showed that initial abnormal return had same, simple 
return had 44%, M/B had 39%, P/E had 39% again, abnormal return had 32% coefficient 
of determination. However it is not so easy to talk about the best R-squared result, 
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because the result is much related to stationarity of the series which was used, according 
to series, for example stock returns, 25% is enough according to some researchers.26 So 
we may be comfortable with these relatively higher R2 results, as the stationarity of series 
is beyond of scope of this study. 
In following part there are the results of hierarchical regression. A series of 
hierarchical regression analyses were conducted for each dependent variable to determine 
the variance explained by each independent variable after controlling for the influence of 
significantly correlated variables as well as to find out if return variables explained 
variance over and above general economic variables for example. 
Prediction of Number of IPOs 
In this analysis, highly correlated variable was controlled and other significantly 
correlated variables were regressed step by step in able to find direct effect of other 
variables after controlling highly correlated variables. It means that this regression was in 
the order of correlation coefficients between significant ones. 
Hierarchical Regression Analysis (HRA) was employed in order to determine the 
influence of one dependent variable (first dependent) as predictors of number of IPOs to 
find out if another independent variable (second dependent) fit contributed to explanation 
of number of IPOs over and above first dependent after controlling for the effect third 
independent, which correlated significantly with dependent variable. If there were not 
enough significant measures as in the sample of actual year normal data, only the 
additional effect of independent variable, after controlling highly correlated variable, has 
been seen. 
So for actual years result as there are only initial abnormal return and P/E ratio, so 
separate 2-step hierarchical regression analysis was used for each variables. The order of 
entry was as follows: 1) Initial Abnormal Return (IAR), 2) P/E ratio (P/E): 
Table displays the standardized regression coefficients (β), which shows the 
significance and relative importance of that variable in the equation; R2, which is the 
variance explained in the outcome variable; the change in R2 as a result of the lastly 
added variable and F statistic showing the significance of the change for each step. 
 
                                        
26 http://www.duke.edu/~rnau/rsquared.htm 
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 Beta 
(stcoef) 
R2 R2 Change F for Change 
Step 1: Return  .384 .384 9.367** 
Initial Abnormal Return .62**    
Step 2: Market Level(P/E)  .353 .049 1.221 
Initial Abnormal Return  .505**    
P/E Ratio -.25    
 
At first step, IAR explained 38% of the variance (F =9.367, p < .01) in all 
regression equations. When P/E was entered as the market level measure at step 2, it 
explained only an additional 0.49% variance (F = 1.221, insignificant) and initial 
abnormal return was still significant. 
For IPO volume, any HRA wasn’t conducted for actual year normal data, as there 
was only one significant correlated independent variable. 
When it is shifted to the previous year’s independent variables with normal data, 
HRA was conducted in this way: A separate 3-step hierarchical regression analysis for 
each variable was conducted. The order of entry was as follows: 1) Initial Abnormal 
Return (IAR), 2) Simple Return ISE-100 (Simple Ret), 3) M/B Ratio (M/B). Since 
Abnormal Return and simple return can be accepted as same variable for this analysis, 
simple return, whose correlation coefficient was higher, was preferred, besides as real 
interest rates result was very different than nominal ones, interest rates were excluded 
than analysis and in an additional, i.e., fourth step real interest rates was included. 
 
 Beta 
(stcoef) 
R2 R2 Change F for Change 
Step 1: Initial Return  .384 .384 9.367** 
Initial Abnormal Return .62**    
Step 2: Market Return  .633 .249 9.484** 
Initial Abnormal Return  .399*    
Simple Return ISE100 .545**    
Step 3: Market Level  .700 .067 2.912 
Initial Abnormal Return  .484*    
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Simple Return ISE100 .233    
M/B Ratio   .388    
Economic Variable(Real Int Rates )     
Step 4: Economic Variable  .707 .006 .264 
Initial Abnormal Return .470**    
Simple Return ISE100 -.304    
MB Ratio  .316    
Real Interest Rates  -.095    
Step 3: Economic Variable  0.674 .041 1.631 
Initial Abnormal Return .403*    
Simple Return ISE100 .574**    
Real Interest Rates -.204    
 
From table above, at first step, IAR explained 38.4% of the variance (F =9367, p 
< .01) in all regression equations. When simple return was entered as the market return 
measure at step 2, it explained an additional 24.9% variance (F = 9.484, p < .01) and IAR 
was still significant. And finally at step 3, M/B stayed insignificant (F = 2.912) and 
simple market return became insignificant. The amount of variance explained by IAR 
decreased at step 3 but remained significant with  β = .484, p < .05. 
In the fourth step, real interest rates explained additional 6% variance but it was 
insignificant (F = .264), with a β = -.045. When real interest rates are added as final step, 
simple return became insignificant.  
When real interest rates was entered as the economic variable at third step instead 
of M/B Ratio, it explained only additional 4.1% variance in number of IPOs at step and it 
was insignificant (F = 1.631); whereas, simple return became significant surprisingly 
(β=.574, p < .01) .  
These findings indicate that number of IPOs is best predicted by initial abnormal 
return, after that simple return in the market is also can be used to predict, but when M/B 
ratio or real interest rates are in overall analysis, simple return, M/B ratio and real interest 
rates  are not correlated to overall performance measure. 
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 Beta 
(stcoef) 
R2 R2 Change F for Change 
Step 1: Initial Return  .384 .384 9.367** 
Initial Abnormal Return .62**    
Step 2: Market Level  .68 .295 12.902** 
Initial Abnormal Return  .562**    
M/B Ratio .546**    
Step 3: Market Level27  .700 .021 .890 
Initial Abnormal Return  .484*    
M/B Ratio .388    
Simple Return ISE100  .233    
 
However, when HRA was conducted by steps as 1) Initial Abnormal Return 
(IAR), 2) M/B Ratio (M/B) 3) Simple Return ISE100 (Simple Ret), the picture didn’t 
change and this time at step 2, M/B explained additional 29.5% variance( F=12.902, p < 
.01), but at third step when simple return is included, became insignificant, as simple 
return. 
 
 Beta 
(stcoef) 
R2 R2 Change F for Change 
Step 1: Initial Return  .384 .384 9.367** 
Initial Abnormal Return .62**    
Step 2: Market Level  .403 .019 .440 
Initial Abnormal Return  .63**    
Real Interest Rates -.137    
 
When two steps HRA were conducted as 1) Initial Abnormal Return (IAR), 2) 
Real Interest Rates, real interest rates variable was insignificant. 
So, according to previous year’s independent variables effect in number of IPOs’ 
results, initial abnormal return predicts hot issue market significantly, in overall 
performance measure, if M/B ratio or simple return were included in the analysis, they 
                                        
27 Same with the step 3 in the table above 
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added important additional variance in explaining amount of variance in number of IPOs, 
however when they were included together, they became insignificant. It can be because 
of high correlation between these two variables (0.72). So as a result, previous year’s 
market returns, as a result market level and average initial return in IPOs together, predict 
next year’s number of IPOs significantly. Although real interest rates had negative 
correlation with number of IPOs had not significant prediction possibility of IPO market. 
So our findings is in same parallel Liang and Helvege(2002), Schultz (2002), Jovanovic 
and Rousseau, Lowry and Schwert’s (2002), Pagano, Panetta, and Zingales (1998) and 
Lowry (2002); they also argued that M/B ratio, proxy of market level, is essential in IPO 
waves. Surprisingly, Pastor and Veronesi (2005)’s argument was also true for Turkish 
IPO market since market returns is important factor in decision to go public, although our 
findings about M/B ratio was controversy to their finding which argued that market level 
is not essential in IPO decision. But it requires a point here that Pastor and Veronesi made 
their analysis with many of data and for much shorter period, so when there was hot issue 
markets, market level was not highest before hot market. Boehmer and Ljungqvist 
(2004)’s industrial analysis was in the same parallel with Pastor and Veronesi, but in our 
analysis the time period was one year, in this way market level increase could have great 
effect in hot issue markets normally, even there was. Besides market level increased with 
increase in market returns, naturally market return increase leads to IPOs increase, as 
Pastor and Veronesi found. 
Besides, initial return increase led to hot markets, parallel to Ibbotson and Jaffe 
(1975)’s findings. But it must also be considered the high correlation between number of 
IPOs and initial abnormal return in the same year from other perspective. This high 
correlation can emanate from hot markets, i.e., when offerings density increase, potential 
firms should decrease their offering price because of competition, so initial abnormal 
return accelerate in hot markets, this is an argument mentioned above, and it is not easy 
to evaluate which predicts other, however, as previous year initial return predicts coming 
year, it is more meaningful to comment that initial abnormal return leads more IPOs. At 
all events, they come together.     
From table 6, in simple regression results, IPO volume had significant relationship 
only with simple return and Rm-Rf (abnormal return), and as these had 0.99 correlation, 
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the HRA was not conducted for actual year and previous year’s independent variables 
and IPO volume. 
During this study, many of times bunch of years or increased data terms have 
passed and why this method is used is explained. Same HRA regression analysis was 
conducted with increased data, in this way it was assumed that the possible strong 
relationships between market return, general economic and market level variables weren’t 
lost because of low data. However, with increased data, same years’ number were 
repeated, may be the trend was developed artificially. Main assumption was that as bunch 
of years is the average data, if time horizon was longer, the relationship between 
variables would be the same in Turkish capital market and economy. In addition, as it is 
seen at the end of regression analysis, the results were not irrational and unexpected 
according to researches made before.  
So, the same process was applied and according to simple regression results with 
increased data, HRA was conducted.   
If the results from the regression table with increased data are remembered: it is 
realized that interest rates, volatility in return in ISE-100 and volatility in exchange rates 
became significant, initial return variables and P\E ratio was still significant. 
 
Reg Results 
Independent Variables Beta (stcoef) R2 Adjusted R2 F for Change 
GDP Growth Rate 0.13 0.017 0.001 1.031 
Real Interest Rates -0.398** 0.158 0.144 11.289** 
Simple Return(ISE100) 0.147 0.022 0.005 1.322 
Rm-Rf -0.1 0 -0.017 0.006 
Vol(ISE_100) 0.285* 0.081 0.066 5.308* 
Initial Abn Return 0.706** 0.498 0.49 59.591** 
Volexc -0.262* 0.069 0.053 4.431* 
M/B 0.546** 0.298 0.287 25.514** 
P/E -0.588** 0.346 0.335 31.476** 
Table: Regression Results; variables explaining number of IPOs in 1990-2006 (increased data) 
 
 112
But as explained before, because of high inflation during 1990s, once again, real 
interest rates instead of nominal rates were used. As anticipated before, real interest rates 
had inverse relationship with number of IPOs, contrary to nominal interest rates. In 
normal conditions, when interest rates are high, opportunity cost of investing in stocks 
and IPOs increase, because of this it is expected that there is negative correlation between 
interest rates and IPO market, as it was seen in real rates. 
 A separate 6-step hierarchical regression analysis was conducted for each 
variable. The order of entry was as follows: 1) Initial Abnormal Return (IAR), 2) M/B 
Ratio (M/B) (Simple Ret), 3) P/E Ratio (P/E), 4) Real Interest Rates (RIR), 5) Volatility 
in ISE100 (VolRet), 6) Volatility in Exchange Rates (Volexc) 
 
 Beta 
(stcoef) 
R2 R2 Change F for Change 
Step 1: Initial Return  .498 .498 59.591** 
Initial Abnormal Return .706**    
Step 2: Market Level  .558 .059 7.899** 
Initial Abnormal Return  .577**    
M/B Ratio .276**    
Step 3: Market Level  .618 .061 9.209** 
Initial Abnormal Return  .415**    
M/B Ratio .279**    
P/E Ratio   -.294**    
Economic Variable(Real Int Rates )     
Step 4: Economic Variable  .646 .028 4.499* 
Initial Abnormal Return .384**    
M/B Ratio .189**    
P/E Ratio   -.291**    
Real Interest Rates  -.177*    
Risk Variable (Vol in ISE, exchrates)     
Step 5: Risk Variable (VolRet)  .665 .019 3.122 
Initial Abnormal Return  .344**    
M/B Ratio .189*    
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P/E Ratio  -.358**    
Real Interest Rates -.155    
Volatility in ISE100 .162    
Step 6: Risk Variable (Volexc)  .715 .051 9.803** 
Initial Abnormal Return .264*    
M/B Ratio .096    
P/E Ratio  -.237*    
Real Interest Rates -472**    
Volatility in ISE100 .155    
Volatility in Exchange Rates -.401**    
 
From table above, at first step, IAR explained 49.8% of the variance (F =59.591, 
p < .01) in all regression equations. When market level variable, M/B was entered at step 
2, it explained an additional 5.9% variance (F = 7.899, p < .01) and IAR is still 
significant. At step 3, P/E ratio explained additional 6.1% variance (F = 9.209), both 
initial and M/B ratio coefficients were still significant, even though, their effect decrease. 
At fourth step, real interest rates was added to equation; it explained additional 2.8% 
variance (F = 4.499, p < .05).  At fifth step, first time, a risk variable for the stock market 
was included in the analysis and Volatility in ISE100 was included in the equation, so it 
was insignificant (F = 3.122,  p = .083) at 5% but significant 10% level. In final step, risk 
variable for total economy was included and volatility in exchange rates added to 
equation, in this way, total amount of variance in number of IPOs explained by 
independent variables reached to 71.5% and it was considerable result. 
When HRA analysis was conducted without initial abnormal return which was 
always highly correlated with number of IPOs and which explained approximately 50% 
of variance of number of IPOs, we are very comfortable with the results. They are shown 
below: 
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 Beta 
(stcoef) 
R2 R2 Change F for Change 
Step 1: Market Level  .298 .298 25.514** 
M/B Ratio .546**    
Step 2: Market Level  .518 .219 26.814** 
M/B Ratio  .427**    
P/E Ratio -.483**    
Step 3: Economic Variable  .562 .044 5.815** 
M/B Ratio  .37**    
P/E Ratio  -.463**    
Real Interest Rates  -.22*    
Step 4: Economic Variable  .600 .038 5.487* 
M/B Ratio .274**    
P/E Ratio   -.531**    
Real Interest Rates  -.183*    
Volatility in ISE100  .227**    
Step 5: Risk Variable (VolRet)  .680 .080 13.977** 
M/B Ratio  .137    
P/E Ratio  .-336**    
Real Interest Rates -.560**    
Volatility in ISE100 .200*    
Volatility in Exchange Rates -.486**    
 
From table above, at first step, M/B explained 29.8% of the variance (F =25.514, 
p < .01) in all regression equations. When another market level variable, P/E was entered 
at step 2, it explained an additional 21.9% variance (F = 26.814, p < .01) and IAR was 
still significant. At step 3, Real Interest Rates explained additional 4.4% variance (F = 
5.815), market level coefficients were still significant, even though, their effect 
decreased. At fourth step, volatility variable was added to equation; it explained 
additional 3.8% variance (F = 5.487, p < .05). At this step M/B ratio, real interest rates 
coefficients decreased whereas P/E ratio increased (β = -.531). At fifth step, Volatility in 
exchange rates was included in the equation, so it explained 8% additional variance (F = 
 115
13.977, p< .01). In overall performance 68% variance in number of IPOs was explained 
by these independent variables, when initial abnormal return was excluded, besides in all 
steps, except M/B ratio at fifth one, coefficients were all significant, majority at 1% level. 
Thus, there were much more evident solutions with increased data for same year 
independent variable and number of IPOs. Market level of the same year was also 
important for IPOs with M/B ratio of the same year, but we are still confused with this 
strong negative relationship of P/E ratio. It is not possible to go ahead of explanation that 
is made before about earnings of firms. Besides risk factor like volatility in exchange 
rates leaded to decrease in IPOs as expected, however volatility in ISE100 had positive 
significant effect in IPOs. 
Same analysis for previous years’ independent variables with number of IPOs was 
made. The simple regression results according to which variables which were included in 
HRA analysis were chosen are displayed in the table below once again; nominal interest 
rates are replaced with real rates. 
 
Reg Results 
Independent Variables Beta (stcoef) R2 Adjusted R2 F for Change 
GDP Growth Rate 0.003 0 -0.17 0.001 
Real Interest Rates  -0.264* 0.07 0.054 4.491* 
Simple Return(ISE100) 0.665** 0.443 0.433 47.462** 
Rm-Rf 0.569** 0.323 0.312 28.666** 
Vol(ISE_100) -0.128 0.016 0 1.004 
Initial Abn Return 0.706** 0.498 0.49 59.591** 
Volexc -0.182 0.033 0.017 2.064 
M/B 0.631** 0.398 0.388 39.66** 
P/E -0.625** 0.391 0.381 38.495** 
Table: Regression Results; variables explaining number of IPOs in 1990-2006 (increased data-previous 
year) 
 
A separate 5-step hierarchical regression analysis was conducted for each 
variable. The order of entry was as follows: 1) Initial Abnormal Return (IAR), 2) Simple 
return 3) M/B Ratio (M/B), 4) P/E Ratio (P/E), 5) Real Interest Rates (RIR). Between 
market return variable only simple return was used, so there was 5-step analysis. 
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  Beta 
(stcoef) 
R2 R2 Change F for Change 
Step 1: Initial Return  .498 .498 59.591** 
Initial Abnormal Return .706**    
Step 2: Market Return  .641 .142 23.372** 
Initial Abnormal Return  .504**    
Simple Return .428**    
Step 3: Market Level  .721 .080 16.702** 
Initial Abnormal Return  .500**    
Simple Return .217**    
M/B Ratio  .354**    
Economic Variable(Real Int Rates )     
Step 4: Market Level  .782 .061 16.001* 
Initial Abnormal Return .359**    
Simple Return .235**    
M/B Ratio  .301**    
P/E Ratio  -.292**    
Step 5: Economic Variable(Real Int Rates)  .795 .013 3.494 
Initial Abnormal Return  .340**    
Simple Return .286**    
M/B Ratio .247**    
P/E Ratio -.281**    
Real Interest Rates -.124    
 
From table above, at first step, IAR explained 49.8% of the variance (F =59.591, 
p < .01) in all regression equations. When market return variable, i.e. simple return was 
entered at step 2, it explained an additional 14.2% variance (F = 23.372, p < .01) and IAR 
was still significant. At step 3, M/B ratio explained additional 8% variance (F = 16.702), 
both initial and return coefficients were still significant, even though, their effects 
decreased. At fourth step, P/E ratio was added to equation; it explained additional 6.1% 
variance (F = 16.001, p < .05).  At fifth step, real interest rates was included in the 
equation, so it was insignificant (F = 3.494, p = .067) at 5% but significant 10% level. 
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Total amount of variance in number of IPOs explained by independent variables reached 
to 79.5%, so it is respectable result. 
When results of increased data with actual and previous year results were 
evaluated, it was seen that initial abnormal return was always significant, previous year 
return predicted coming year’s number of IPOs significantly, but actual year market 
return had no relationship with IPO market, in this parallel, M/B ratio of previous and 
actual year was significant for number of IPOs, P/E ratio was also significant for both but 
negatively related to number of IPOs, real interest rates was significant at 1% level and 
negatively related to number of IPOs for actual year as volatility in ISE and volatility in 
exchange rates, but it was not so significant in previous year effect on coming year IPOs 
analysis, it was significant only at 10% level. 
When increased data was used, initial abnormal return, simple return, P/E ratio, 
M/B ratio and real interest rates of previous year had relationship with number of IPOs. 
R2’s were higher and their coefficients were more significant as targeted by increasing 
data. For actual year increased data, in addition to initial abnormal return, P/E ratio, M/B 
ratio, real interest rates, volatility in stock market and in exchange rates were significantly 
effective in predicting number of IPOs of same year. 
Consequently, market level variables (M/B and P/E) of previous year can predict 
hot issue markets, as well as same year.  Market level and initial return explanations are 
not be repeated as it was mentioned after normal data results. We can only refer to other 
researchers’ findings about windows of opportunity, as Ibbotson and Sindelar (1994) 
stated, or as Ritter (1991) argued that if there are periods in which stocks are mispriced, 
the companies recognizing that other companies in their industry are overvalued, have 
incentive to go public or as Marc, Panetta and Zingales (1998) have signaled that industry 
M/B appears to be the most significant determinant of the probability of listing, or as 
Bayliss and Chaplinsky (1996) said as managers’ private information gives them a 
superior ability to value their firm’s common stock. This information advantage creates 
an adverse selection problem since firms can exploit valuation errors on the part of 
investors. It is also an information asymmetry theory prediction.   
For actual year analysis it was seen that, volatility in stock market volatility in 
exchange rates and real interest rates had negative effects on IPO markets, but they had 
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no effect in coming year, so this result may be interpreted as; these are risk variables 
(until here for real interest rates were evaluated as economic variables but it is also risk 
variable) for general economy or for capital markets, have negative effect in the same 
year. In this way, when risk increase the number of IPOs decrease directly and there is no 
lag in IPO market for these variables. 
According to the results of Boehmer and Ljungqvist (2004), IPO announcements 
were preceded by high stock index returns; it means that firms tend to announce IPO 
plans after increases in the volatility of share prices in their industry. It is not parallel to 
our findings. However, Boehmer and Ljungqvist’s one is an industry analysis. Besides, 
Hyuk, Masulis and Nanda (1993) found that the relative frequency of monthly corporate 
equity to debt offers was positively related to stock price volatility. It is also contrary to 
our argument, but this was ratio analysis, may be debt offer is affected much more 
negatively than equity from stock price volatility, so it doesn’t mean that equity offers are 
positively related.  However, Pastor and Veronesi (2005) found that IPO volume is 
negatively related to changes in market return volatility parallel to our findings. 
Marsh (1982) and Taggart (1977) found significant effect evidence of interest 
rates in IPOs, as reached in this work, especially for same year rates. 
For IPO volume HRA was not conducted because there were only two significant 
relationships between independent variables and IPO volume for both actual and previous 
year analysis. So in total no significant relationships of IPO volume with risk, economic 
and market return variables were maintained, except with simple market return and 
exchange rates volatility. 
By considering the regression results reached above, the previous year variables 
and actual year variables were mixed for being able to maintain single equation. 
According to simple regression analysis; independent variables, which were significantly 
related to number of IPOs in normal data, were chosen. If previous year’s and actual 
year’s variable was significantly related, the more significant would be taken, i.e., for 
example, when both initial abnormal return of previous and actual year were significant 
for actual year IPO, most significant was chosen. 
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For normal data, initial abnormal return, simple return, M/B ratio, real interest 
rates of previous year and P/E ratio of same year were used in predicting the number of 
IPOs. 
 
  Stand. Coefficients F statistic R-Squraed 
Initial Abn Returnx 0.317 
M/B Ratiox 0.208 
Simple Retx 0.402 
Real Int Ratesx -0.201 
P/E Ratio -0.290 
F = 7.134 p < .01 76.40% 
xPrevious Year Values 
** p<.01 and * p<.05 
 
The coefficient of determination was very high and according to F-statistic, it was 
significant at 1% level, however any of coefficients was significant when they were 
added to same regression equation. 
For increased data, initial abnormal return, simple return, M/B ratio and P/E ratio 
of previous year, volatility in ISE, volatility in exchange rates and real interest rates of 
same year were used in predicting the number of IPOs. 
 
  Stand. Coefficients F statistic R-Squraed 
Initial Abn Returnx 0.281** 
M/B Ratiox 0.523** 
Simple Retx 0.142* 
P/E Ratiox -0.089 
Real In Rates -0.436** 
ISE Vol -0.273** 
Volexc -0.393** 
F = 50.405 p < .01 86.70% 
xPrevious Year Values 
** p<.01 and * p<.05 
 
The coefficient of determination was so high and it is significant at 1% level. It 
means these independent variables explained approximately 87% of amount of variance 
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in number of IPO’s variance. Besides, better than normal data, except P/E ratio, all of 
coefficients were significant at 1% level, simple return was significant at 5% level. We 
are not so disappointed with P/E ratio, since it was only variable different than expected, 
with negative coefficient. 
Finally the results above were reached, after conducting very detailed regression 
analysis with normal and increased with bunch of years’ data: 
- Turkish IPO market is positively and significantly related to average 
initial abnormal return of previous year’s IPOs as well as same year’s 
average initial abnormal return. 
- Number of IPOs in ISE in coming year can be predicted from actual 
year’s Market Level indicators, M/B ratio is positively and significantly 
but P/E ratio is significantly but negatively related to number of IPOs. 
Actual year’s market level ratios are also significant for actual year’s 
number of IPOs. 
- Stock market volatility, economic risks such as exchange rates volatility 
or real interest rates changes during the year effects significantly number 
of offerings made in this year.  
- Contrary to very broad belief, there is no significant relationship 
between IPO market in ISE and GDP growth rate according to 
regression analysis, although it seems there is in graphical analysis. 
- The number of IPOs are significantly predicted by previous year’ M/B 
ratio, average initial abnormal return of IPOs and return in ISE-100, 
same year’s volatility in ISE, volatility in exchange rates and real 
interest rates.  
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Conclusion 
 
The firms need some capital for some purposes like growth, financing some 
projects or some other motives. The question is whether this need will be fulfilled by debt 
or equity. This question’s response was investigated by many researchers, especially after 
Franco Modigliani and Merton Miller (M&M) theory in 1958. They had argued that the 
company’s value is independent from its capital structure and added that the company’s 
best capital structure is the one that supports the operations and investments of the 
business. Although M&M theory claims that the capital structure has no effect in firm 
value but financing by debt has tax shield advantage, firms don’t have the ability to be 
financed perpetually by debt, so financing by equity should be used in the some stage of 
firm’s lifecycle in order to fulfill some great projects. Besides becoming public have also 
other advantages for firms. However timing in issuing equity is a crucial decision taken 
by firm in order to accomplish a successful offering. 
In this way, this study mainly focused on financing from equity side, more 
specifically on Initial Public Offerings (IPO) and the periods on which the density of first 
offerings is high. The literature on IPOs offers a wide variety of explanations to justify 
the dramatic swings in the volume of IPOs observed in the market. Many theories predict 
that hot IPO markets are characterized by clusters of firms in particular industries for 
which a technological innovation has occurred, suggesting that hot and cold market IPO 
firms will differ in quality, prospects, or types of business. Others suggest hot market 
IPOs are firms that take the advantage of irrational investors. Some others argue that 
IPOs tend to be increase when markets are in their peaks or after some changes in 
economic and financial indicators, such as market return, volatility, GDP growth and etc. 
The purpose of this study was to explore the economic and financial conditions of 
the periods in which IPOs were more intense in Turkish IPO market, by taking the 
regulations imposed by government and some other important developments which affect 
capital markets.    
IPOs fulfilled in Istanbul Stock Exchange during 16 years, i.e. 1990-2006, have 
been examined within the scope of this study, from the perspective of IPOs timing 
according to some indicators that are supposed to be essential in many conducted 
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researches related with the same subjects in the stock markets from many different 
countries during the period of 1960-2005. 
After exploring some critical anomalies in IPO markets and other researches made 
about IPOs, the Turkish IPO market was analyzed in a detailed manner, by historical, 
graphical, correlation and finally regression analysis. 
During these analyses, number of IPOs and volume were determined as dependent 
variable, whereas GDP growth rate, Interest rates, Return in ISE, Volatility in Return in 
ISE, Initial Return in IPOs, Exchange Rate Volatility, Market to Book Ratio and Price 
Earnings Level of all market were used as independent variables. GDP growth rate, 
Interest Rates were grouped as general economic variables, Volatility indicators were 
named risk variables, M/B and P/E ratios were market level variables and finally Initial 
Return and Return in ISE were taken as Market Return variables. In addition, at the 
beginning of the study, the characteristics of IPOs between 1990 and 2006 were defined 
in a detailed table including issue methods used in IPOs, average free float rate, nominal 
and total volume of IPOs. 
In empirical results part, statistical findings about number and volume of IPOs 
with other variables and some historical developments in Turkish economy and capital 
markets showed that 1997 Asian crisis and especially year 2000 liquidity crisis and year 
2001 devaluation had a huge negative effect of IPOs, as well as in every market. Besides, 
surprisingly, the volume and the number of IPOs do not move in parallel in Turkish IPO 
market. There are some sub-period comovement with M/B ratio, market return and initial 
return with number or volume of IPOs according to the graphs represented. 
CMB’s shift from permission system to registration system, as decreasing the 
possibility to be refused in offering period, amendment of communiqué on Special Cases 
of Public Disclosure which provided more accurate information to potential investors and 
credibility of publicly traded firms, the settlement time lengthening and amendment of 
communiqué on Margin Trading, Shortselling and Lending and Borrowing of Securities 
providing liquidity were important regulations imposed which had positive effect in 
1994-1998 period in which 130 IPOs were realized. 
Finally, according to simple and hierarchical regression analyses conducted with 
normal and increased data, where dependent variables were number of IPOs and IPO 
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volume and independent variables were all indicators defined in all variable groups, the 
results reached were; 
- Turkish IPO market is positively and significantly related to average initial 
abnormal return of previous year’s IPOs as well as that of the same year. 
- Number of IPOs in ISE in the coming year can be predicted from actual year’s 
Market Level indicators. M/B ratio is positively and significantly but P/E ratio is 
significantly but negatively related to the number of IPOs. Actual year’s market level 
ratios are also significant for actual year’s number of IPOs. 
- Stock market volatility, economic risk such as exchange rates volatility or real 
interest rates changes during the year affects significantly the number of offerings made 
in this year.  
- Contrary to a very broad belief, there is no significant relationship between IPO 
market in ISE and GDP growth rate.  
- The number of IPOs are significantly predicted by previous year’ M/B ratio, 
average initial abnormal return of IPOs and return in ISE-100, same year’s volatility in 
ISE, volatility in exchange rates and real interest rates. 
- IPO Volume is only predicted significantly by previous year market return. 
 
Consequently, Turkish stock market deals with more IPOs, when its level is high 
and hot issue markets phenomenon is present with increasing number of IPOs in high 
initial return periods. There is no direct relationship between GDP growth rate and 
number of IPOs, and the exchange rate volatility and increase in real interest rates have 
negative impact in Turkish IPO market. 
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TABLES and GRAPHS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Years 
Number 
of IPOs 
Inv. Trust 
Companies 
Shareholder 
Issue(SI) 
Capital 
Increase(CI) 
Both CI 
and SI 
Gradual 
Foundation 
Nominal 
Volume(TL) 
Nominal 
Volume(USD) 
Total Volume(000 
TL) 
Total 
Volume(USD) 
Average Free 
Float (Inc 
ITC) 
Average Free 
Float (Exc ITC) 
1990            35 0 31 2 0 0 323,375,740 125,135,704.8 2,575,192,303 985,310,871.9 17.95 17.95
1991            23 1 19 3 0 1 308,238,654 77,476,998.2 1,476,792,676 391,627,012.4 30.79 27.97
1992            13 1 9 4 0 0 103,080,975 15,170,720.5 643,718,575 94,423,549.9 18.13 12.98
1993            16 0 12 4 0 0 208,706,000 18,129,634.3 1,784,264,000 152,446,679.0 18.17 18.17
1994            25 1 17 8 0 0 708,742,032 24,418,874.1 7,683,665,012 270,480,024.6 20.28 17.60
1995            29 6 11 13 3 2 1,944,450,000 44,439,629.8 10,698,432,046 246,782,514.6 33.08 17.80
1996            27 7 11 13 3 0 2,984,896,249 34,625,739.2 14,700,795,721 167,921,615.7 28.42 19.98
1997            29 2 5 19 5 0 9,668,869,100 66,090,511.6 63,569,336,920 420,376,565.8 18.81 16.54
1998            20 4 1 13 6 0 16,962,951,000 66,997,728.1 94,318,286,750 383,348,400.8 26.32 19.58
1999            10 7 4 5 1 0 26,812,998,000 82,492,902.3 46,472,932,825 90,722,366.2 38.33 9.44
2000          35 1 5 22 8 0 95,369,545,969 157,537,878.9 1,720,621,999,357 2,806,222,339.0 19.36 18.83
2001             1 0 1 0 0 0 367,500,000 231,099.5 385,875,000 242,654 49.00 49.00
2002            4 1 2 2 0 0 23,102,100,000 17,061,930.5 76,618,450,000 56,467,358.4 25.00 17.00
2003             2 0 0 2 0 0 3,150,000,000 1,957,704.5 18,395,342,500 11,252,272.7 35.12 35.12
2004           12 2 3 3 6 0 158,531,251,991 107,114,362.2 713,936,043,185 482,575,184.7 33.20 26.17
2005         9 4 5 2 2 0 364,818,635,000 268,918,245.3 2,362,053,076,000 1,743,964,255.7 50.74 31.84
2006          14 5 6 4 4 0 280,498,041,000 210,571,351.1 1,238,121,967,990 929,464,657.6 48.78 28.92
1990-1991             29 0.5 25 2.5 0 1 315,807,197.0 101,306,352 2,025,992,489.3 688,468,942.15 24.37 22.96
1991-1992             18 1 14.5 3.5 0 1 205,659,814.5 46,323,859 1,060,255,625.5 243,025,281.14 24.46 20.47
1992-1993             14.5 0.5 10.5 4 0 0 155,893,487.5 16,650,177 1,213,991,287.5 123,435,114.43 18.15 15.57
1993-1994             20.5 0.5 14.5 6 0 0 458,724,016.0 21,274,254 4,733,964,506.0 211,463,351.77 19.22 17.88
1994-1995            27 3.5 14 10.5 1.5 1 1,326,596,016.0 34,429,252 9,191,048,529.0 258,631,269.57 26.68 17.70
1995-1996            28 6.5 11 13 3 1 2,464,673,124.5 39,532,684 12,699,613,883.5 207,352,065.12 30.75 18.89
1996-1997            28 4.5 8 16 4 0 6,326,882,674.5 50,358,125 39,135,066,320.5 294,149,090.75 23.61 18.26
1997-1998            24.5 3 3 16 5.5 0 13,315,910,050.0 66,544,120 78,943,811,835.0 401,862,483.32 22.56 18.06
1998-1999           15 5.5 2.5 9 3.5 0 21,887,974,500.0 74,745,315 70,395,609,787.5 237,035,383.49 32.32 14.51
1999-2000           22.5 4 4.5 13.5 4.5 0 61,091,271,984.5 120,015,391 883,547,466,091.0 1,448,472,352.59 28.85 14.14
2000-2001          18 0.5 3 11 4 0 47,868,522,984.5 78,884,489 860,503,937,178.5 1,403,232,496.75 34.18 33.92
2001-2002            2.5 0.5 1.5 1 0 0 11,734,800,000.0 8,646,515 38,502,162,500.0 28,355,006.46 37.00 33.00
2002-2003          3 0.5 1 2 0 0 13,126,050,000.0 9,509,817 47,506,896,250.0 33,859,815.57 30.06 26.06
2003-2004          7 1 1.5 2.5 3 0 80,840,625,995.5 54,536,033 366,165,692,842.3 246,913,728.69 34.16 30.64
2004-2005             10.5 3 4 2.5 4 0 261,674,943,495.5 188,016,304 1,537,994,559,592.3 1,113,269,720.17 41.97 29.01
2005-2006             11.5 4.5 5.5 3.0 3.0 0 322,658,338,000.0 239,744,798 1,800,087,521,995.0 1,336,714,456.64 49.76 30.38
1990-1992             23.7 0.7 19.7 3.0 0.0 0 244,898,456.3 72,594,474 1,565,234,517.8 490,453,811.40 22.29 19.63
1991-1993             17.3 0.7 13.7 3.7 0.0 0 206,675,209.7 36,925,784 1,301,591,750.3 212,832,413.75 22.36 19.70
1992-1994             18.0 0.7 12.7 5.3 0.0 0 340,176,335.7 19,239,743 3,370,549,195.7 172,450,084.47 18.86 16.25
1993-1995             23.3 2.3 13.3 8.3 1.0 1 953,966,010.7 28,996,046 6,722,120,352.7 223,236,406.04 23.84 17.85
1994-1996             27.0 4.7 13.0 11.3 2.0 1 1,879,362,760.3 34,494,748 11,027,630,926.3 228,394,718.27 27.26 18.46
1995-1997             28.3 5.0 9.0 15.0 3.7 1 4,866,071,783.0 48,385,294 29,656,188,229.0 278,360,232.03 26.77 18.11
1996-1998             25.3 4.3 5.7 15.0 4.7 0 9,872,238,783.0 55,904,660 57,529,473,130.3 323,882,194.10 24.51 18.70
1997-1999            19.7 4.3 3.3 12.3 4.0 0 17,814,939,366.7 71,860,381 68,120,185,498.3 298,149,110.94 27.82 15.19
1998-2000           21.7 4.0 3.3 13.3 5.0 0 46,381,831,656.3 102,342,836 620,471,072,977.3 1,093,431,035.33 28.00 15.95
1999-2001            15.3 2.7 3.3 9.0 3.0 0 40,850,014,656.3 80,087,294 589,160,269,060.7 965,729,119.89 35.57 25.76
2000-2002            13.3 0.7 2.7 8.0 2.7 0 39,613,048,656.3 58,276,970 599,208,774,785.7 954,310,783.98 31.12 28.28
2001-2003             2.3 0.3 1.0 1.3 0.0 0 8,873,200,000.0 6,416,911 31,799,889,166.7 22,654,095.21 36.37 33.71
2002-2004          6.0 1.0 1.7 2.3 2.0 0 61,594,450,663.7 42,044,666 269,649,945,228.2 183,431,605.27 31.11 26.09
2003-2005             7.7 2.0 2.7 2.3 2.7 0 175,499,962,330.3 125,996,771 1,031,461,487,228.2 745,930,571.02 39.68 31.04
2004-2006             11.67 3.67 4.67 3.00 4.00 0 267,949,309,330.3 195,534,653 1,438,037,029,058.2 1,052,001,365.98 44.24 28.98
1990-1993             21.75 0.50 17.75 3.25 0.00 0 235,850,342.3 58,978,264 1,619,991,888.4 405,952,028.29 21.26 19.27
1991-1994             19.25 0.75 14.50 4.75 0.00 0 332,191,915.3 33,799,057 2,897,110,065.8 227,244,316.45 21.84 19.18
1992-1995             20.75 2.00 12.25 7.25 0.75 1 741,244,751.8 25,539,715 5,202,519,908.3 191,033,192.00 22.41 16.64
1993-1996             24.25 3.50 12.75 9.50 1.50 1 1,461,698,570.3 30,403,469 8,716,789,194.8 209,407,708.44 24.99 18.39
1994-1997             27.50 4.00 11.00 13.25 2.75 1 3,826,739,345.3 42,393,689 24,163,057,424.8 276,390,180.16 25.15 17.98
1995-1998             26.25 4.75 7.00 14.50 4.25 1 7,890,291,587.3 53,038,402 45,821,712,859.3 304,607,274.22 26.66 18.48
1996-1999             21.50 5.00 5.25 12.50 3.75 0 14,107,428,587.3 62,551,720 54,765,338,054.0 265,592,237.12 27.97 16.39
1997-2000             23.50 3.50 3.75 14.75 5.00 0 37,203,591,017.3 93,279,755 481,245,638,963.0 925,167,417.96 25.71 16.10
1998-2001             16.50 3.00 2.75 10.00 3.75 0 34,878,248,742.3 76,814,902 465,449,773,483.0 820,133,940.12 33.25 24.21
1999-2002             12.50 2.25 3.00 7.25 2.25 0 36,413,035,992.3 64,330,953 461,024,814,295.5 738,413,679.53 32.92 23.57
2000-2003             10.50 0.50 2.00 6.50 2.00 0 30,497,286,492.3 44,197,153 454,005,416,714.3 718,546,156.16 32.12 29.99
2001-2004            4.75 0.75 1.50 1.75 1.50 0 46,287,712,997.8 31,591,274 202,333,927,671.1 137,634,367.57 35.58 31.82
2002-2005            6.75 1.75 2.50 2.25 2.00 0 137,400,496,747.8 98,763,061 792,750,727,921.1 573,564,767.87 36.01 27.53
2003-2006    2.75         9.25 2.75 3.5 3 0 201,749,481,997.8 147,140,416 1,083,126,607,418.6 791,814,092.66 41.96 30.51
Table 2: IPOs’ Chatactheristics in ISE between 1990-1996 (per year and bunch of year) 
 
 Years 
Number 
of IPOs 
Growth 
Rate 
Total 
Volume(USD) 
Interest 
Rate(12_months;end 
of the previous year 
) 
Simple 
Return(İMKB_100) 
Cum 
Return(İMKB_100) Rm-Rf Vol(İMKB_100) 
İnitial 
Raw 
Return 
İnitial 
Abn 
Return 
Vol_Echange 
Rates(USD/TL) 
M/B 
Ratio 
1990 35     9.4 985,310,871.9 58.83% 46.81% 53.65% -5.18% 3.51% 25.01% 24.21% 0.23% 4,12
1991             23 0.3 391,627,012.4 59.35% 34.03% 45.11% -14.24% 3.60% 5.86% 5.94% 0.94% 4,05
1992             13 6.4 94,423,549.9 72.70% -8.18% -3.15% -75.85% 2.08% 5.71% 4.79% 0.49% 2,59
1993           16 8.1 152,446,679.0 74.24% 414.98% 172.51% 98.27% 2.57% 13.51% 12.84% 0.36% 1,67
1994             25 -6.1 270,480,024.6 74.76% 31.95% 47.13% -27.63% 3.91% 5.00% 5.55% 3.52% 6,78
1995          29 8.0 246,782,514.6 95.56% 47.55% 46.77% -48.79% 2.50% 12.99% 13.49% 0.50% 5,09
1996           27 7.1 167,921,615.7 92.32% 140.79% 92.91% 0.59% 2.00% 7.28% 6.90% 0.35% 3,71
1997          29 8.3 420,376,565.8 93.77% 271.45% 145.97% 52.20% 2.99% 10.41% 11.86% 0.34% 4,52
1998          20 3.9 383,348,400.8 96.56% -22.76% -5.47% -102.03% 4.02% 7.77% 7.82% 0.34% 8,31
1999          10 -6.1 90,722,366.2 95.50% 498.31% 192.95% 97.45% 3.39% 12.21% 9.79% 0.31% 3,21
2000            35 6.3 2,806,222,339.0 46.73% -37.59% -29.37% -76.10% 3.74% 8.24% 8.02% 0.34% 7,70
2001        1 -9.5 242,654 45.64% 47.95% 58.11% 12.47% 3.90% 4.76% 3.89% 3.35% 3,02
2002         4 7.9 56,467,358.4 62.50% -23.81% -17.57% -80.07% 3.00% -3.87% -2.11% 0.93% 3,71
2003         2 5.9 11,252,272.7 48.19% 82.28% 68.15% 19.96% 2.55% 5.25% 5.92% 0.74% 2,01
2004           12 9.9 482,575,184.7 28.59% 36.67% 35.14% 6.55% 1.76% 1.65% 2.34% 0.75% 2,16
2005        9 7.6 1,743,964,255.7 22.06% 63.81% 52.44% 30.38% 1.53% 6.03% 7.19% 0.69% 1,51
2006             14 5.0 929,464,657.6 20.38% 2.77% 6.56% -13.82% 1.93% 6.73% 7.83% 1.04% 2,11
Table 2: The Number and Volume of IPOs and other variables per year 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Years 
Number 
of IPOs 
GDP 
Growth 
Rate Total Volume(USD) 
Interest 
Rate(12_months;end 
of the previous year 
) 
Simple 
Return(İMKB_100) 
Rm-
Rf Vol(İMKB_100) 
İnitial 
Raw 
Return 
İnitial 
Abn 
Return 
Vol_Echange 
Rates(USD/TL) 
M/B 
Ratio 
P/E 
Ratio 
1990-1991            29 4,86 688.468.942,15 0,59 0,40 -0,19 0,035 0,172 0,168 0,007 3,32 19,93  
1991-1992            18 3,38 243.025.281,14 0,66 0,11 -0,55 0,029 0,058 0,055 0,007 2,13 13,64  
1992-1993            15 7,27 123.435.114,43 0,73 1,17 0,44 0,024 0,100 0,092 0,004 4,23 18,57  
1993-1994            21 1,03 211.463.351,77 0,74 1,61 0,86 0,033 0,083 0,084 0,025 5,94 25,29  
1994-1995            27 0,93 258.631.269,57 0,85 0,40 -0,45 0,033 0,093 0,098 0,025 4,40 17,03  
1995-1996            28 7,54 207.352.065,12 0,94 0,88 -0,05 0,023 0,102 0,103 0,005 4,12 10,69  
1996-1997            28 7,71 294.149.090,75 0,93 1,99 1,06 0,026 0,089 0,095 0,003 6,42 18,27  
1997-1998            25 6,07 401.862.483,32 0,95 0,69 -0,26 0,036 0,093 0,102 0,003 5,76 16,61  
1998-1999            15 -1,11 237.035.383,49 0,96 1,15 0,19 0,038 0,092 0,085 0,003 5,45 23,18  
1999-2000            23 0,13 1.448.472.352,59 0,69 0,93 0,24 0,037 0,091 0,084 0,003 5,36 27,17  
2000-2001            18 -1,60 1.403.232.496,75 0,46 -0,04 -0,50 0,039 0,081 0,079 0,024 3,37 62,58  
2001-2002            3 -0,80 28.355.006,46 0,54 0,06 -0,48 0,034 -0,021 -0,009 0,025 2,86 152,13  
2002-2003      3 6,90 33.859.815,57 0,55 0,18 -0,37 0,027 -0,008 0,006 0,008 2,08 105,23  
2003-2004            7 7,88 246.913.728,69 0,38 0,58 0,20 0,022 0,022 0,029 0,007 1,84 14,36  
2004-2005            11 8,75 1.113.269.720,17 0,25 0,50 0,24 0,017 0,035 0,044 0,007 1,81 15,69  
2005-2006            12 6,30 1.336.714.456,64 0,21 0,30 0,09 0,017 0,065 0,076 0,009 2,02 19,90  
1990-1992            24 5,37 490.453.811,40 0,64 0,22 -0,42 0,031 0,185 0,178 0,006 2,77 17,08  
1991-1993            17 4,96 212.832.413,75 0,69 0,85 0,17 0,028 0,116 0,111 0,006 3,68 17,67  
1992-1994            18 2,82 172.450.084,47 0,74 0,84 0,10 0,030 0,143 0,140 0,021 4,51 20,66  
1993-1995            23 3,34 223.236.406,04 0,81 1,16 0,34 0,031 0,175 0,179 0,021 5,19 19,94  
1994-1996        9 0, 3 1 15,40  27 3,00 228.394.718,27 0,87 0,67 -0,20 0,029 0,12 13 0,02 4,44 
1995-1997 3 5 0,156 0,165 0,004 5,51 15,26  28 7,79 278.360.232,0 0,94 1,36 0,42 0,02
1996-1998 25 6,42 323.882.194,10 0,94 0,91 -0,04 0,031 0,117 0,123 0,003 5,35 15,13  
1997-1999 20 2,02 298.149.110,94 0,95 1,58 0,63 0,035 0,118 0,122 0,003 6,41 23,58  
1998-2000 22 1,37 1.093.431.035,33 0,78 0,42 -0,36 0,038 0,189 0,178 0,003 4,64 21,06  
1999-2001 15 -3,09 965.729.119,89 0,61 0,77 0,16 0,037 0,092 0,085 0,020 4,81 54,23  
2000-2002 13 1,58 954.310.783,98 0,51 -0,11 -0,63 0,035 0,077 0,077 0,020 2,91 107,03  
2001-2003 2 1,42 22.654.095,21 0,52 0,27 -0,25 0,031 0,000 0,015 0,021 2,62 106,27  
2002-2004 6 7,90 183.431.605,27 0,46 0,24 -0,22 0,024 0,025 0,053 0,008 1,89 74,88  
2003-2005 8 7,79 745.930.571,02 0,33 0,60 0,27 0,021 0,060 0,075 0,007 1,93 15,30  
2004-2006 12 7,50 1.052.001.365,98 0,24 0,32 0,09 0,018 0,080 0,096 0,008 1,85 17,99  
1990-1993 22 6,07 405.952.028,29 0,66 0,75 0,09 0,030 0,148 0,143 0,006 3,77 19,25  
1991-1994 19 2,20 227.244.316,45 0,70 0,70 0,00 0,031 0,071 0,070 0,019 4,03 19,46  
1992-1995 21 4,10 191.033.192,00 0,79 0,74 -0,05 0,029 0,095 0,096 0,018 4,31 17,80  
 
1993-1996 24 4,28 209.407.708,44 0,84 1,22 0,38 0,028 0,094 0,095 0,018 5,03 17,99  
1994-1997 28 4,32 276.390.180,16 0,89 1,04 0,15 0,029 0,091 0,096 0,018 5,41 17,65  
1995-1998 26 6,80 304.607.274,22 0,95 0,79 -0,16 0,030 0,098 0,103 0,004 4,94 13,65  
1996-1999 22 3,30 265.592.237,12 0,95 1,54 0,59 0,043 0,090 0,091 0,003 5,94 20,73  
1997-2000 24 3,10 925.167.417,96 0,82 0,81 -0,01 0,036 0,092 0,093 0,003 5,56 21,89  
1998-2001 17 -1,36 820.133.940,12 0,69 0,44 -0,26 0,038 0,086 0,082 0,017 4,41 42,88  
1999-2002 13 -0,34 738.413.679,53 0,61 0,43 -0,18 0,035 0,080 0,075 0,018 4,11 89,65  
2000-2003 11 2,65 718.546.156,16 0,51 0,06 -0,44 0,033 0,069 0,069 0,018 2,72 83,91  
2001-2004 5 3,54 137.634.367,57 0,46 0,29 -0,16 0,029 0,010 0,019 0,018 2,35 83,24  
2002-2005 7 7,83 573.564.767,87 0,39 0,33 -0,07 0,038 0,026 0,036 0,008 1,95 60,46  
2003-2006 9 7,09 791.814.092,66 0,29 0,43 0,14 0,020 0,048 0,058 0,008 1,93 17,13  
Table 3: The Number of IPOs and other variables (Bunch of years) 
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Graph 1: Number of IPOs and GDP Growth Rate per Year  
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Graph 2: Percentage Change Rate of Number of IPOs and GDP Growth Rate 
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Graph 3: Relative Values of IPO Total Volume and GDP Growth Rate (Base Year: 1990) 
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Graph 4: GDP Growth Rate and Interest Rates per Year 
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Graph 5: Number of IPOs and Interest Rates per Year 
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Graph 6: Cumulative and Simple Return in İMKB_100 in period 1990-2006 
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Graph 7: Simple Excess Return in İMKB_100 and number of IPOs in period 1990-2006 
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Graph 8: Previous year’s Simple Excess Return in İMKB_100 and number of IPOs in period 1990-2006 
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Graph 9: Previous year’s Simple Excess Return in İMKB_100 and number and volume of IPOs in period 1990-2006 
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Graph 10: M/B Ratio and Number of IPOs in period 1990-2006 
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Graph 11: Previous Year M/B Ratio and Number of IPOs in period 1990-2006 
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Graph 12: Average Raw and Abnormal Initial Return of IPOs in period 1990-2006 
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Graph 13: Average Abnormal Initial Return and IPOs in period 1990-2006 
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Graph 14: Average Abnormal Initial Return of Previous Year and IPOs in period 1990-2006 
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Graph 15: 100 days’ MA of IMKB-100 volatility between 1990 and 2006 
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Graph 16: IMKB-100 volatility and number of IPOs between 1990 and 2006 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Reg Results 
Independent Variables Beta (stcoef) R P2P Adjusted RP2 P F for Change 
GDP Growth Rate -0.157 0.025 -0.04 0.38
Interest Rates(End of Previous Year) 0.614** 0.377 0.335 9.059**
Simple Return(IMKB100) 0.707** 0.5 0.467 14.994**
Rm-Rf 0.656** 0.43 0.392 11.328**
Vol(İMKB_100) -0.123 0.015 -0.051 0.229
İnitial Abn Return 0.62** 0.384 0.343 9.367**
ExcRates_Vol -0.179 0.032 -0.033 0.495
M/B 0.606* 0.367 0.325 8.707*
P/E -0.426 0.181 0.127 3.324
Table 4: Regression Results; variables explaining number of IPOs in 1990-2006 (previous year) 
 
 
Reg Results 
Independent Variables Beta (stcoef) R P2P Adjusted RP2 P F for Change 
GDP Growth Rate 0.267 0.071 0.009 1.151
Interest Rates(End of last Year) -0.457 0.209 0.156 3.964
Simple Return(IMKB100) -0.298 0.089 0.028 1.464
Cum Return(IMKB100) -0.369 0.136 0.078 2.361
Rm-Rf -0.199 0.04 -0.24 0.62
Vol(İMKB_100) 0.09 0.008 -0.058 0.123
İnitial Raw Return 0.149 0.022 -0.043 0.342
İnitial Abn Return 0.183 0.034 -0.031 0.522
ExcRates_Vol -0.222 0.049 -0.014 0.781
M/B -0.215 0.046 -0.018 0.724
P/E -0.246 0.61 -0.002 0.969
Table 5: Regression Results; variables explaining IPO Volume in 1990-2006 
 
 
 
 
 Reg Results 
Independent Variables Beta (stcoef) R P2P Adjusted RP2 P F for Change 
GDP Growth Rate -0.185 0.034 -0.03 0.532
Interest Rates(End of Previous Year) 0.003 0 -0.067 0
Simple Return(IMKB100) 0.572* 0.327 0.282 7.288*
Rm-Rf 0.601* 0.361 0.318 8.472*
Vol(İMKB_100) -0.3409 0.122 0.063 2.075
İnitial Abn Return 0.183 0.34 -0.31 0.522
ExcRates_Vol -0.154 0.024 -0.041 0.364
M/B 0.278 0.077 0.016 1.254
P/E -0.167 0.028 -0.037 0.432
Table 6: Regression Results; variables explaining IPO Volume in 1990-2006(Previous Year) 
 
